

APPENDIX TWO. Two External Models for Philip II

One might conceivably argue that Philip's views on sovereignty and coinage could have been shaped by familiarity with the practices of other sovereigns. The question is whether Philip's knowledge of such external models could have induced him to think about sovereignty and coinage along the lines commonly assumed for ancient kings by modern scholars. Dietmar Kienast, for example, has argued that Philip's rule as a Macedonian king was influenced by the practices of Persian kingship in both foreign and domestic policy. Kienast points to Philip's treatment of Thrace as a prime example of this phenomenon: the region had been under Persian control before it was joined to Macedonia.¹ E. A. Fredricksmeyer has recently argued that Philip aimed at absolute monarchy in the style of the Persian king.² In reality it is very difficult to say what influences worked on Philip as he met the changing challenges of ruling his kingdom, and how important any external models were. Common sense, ambition, and the limits imposed by the traditions of the Macedonian nobility were the principal influences on Philip as king. If he did pay any attention to Persian arrangements for coinage, he could not have reached the conclusion from this model that as a king he should suppress local coinage. Coinage in Persia owed its start to a king, the innovative Darius, but as we saw in the discussion of Ellis' theory on suppression as a policy of Alexander in chapter 5, the Great King did not enforce a monopoly

¹ *Philipp II von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden* (Munich, 1973, *Abhandlungen der Marburger Gelehrten Gesellschaft* 6), p. 249.

² "On the Final Aims of Philip II," in *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, ed. W. L. Adams and E. N. Borza (Lanham, Md., 1982), pp. 85-98.

on the right of coinage in his domain. There was no precedent to be found in the Persian model for Philip to insist on a royal monopoly of the right of coinage or a uniform monetary circulation.

A second external model to be considered is that of Boeotia. Since Philip was held hostage for a time at Thebes as a young man and was later involved in Boeotian affairs, it is obvious that he had the opportunity to learn about the policy on coinage which Thebes enforced as the *hegemon* of the Boeotian League. Could he have found in Theban practice an inspiration for a policy of the suppression of local coinage by a powerful *hegemon*?

The earliest coin with a Boeotian type (the famous shield) on the obverse is marked with the letter chi, has a type of Chalcis on the reverse, and is on the Euboic standard. A reasonable guess is that this odd coin was part of an issue produced at Chalcis in the later sixth century to finance some joint enterprise undertaken by the Chalcidians and the Boeotians.³ The first coins from Boeotia proper were issued in the last years of the sixth century by three mints and have the same types. Initials identify Tanagra and Haliartus as two of the mints. The coins without any inscription are assumed to have been produced at Thebes. By *ca.* 500 B.C., seven different cities are issuing coins with the same types, all seven issues identified by the initial of the particular mint on the reverse. Orchomenus at the same time issued a fractional coinage with different types. These coinages appear to dwindle away after the Persian Wars, perhaps because they had been produced as a response to the financial demands of the war years. In the second quarter of the fifth century, Tanagra may have tried to issue a coinage purporting to be a federal issue, but the chronology of these coins is very uncertain.⁴ The point to notice here is that coinage in Boeotia from the earliest times was usually a cooperative effort among various cities. There was no strong tradition of individual civic coinages issued in complete independence of the other cities in Boeotia.

³ Kraay, *ACGC*, pp. 108–111.

⁴ See B. H. Fowler, "Thucydides I.107–108 and the Tanagran Federal Issues," *Phoenix* 11 (1957), pp. 164–170; R. J. Buck, *A History of Boeotia* (Edmonton, Alberta, 1979), pp. 141–142.

Since the Boeotian League was in existence already in the sixth century, it is obvious that the cities of the region had decided early, no doubt under the dominant influence of Thebes, that their situation called for cooperation.⁵ The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* confirms the tradition of the Boeotian confederacy that "in all matters, financial, legal and others, the members shared in proportion to their provision of federal officers and military contingents."⁶

This tradition probably explains the "revival of civic issues" at Acraephia, Coronea, Haliartus, Tanagra, and Thebes which is postulated for the period *ca.* 456–447 B.C. when the Athenians controlled most of Boeotia after a defeat of League forces under the leadership of Thebes. These issues have the usual shield on the obverse and individual reverse types with identifying initials. Since Tanagra and Thebes certainly, and Coronea probably, were Athenian opponents in this period, these issues were likely produced in cooperation to finance military resistance either before the defeat in 456 or before the victory in 447. The Boeotian victory at Coronea in 447 forced the Athenians to evacuate Boeotia and allowed the cities to regain their autonomy.⁷ The state of Boeotian coinage after 446 is an unresolved mystery. Kraay in his handbook assumes that the series with shield on the obverse and Theban types and inscription on the reverse begins by the third quarter of the century. J.A.O. Larsen, on the other hand, points out that Orchomenus, not Thebes, dominated the Boeotian League until 426 and puts the start of the series after that date.⁸ The hoards do not help us to decide which opinion, if

⁵ Cf. Buck, *History of Boeotia*, p. 112. For a discussion of Boeotian coinage in this period as a political phenomenon, see Jean Ducat, "La confédération béotienne et l'expansion thébaine à l'époque archaïque," *BCH* 97 (1973), pp. 61–62, 71–72.

⁶ In the London papyrus, section XVI (XI), 4 (Bartoletti): τῶν κοινῶν ἀπέλαυνον. For the quotation, see I.A.F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge, 1967), p. 163.

⁷ Thucydides (1.113.4) and Diodorus (12.6.2) are explicit on this point: the Boeotians were "autonomous" again.

⁸ *ACGC*, p. 111; *GFS*, p. 37.

either, is correct.⁹ But the striking thing is that there are no "civic issues" known which can fit into the period of autonomy after 446 when Orchomenus and its friends led Boeotia. If coins were truly badges of autonomy, the Orchomenians should have produced some while free of Theban control.

The issues just mentioned with particularly Theban types on the reverse, which are assumed to end with the King's Peace in 386, do not represent a radical break with earlier Boeotian tradition on coinage. That is, coins are produced for a confederacy with the Boeotian shield on the obverse and local identification on the reverse, presumably financed by the contributions of various Boeotian cities and intended to pay joint expenses. One city or the other may dominate the confederacy, Thebes more often than not, but the principle remains the same.¹⁰

It makes sense to suppose that the cities in Boeotia found it convenient for various practical reasons to forego individual civic coinages in favor of a confederate production. Most cities in Boeotia were small, and the establishment of a mint would have meant an initial capital outlay that was unnecessary. Much more important, a confederate coinage, produced either at one central mint or at several locations, simplified the regularization of contributions toward paying for a confederate military force and ruled out disputes among the troops over whose pay was issued in more valuable or less valuable currency. Finally, a confederate coinage did give a powerful *hegemon* the opportunity to exploit the financial resources of subordinates. If Thebes or any other city in Boeotia could require other cities to send in funds to be made into a coinage to serve, as the leader would say, "the needs of all," so much the better for the dominant city. It could control the funds to its own financial advantage. That was a gain

⁹ The chronological conclusions drawn by Kraay (*ACGC*, p. 111) on the basis of *IGCH 42* are not reliable because O. Picard, *Chalcis et la confédération eubéenne: étude de numismatique et d'histoire (IV^e-I^{er} siècle)* (Athens, 1979), p. 167, has lowered its date from ca. 400 B.C. to ca. 350 on the strength of information supplied by Herbert Cahn.

¹⁰ The two fourth-century issues from Boeotia marked with personal names and the legend "of the Boeotians" respectively, Kraay's series I(c) and II, are discussed in section 1 of chapter 8.

to expect from the fact of exercising domination; it was not a demonstration of a theoretical connection between sovereignty and coinage. The model provided by the situation in Boeotia was not going to influence Philip to suppress Greek coinages in the interest of such a notion.