An Experimental Test of a Predator-Prey Model of Conflict
Date of This Version
appropriation, property rights, Predator-Prey game, conflict
Grossman and Kim's (1996) predator-prey model predicts as the effectiveness of offense against defense increases, the equilibrium level of appropriation will vary from zero to full to partial predation. We test the prediction using a repeated single-play protocol with eight decision periods. The data show a clear and substantial convergence to subgame perfect outcomes, with most movement occurring in the first several periods. The results suggest that standard game-theoretic principles may be particularly appropriate to the study of conflict.
Working Paper Number
Anderton, Charles and Carter, John, "An Experimental Test of a Predator-Prey Model of Conflict" (1997). Economics Department Working Papers. Paper 135.
This article was published as: Anderton, C., Carter, J. (2001). An Experimental Test of a Predator-Prey Model of Conflict. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45(1), pp.83-97.
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