An Experimental Test of a Predator-Prey Model of Conflict

Document Type

Working Paper

Date of This Version

1-1-1997

Keywords

appropriation, property rights, Predator-Prey game, conflict

Abstract

Grossman and Kim's (1996) predator-prey model predicts as the effectiveness of offense against defense increases, the equilibrium level of appropriation will vary from zero to full to partial predation. We test the prediction using a repeated single-play protocol with eight decision periods. The data show a clear and substantial convergence to subgame perfect outcomes, with most movement occurring in the first several periods. The results suggest that standard game-theoretic principles may be particularly appropriate to the study of conflict.

Working Paper Number

9603

Fulltext URL for Link

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00165-7

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