Date of Creation

5-19-2026

Degree Type

Thesis

Department

Political Science

First Advisor

Gregory Burnep

Abstract

Congress and presidents have clashed over yearly funding awarded to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) throughout the existence of the government agency. Although presidents have routinely requested funding cuts in their annual budget proposals, Congress has steadily increased the amount of congressionally directed funding NIH receives yearly. Outlined in the Constitution, Congress holds the “power of the purse”; therefore, the legislative body provides federal funding for NIH and other executive departments.1 However, presidents have repeatedly attempted to rescind funds to NIH without congressional approval through impoundment. President Donald Trump was the most recent U.S. president to do so. His actions challenged the existing Impoundment Control Act and called into question the extent in which a president can exert their political agenda.

In this paper, I will examine the ways in which the Trump administration’s strategy of impounding NIH research funding was historically unprecedented under the modern budget framework established by the Impoundment Control Act. More specifically, I will evaluate the differences in the strategy of impounding NIH funding between President Donald Trump and President Ronald Reagan, who similarly attempted to withhold appropriated funds directed to NIH. I will conclude that President Trump utilized unilateral authority in an unprecedented display of executive power to impound NIH funds. A lack of checks and balances toward the President’s actions has contributed to the facilitation and expansion of his executive power.

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