College Honors Program

Respecting a Person’s Dignity: Kantian Approaches to Morality

Date of Creation

5-31-2023

Document Type

Campus Access Only

Department

Philosophy

First Advisor

Karsten Stueber

Abstract

The central ethical concept of dignity, and the respect of it, is inherently connected to the evolution of human rights. Why do we have certain inalienable rights? Why do we have human rights doctrine? The notions of human rights are all grounded in something we call dignity. The notion that human dignity is inalienable stems from Enlightenment and philosophical ideals that influenced the human rights doctrine of modern nations. The question of the derivation of morality is heavily debated in philosophy as it has many social and judicial repercussions. Moral norms and legal questions often rely heavily on concepts of dignity, however dignity itself as a concept was not always seen as innately part of human nature. Through a historical analysis of dignity in moral versus social conceptions, there is a direct correlation between Kant’s possession of dignity in the moral sense demands certain normative behaviors to us and others. This correlation is seminal to the development of human rights doctrine in reflecting the respect of dignity. In the era of Enlightenment thinking, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Critique of Practical Reason (1788) offer insight as to why Kant believes that the dignity of humanity is intrinsic and should be upheld by the supreme moral principle Categorical Imperative. Through an analysis of Kant's idea of human dignity, which requires fundamental respect for persons, this paper will describe and extend the nature of Immanuel Kant’s idea of human dignity.

Comments

Reader: Predrag Cicovacki

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