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Opportunity Calls: The Moral Economy During Existential Economic Transition in the Ural Mountains and Appalachia, 1991 - 2008

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Nora Springer '20

The frenzied sale of vouchers on street corners, the constantly fluctuating prices on essentials like bread, the intimate fear of growing lawlessness – it is difficult to imagine the panic of Moscow in the late 1990s. The entire country was up for grabs in the world's largest fire sale. After the defeat of communist Gennady Zyuganov by Boris Yeltsin in 1996, it was clear that Russia was set on an irreversible course to capitalism. However, in order to achieve a capitalist economy, the entire nation of Russia needed to privatize. While small business had been allowed to prosper under Gorbachev, every meaningful industry and corporation was still nationalized at the time of Russian privatization in the late 1990s.

Even minor property considered "personal" in most capitalist societies now needed to officially be recognized as such. This personal privatization was extremely dangerous. In 2000, the Moscow militia had compiled a 3,000-name file of elderly people who had gone missing within a month of privatizing their apartments.[1] When it came to the privatization of massive oil, telecommunications, construction, and other essential corporations, the scale of corruption, intimidation, and fraud employed to make money was staggering. While it may be initially assumed that members of the Soviet criminal class became this new capitalist Mafiosos, the evidence does not show this to be true. Black marketeers did not expand in the new economy, but remained in a small-scale underground economy. Disturbingly, it was young members of the Komosol, formerly upstanding citizens like Mikhail Khordokovsky, who proved the most brutal and most cunning in the race to make money from the new capitalism.[2]

To make matters even worse, this sale was happening at a real discount. The severe undervaluing of Russian assets exacerbated the disruption of Russian society caused by transition. In 1996, the entire Russian economy was valued at ten billion U.S. dollars.[3] This figure included 6% of the world's total oil wells, expansive industrial infrastructure, and 15% of the world's wheat exports.[4] One American hedge fund manager reported making 1,500% returns for his investors in only four years from 1996 to 2000, despite the collapse of the ruble in 1998. None of these particular investors were Russians or even Eastern Europeans. Instead, this hedge fund represented a coalition of powerful Western billionaires.[5]

Meanwhile, in Appalachia, steel mills and coal mines were shuttering by the day. After a steady period of decline during the 1980s, the introduction of subsidized Chinese steel to the American market meant that production costs in American manufacturing were simply too high to be sustainable.[6] Unlike in Russia, the beginning of this transition was not any America's idea of liberalism – the air in Appalachia was tinged with mourning, the loss of a lifestyle, the closing of the only good jobs the region had ever known.[7] Over time, however, new hope began to emerge in the region. Transition, like in the

Urals, became characterized as an opportunity – a chance for a brighter future in the historically disenfranchised mountains.

In both Appalachia and Russia, decision makers prioritized certain goals and data metrics over others, often painting an incomplete portrait of economic transition, and, in some cases, causing serious harm. During the transition of Russia to capitalism, the goals of privatization began with optimistic fervor as a democratic spirit swept the country. Over time, however, the goals of privatization shifted to practicality, especially protecting and encouraging the interests of Western investors. In Appalachia, economic transition began as a matter of practicality: steel and coal companies were leaving for cheaper labor in China. However, transition came to be viewed as an opportunity to integrate working class Appalachians into the professional knowledge economy. In the Urals and Appalachia, the privileging of different forms of data served as metrics for the accomplishment of different goals. In both transitions, one word keeps coming up: opportunity. As Russia privatized and Appalachia professionalized, practical business interests interacted with political optimism in dynamic and constantly renegotiated ways. In this paper, I will analyze the rhetoric of transition delivered by decision makers in two major sections. In the first, I will analyze the goals of economic transition in both Russia and Appalachia. Here, the question of economic opportunity will be considered as both an opportunity to liberalize and improve society, and an opportunity to generate profit for businesses and investors.

I. Good Work: The Transition to Capitalism in Russia and the Moral Economy

After the collapse of communism in Russia, the goal for the Yelstin government may seem obvious: transition to capitalism. This goal was not, however, as straightforward as it appears at first glance. For a country that had spent seven decades under a communist system, everything was in question. *How* would the country transition to capitalism? How would the country know when it had achieved "capitalism"? What did Russian capitalism even mean? Would Russian capitalism look like the one in the United States, or maybe more Scandinavian, or possibly an entirely new invention? As reformist spirit swept Russia, and Westerners excited for a new, potentially democratic nation, debate over what it meant to be "capitalist" and how "capitalism" would be measured, raged on, with different actors presenting and advocating for different ideas of success.

Nearly all of these actors placed success within the context of a moral or just economy, and especially an economy that was productive in creating a better culture. Ideas of moral economy can be traced to the eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers, Adam Smith and David Hume, who had envisioned a "civil society," including business and economic sectors that would help raise peasants from feudalism.[8] Moral economy has since been interpreted in both descriptive and prescriptive ways. Some scholars argue that the moral economy, or the idea that economies also push society forward, is a natural function of economic life, while others argue that it is not always but *should* be a function of economic life.[9] Irrespective of whether the moral economy is generally prescriptive or descriptive, during Russian privatization, ideas of the moral economy were both inescapable and taken for granted.

To many economists, especially in the early years of Russian transition, privatization was not considered an end in and of itself. Instead, depoliticization of the economy was taken to be the ultimate goal of privatization. Economists under this paradigm especially focused on the need to cut production costs, break up the consolidation of managerial power by former Komosol members, and reduce subsidies to incentivize restructuring.[10] It was assumed that the removal of politics from business would essentially lead to the creation of a more democratic, freer, and more transparent state. The International Monetary Fund in particular encouraged depoliticization measures, differentiated from and above privatization efforts.[11]

However, nowhere is this principle of moral economy seen more starkly than in the writings of Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais. Gaidar was a 35-year-old theorist only beginning to make a name for himself by publishing papers on potential avenues for Russian reform when Yeltsin shockingly appointed him, and then kept promoting him to important advisory roles.[12] Chubais was an economist who had convened a study group in Leningrad of the like-minded liberal capitalist reformers, and had been poached by Gaidar for his radical ideas. As ideas of privatization developed into rapid economic change, members of the Leningrad group moved from an advisory capacity to increasingly political and policy-oriented roles. However, the informal Leningrad group was made up of bright young students running econometric models of micro-sized Gorbachev small business economies, not policy experts prepared to construct an entirely new economic system for one of the world's largest countries.[13] The harshest critics of the Leningrad group focus on their elite disconnect from the conditions faced by ordinary people. Marshall Goodman argued that the Gaidar reforms were, "little more than classroom exercises. It came as no surprise, therefore, when they resulted in widespread economic hardship."[14] Aleksandr Rutskoi, Yeltsin's vice president, similarly referred to the group as "urchins in pink shorts and yellow sneakers."[15] Whether or not the Leningrad group were schoolboys playing at power, they certainly imagined themselves as great, moral reformers of a corrupt political system and defunct culture.

Gaidar and Chubais co-authored the pamphlet *Crossroads in Modern Russian History* consistently appealing to ideas of moral economy, especially opposing oligarchic control in favor of more liberal, democratic policies. They make these arguments even though they came from ostensibly the technical discipline of mathematical economics, not anthropology or political science, which are normally associated with issues of moral political economy. In *Crossroads*, they argued especially using the Svyazinvest case. An auction was held to privatize Svyazinvest, Russia's largest telecommunications company. As Chubais and Gaidar describe it:

> The argument was simple: would the company go to the higher bidder at an honest auction, or to its owner 'by the unspoken rules?' The position of the reform wing of the government

> (primarily Anatoly Chubais, Boris Nemtsov, and Oleg Sysuev) was unilateral: the privatization of Svyazinvest had to guarantee the separation of business from government and the formation of a system in which the rules of the game are the same for everyone. The position of an influential part of the oligarchs was different: this was a change in the rules of the game that they did not accept.[16]

Gaidar and Chubais describe their economic decisions using moral terms. They continued to argue that the Svyazinvest case applied more generally to the goals of economic transition in Russia, claiming:

> This proved that our [Russian] government could guarantee equal conditions for opposing business groups, not be the agent of any one group, and stand above when necessary. The clash of the government and the oligarchs in 1997 remains one of the first successful attempts at changing the character of Russian capitalism by separating government from property.[17]

Gaidar and Cubais support the IMF in moralizing depoliticization measures. Later, they go on to say they regret that the "nascent middle class suffered the most from the [1998 Ruble collapse] crisis."[18] In their writings, the two men seem in touch with the needs of ordinary families and sensitive to the particular damages caused by rapid economic change.

In their description of battling the oligarchs, Chubais and Gaidar appeal to ideals of fairness, cultural reform, and impartiality. The two economic theorists, described most derisively as essentially out of touch math nerds, were actually deeply invested in the impact of the economy on morality, culture, and Russian identity. During the crisis that rapid economic transition became in Russia, traditional disciplinary roles did not hold up. Academics learned in abstract mathematical economics could, in only a short number of years, become politicians now equally bent wielding the economy as a moral tool.

II. Investment or Encroachment: The View of Western Financers in Moscow

Perhaps the most notorious of Westerners in Moscow is New York Times bestselling author and hedge fund manager Bill Browder. His book *Red Notice* swept American bookstores, promising to tell the story of the sole, brave American who stood strong against oppressive Russian oligarchs. By Browder's account, he alone defended the country from the tyranny of Vladimir Putin's cronies (all while making millions and marrying a "slender Russian vixen").[19] To Browder, the goal of transitioning Russia to capitalism was to inculcate a culture of hard work and democratic agency. He argues:

> Seventy years of communism had destroyed the work ethic of an entire nation. Millions of Russians had been sent to the gulags for showing the slightest hint of personal initiative. The Soviets severely penalized independent thinkers, so the natural self-preservation reaction was to do as little as possible and hope that nobody would notice you. This had been fed into the

> psyches of ordinary Russians from the moment they were on their mothers' breasts. To run a Western-style business, therefore, you either had to completely brainwash a fresh young Russian about the virtues of efficiency and clear thinking or find some miraculous person whose natural psychology had somehow defied the pressures of communism.[20]

Browder presented a popularized and updated version of an old Cold War idea – that capitalism will naturally create more democratic, healthier cultural value systems for the oppressed and repressed Russian people. It is unclear how much Browder actually knew about Russian culture. Despite ten years in Russia, he did speak even basic Russian and required the constant use of a translator.[21] In the entire length of his monograph, he rarely referred to Russian culture, government, or values in positive terms.

Browder framed the need to make Russians harder working and more democratic not as a benefit to ordinary Russian people, but primarily as a benefit to Western investors. In his book, significant attention is paid to the need for a rule of law in Russia. He describes a scandal when the Russian oligarch Potanin doubled the available shares of his oil company, Sidanco, accessible to anybody except for Browder's fund, Hermitage Investments. Hermitage had invested heavily in Sidanco in the past. This prohibition meant that Browder's investment in Sidanco was cut into half overnight. Browder claims that the reason for this move by Potanin was "that a group of unconnected *foreigners* also had a big financial success [in Russian privatization] was unbearable to them. This was simply not supposed to happen. It was not ... *Russian*."[22] He then goes on to criticize at length the difficulties with establishing respect for the law and proper bureaucratic channels in post-communist Russia, usually framing the problem in the context of the victimization of foreigners by the Russian oligarchs and political leaders. To him, the primary goals of transition were establishing rule of law, inculcating capitalist values, reducing investment risk, and reigning in the influence of oligarchs. All of these goals were geared to the benefit of Western investors.[23]

Red Notice was written for a popular audience, and it reads like a James Bond novel. The Russians are overwhelming the villains, and Browder positions himself as an American hero. He consistently contrasts himself with the emerging oligarch class, although it is not clear how he, a man who made millions essentially acting as a vulture on undervalued assets, is meaningfully more ethical in practice. Despite the book's shocking shortcomings, Browder helped to define American attitudes towards the moral economy in Russia. It is telling that Browder sees profit making in Russia, and especially profit making for Westerners in Russia, as a moral enterprise. Browder is exemplary of a particular class of American investors who helped to define both the usefulness of the Russian economy *both* for societal betterment *and* for money making. To Browder, the moral and the profitable economy are not two separate ideas.

The idea that Russian privatization and capitalism should be primarily about attracting Western advisors is given much more serious treatment by other writers too. In a comprehensive series of papers published in the *International Trade and Business Law Review* that focused on the opportunities provided by the privatizing oil industry, the purpose of privatization is again assumed to be the financial gain for Western investors. The report identifies the main barrier to Western investment and developing full "Russian capitalism" in the energy industry resulting from the undue power given to politicians, and especially their personal connections with oligarchs that often exclude foreigners.[24] The report identifies specific policy changes that would allow for more Western investment in the energy sector, especially focused on minimizing risk caused by volatile political conditions. The first and most important recommendation is to limit the ability of Russian politicians to indirectly expropriate energy companies. Although direct expropriation was made illegal without adequate compensation and due cause, local governments developed a system where the state crept into ownership through stringent regulations on foreign wealth investment. The report argues for a law forcing local governments to compensate for reductions in property value.[25] The second recommendation is that tax laws be reformed to stop the double taxation, both local and federal, that most energy companies are subject to as a result of the specific historical circumstances of energy nationalization during the early Soviet period.[26] Together, this report, as does Browder's book, reflected the attitude that encouraging Western investment was part and parcel of a moral economy.

III. Silicon Holler: Unintended Consequences of Appalachia's Tech Economy

After the complete collapse of the steel industry, Appalachia seemed poised to become the new future of tech. Throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, the relatively low cost of land, beautiful scenery, and expansive area attracted the attention of multinational technology companies. It seemed that investment from companies like Amazon, Google, and Microsoft could replace U.S. Steel, Bethlehem Corporation, and Black Mountain Coal Company. Still, at the beginning of the high-tech experiment in 1998, prospects for the Appalachian tech industry were, realistically, dismal. There was a lack of both infrastructure and workers with an adequate knowledge base. As seen in the below graph, both technology jobs and commensurate pay was lagging far behind the national average.

Table 1

Technology industry employment and wages, 1989, 1998

United States*	Employment				Payroll		
Sectors	1989 (000's)	1998 (000's)	% private sector '98	% Change '89-'98	1998 (Mil $)	% private sector '98	Average wage $
Very tech-intensive	4,105	4,687	4.5	14.2	268,592	8.1	57,311
Moderately tech-intensive	6,638	7,575	7.3	14.1	286,022	8.6	37,757
Somewhat tech-intensive	2,484	2,497	2.4	0.5	102,387	3.1	41,001
All tech sectors	13,226	14,759	14.2	11.6	657,001	19.8	44,515
Total private sector	96,029	104,258	100.0	8.6	3,310,187	100.0	31,750

Appalachia	Employment				Payroll		
Sectors	1989 (000's)	1998 (000's)	% private sector '98	% Change '89-'98	1998 (Mil $)	% private sector '98	Average wage $
Very tech-intensive	190	206	2.4	8.4	8,995	4.1	43,628
Moderately tech-intensive	525	614	7.3	17.0	19,761	9.0	32,164
Somewhat tech-intensive	243	246	2.9	0.9	8,777	4.0	35,738
All tech sectors	959	1,066	12.6	11.2	37,534	17.1	35,204
Total private sector	7,292	8,443	100.0	15.8	219,867	100.0	26,041

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, ES-202 files. *U.S. figures exclude Alaska, Hawaii, and Wyoming. Appalachia includes only the 406-county ARC region.

Fig. 1[27]

Tech publications were nevertheless excited about the potential in Appalachia. One *Wired* article began with an optimistic sentence: "Scranton, Pennsylvania sits at the crossroads of the technology revolution."[28] Technology in Appalachia seemed promising, and mutually beneficial for companies who could access huge amounts of otherwise unused land at low cost and to transition the region into the white-collar knowledge economy. A readymade work force however was not available in Appalachia. Jim Cummings, the director of the Greater Scranton Chamber of Commerce, interviewed in the same *Wired* article, outlined his city's plan to attract more tech investment. He stated that many Appalachians "are unprepared for work in the technology sector, forcing companies to bring mostly jobs requiring low skill levels to these rural communities."[29] To Cummings, the problem is essentially cultural. Appalachians had been insulated from the norms of white-collar professional employment from a century of predominantly blue-collar work. By providing training in low skills, menial jobs like call centers; the plan was that Appalachia would eventually accrue a critical mass of able white-collar workers, thereby attracting better jobs in the tech sector. Interestingly, Cummings main worry was not whether companies would actually follow through with higher paid work. Instead, he expressed concern about the well-documented Appalachian brain drain. To him, the biggest obstacle facing the region was young people moving far away for better prospects.[30]

Jim Cumming's vision for the tech industry as a civilizing force replacing blue collar work was not a vernacular idea relegated to his small city. Instead, he echoed much of what mainstream America thought of Appalachia. One grant writer, who oversaw projects to encourage tech investment through the charitable Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation, called the collapse of manufacturing "a terrifying liberation." BitSource, a startup operating in Pikesville, Kentucky, reported that they put a great deal of effort into having mine workers become professional office employees. Rusty Justice, a BitSource founder, said that he held frequent "reimagination trainings" where he told workers "quit thinking of yourselves as unemployed coal workers, you're technology workers."[31] BitSource remains today a functioning Pikesville company focused especially on employing and giving professional training to former coal workers, prioritizing those suffering from black lung.[32]

The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) was also part of this dialogue. ARC essentially functions as an organization that both determines the boundaries of a moral economy in Appalachia and helps investors determine what will make a profit in Appalachia. Established as part of the War on Poverty in 1965, ARC both assists with the economy's effect on society and provides mathematical insights into Appalachian investment.[33] Its mission statement is to "innovate, partner, and invest to build community capacity and economic growth in Appalachia."[34] The federal organization claims to service three populations: the Appalachian people (and especially the poorest among them), "the American taxpayer" (who, interestingly, is never imagined as an Appalachian), and any businesses willing to invest in Appalachia.[35] The organization thus exists as neither purely interested in business profit, nor purely interested in bettering economic life and society, but exists in some negotiated cooperation between the two.

ARC's involvement in the burgeoning Appalachian tech industry was thus extensive. In promotional material, ARC dramatically emphasized that tech companies involved in Appalachia were "angel" investors. The implication was that they were willing to risk enormous sums of money on difficult projects, and working in the interest of social good.[36] The organization also lobbied for subsidies to tech companies willing to invest in the region under the logic of professionalizing the workforce, which passed through state legislatures.[37] ARC established funds, hosted conferences, ran technology education workshops for education professionals, and published case studies and reports on how to run a successful Appalachian tech company.[38] Between advocacy and subsidies, ARC helped to define not only what the new Appalachian economy *should* look like, but also what *would* make money in the new Appalachian economy.

Investment in the technology sector after the collapse of manufacturing is, truly, an example of best intentions. In local op-eds and newspapers across the region, Appalachians expressed excitement and optimism for a new tech future.[39] People signed up for the educational programs in droves, including especially workshops on coding in Kentucky.[40] The plan for attracting higher paid and higher skilled jobs by cultivating a culture of white-collar professionalism was eminently reasonable. It was not, however, successful. The tech companies did not come through with better work. Today, by some metrics, West Virginia especially seems to be a booming tech center. The technology sector comprises $2.5 billion of the state's economy. Tech employment stands at 31,473.[41] However, 62% of these employees work in call centers. According to the West Virginia Bureau of Labor Statistics, call center employees make an average of $25,020 a year. The average salary in West Virginia as a whole is $43,469 a year.[42] As will be explored more deeply in section two, the data considered acceptable to use in determining whether or not West Virginia has a "tech economy" reveals a great deal about the goals of the West Virginia tech economy. In the end, tech in Appalachia served to employ at shockingly low wages unskilled workers in highly isolated regions. Not to educate Appalachians as software engineers and office managers.

In both the Appalachia and Ural Mountains region of Russia, although in somewhat different ways, the goals of economic transition were characterized as an opportunity and cast in moral terms. At first, the Appalachian economic transition was viewed as a matter of pragmatic economic necessity. Increased production costs and the influx of cheap Chinese steel meant that Appalachia simply *must* transition from an industrial economy.[43] However, over time, the transition began to be viewed as an opportunity, and by the early 2000s it constituted essentially a civilizing mission. Community leaders argued that through the reduction of blue-collar jobs, Appalachia could develop a robust professional culture, eventually leading to better and higher paid employment opportunities. Tech companies were encouraged with tax breaks and positive press.[44] However, on the ground, these opportunities failed to manifest. Working class Appalachians continued to be funneled into low-wage, low-skill work, albeit in an office setting. Tech companies were able to gain impressive access to a vulnerable working class population by marketing ideas about the economy as a tool for just society.

The Ural Mountains region and Russia as a whole underwent a similar process. Although initially viewed as an enormous opportunity and civilizing, democracy-promoting mission, transition to capitalism over time began to be viewed in more pragmatic terms. As in Appalachia, "opportunity" had a twofold meaning. The opportunity to make society better, and the opportunity to make a whole lot of money. The goals of transition were increasingly cast as an opportunity for Western advisors to generate enormous profit instead of an opportunity for Russian society to liberalize. Still, Western advisors enjoyed moral legitimacy, were protected by the United States government, and were idolized by Western media because of the idea that capitalism provided a moral economy in Russia. In both regions, shock economic change resulted in an "all hands-on deck" crisis where institutional and disciplinary boundaries were blurred, with traditional economists acting as policymakers and vice versa.

By analyzing the trajectory of goals set by these two transitions, we can see that the issues of moral economy and economic pragmatism are not so easily differentiated in times of shocking and sudden change. Instead, questions about "what society should be like" and "what is economically profitable" are negotiated together over time, interacting in dynamic and evolving ways. Dialogues about the mathematical economy and the role of the economy in shaping society are often taken to be two separate conversations, with discussions about a morally just economic system often assumed to be fundamentally different from discussions about a profitable economic system.[45] In cases where these two conversations are treated together, scholars often point to the moral economy as a cynical tool for profit hungry corporations by exploiting liberal ideas.[46] However, in both the Urals Mountain region and Appalachia, albeit in different ways, using the economy as a civilizing mission and using the economy to make a profit were goals that mutually reinforced each other and grew together. While the moral economy helped to set the boundaries for legitimate or desirable profit making, corporations and financiers helped to reinforce and generate ideas of moral legitimacy. In normal times and in normal places, it is often taken for granted that two different conversations about the economy are taking place. On the one hand, sociologists and politicians debate "what the economy should do." On the other hand, economists and mathematicians debate "what will make a profit." In these two instances of momentous economic transitions, however, only one conversation took place: "what should make a profit." In this way, even at high levels of business and economics often assumed to be either impartial or coldly cynical, morality was always a part of the equation.

IV. Conclusion

It is often assumed that economists and businessmen act outside of moral constraints, even in times of existential economic crisis. The econometrics of Chubais and Gaidar, as well as the accounting of Deloitte, have all been used to characterize engineers of economic transition as cold, academic, and removed from reality. However, in both Appalachia and the Urals, mathematics about what will make a profit is inextricable from moral questions of what *should* make a profit. The goals of economic transition, and ideology about what economic transition should mean, were baked into the calculations of both transitions. Further, the data used to determine the success or even reality of transition reveals much about the goals of transition. In both Appalachia and the Urals, decision makers were far from ideologically impartial. Instead, they created economic systems and privileged forms of profit based on specific ideas about what the economy *should* be, how transition *should* develop, and the kinds of people who *should* benefit.

In the Urals as in Appalachia, disruption of the economy during the late 1990s created new value systems, leaching into workers' interpersonal relationships and daily lives. Local, regional, and national culture influenced beliefs about labor and laboring, attitudes that are often assumed by Westerners to be constant, ahistorical, and universal across cultures. In actuality, the economic laws that govern working life are not just abstract mathematical realities, but are also tied to questions of relationships, social values, and cultural context.

The structure of the workplace and economy does not just manifest in abstract theories and formulas, but has significant bearing on the "personal" lives of ordinary working people. While many

Westerners would argue that any route which ends in capitalism over communism is worthwhile, most ordinary Urals residents did not experience a wash of ideological joyousness at the triumph of a democratic market economy, but did find new difficulties in relating to their bosses, confusing workplace arrangements around such basics as scheduling, and an alien values system during transition.

Footnotes:

[1] Brady, *Kapitalizm*, 150.

[2] Brady, *Kapitalizm*, 44.

[3] Bowder, *Red Notice*, 32.

[4] De Kwant, "Emerging Oil and Gas Economies," 182.

[5] Bowder, *Red Notice*, 8.

[6] Loomis, Carol J., Patricia Neering, and Christopher Tkaczyk. "The Sinking of Bethlehem Steel: A Fortune Autopsy." Fortune Magazine Archives. Time, Inc., 5 Apr. 2004. Web. 16 May 2017.

[7] Michael Kruse, "Johnstown Never Believed Trump Would Help. They Still Love Him Anyway," *Politico*, 8 November 2017.

[8] Severyn T. Buyn, "The Moral Economy," *Review of Social Economy* 1, vol. 57 (March 1999): 25.

[9] Thomas Clay Arnold, "Rethinking Moral Economy," *The American Political Science Review* 1, vol. 95 (March 2001): 85.

[10] Boycko, "Privatizing Russia."

[11] Poul Thomsen, "State Ownership in Europe's Former Socialist States: The Unfinished Reform Agenda," *International Monetary Fund*, 18 June 2019.

[12] Marshall I. Goodman, *Lost Opportunity: What Has Made Economic Reform in Russia So Difficult?* 85.

[13] Marshall I. Goodman, *Lost Opportunity: What Has Made Economic Reform in Russia So Difficult?* 87.

[14] Marshall I. Goodman, *Lost Opportunity: What Has Made Economic Reform in Russia So Difficult?* 93.

[15] *Izvestiya*, Dec 2, 1991, p. 2; *NYT*, June 2, 1992, p. A8.

[16] Gaidar and Chubais, trans. Antonia W. Bouis, C*rossroad is in Modern Russian History*, 60.

[17] Chubais and Gaidar, *Crossroads of Russian History*, 61.

[18] Chubais and Gaidar, *Crossroads of Russian History*, 74.

[19] Browder, *Red Notice*, 68.

[20] Browder, *Red Notice*, 47.

[21] Browder, *Red Notice*, 9.

[22] Browder, *Red Notice*, 55.

[23] Ibid. It is worth noting that despite criticizing the "failure" of the rule of law in Russia in the Sidanco stocks case, Browder's own narrative seems to indicate a strong protection of Westerners from the Russian government. With the help of a Russian lawyer, Browder filed a detailed complaint against Sidanco with the Russian Securities and Exchange Committee. The SEC ruled in favor of Browder within a week of the complaint being filed, and Browder was able to

protect Hermitage's representation in Sidanco. (Browder, *Red Notice*, 61).In another case, Browder himself describes how Russian police often privileged Westerners at the expense of Russians when investigating crimes (Browder, *Red Notice*, 76-77)

[24] De Kwant, "Emerging Oil and Gas Economies," 175.

[25] De Kwant, "Emerging Oil and Gas Economies," 200-01.

[26] In the early Soviet Union, all oil and gas resources fell under the jurisdiction of regional authorities. In the 1930s, ownership shifted to the Supreme Soviet federal system with ostensible regional "consent." After the collapse of communism, regional authorities reasserted their claim to energy companies, and their federal superiors, not wanting to lose local support, accepted overlapping jurisdiction, including double taxation and double excise fees:
De Kwant, "Emerging Oil and Gas Economies," 191-93.

[27] Edward Feser, et. al., "Regional Technology Assets and Opportunities: The Geographic Clustering of High-Tech Industry, Science and Innovation in Appalachia," *Appalachian Regional Commission* (August 2002): 4.

[28] King, "Appalachia's Blue Tech Collar," *WIRED* (9 October 2001).

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Qtd. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Beyond Coal: Imagining Appalachia's Future," 17 August 2016.

[32] BitSource, "Our Exclusive Story," *Bitsource.com* (2019).

[33] Caudill, *Night Comes to the Cumberlands*, 376.

[34] Appalachian Regional Commission, "The Appalachian Regional Commission" (15 May 2009).

[35] Appalachian Regional Commission, *About Our Mission* (2019).

[36] Appalachian Regional Commission, "ARC Announces Support for Creation of Five New Angel Investment Funds for the Appalachian Region," Sept 2012.

[37] Fred W. Baldwin for Appalachian Regional Commission, "Appalachian Angels: Growing High-Tech Businesses in Western North Carolina," Nov 2013.

[38] Edward Feser, et. al., "Regional Technology Assets and Opportunities: The Geographic Clustering of High-Tech Industry, Science and Innovation in Appalachia," *Appalachian Regional Commission* (August 2002).

[39] Interestingly, executives in technology said little at the time. Beyond one California senator visiting Appalachia and styling himself as "an ambassador for Silicon Valley" in 2017, it seems that the ideology of a high-tech mountain future was a chimera with little basis in the actual beliefs of tech executives:
Nancy Scola, "Silicon Valley sends ambassador to Trump's coal country," *Politico* (26 Mar 2017).

[40] Arlie Hochschild, "The Coders of Kentucky," *The Atlantic*. 21 Sept 2018.

[41] COMPTIA, "New Report Details Employment and Economic Impact of West Virginia Tech Industry."

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