12-15-2022

The Sunflower Movement of 2014: How Commitment to Democratization Drives Activism in Taiwan

Katherine Ann Wagner
College of the Holy Cross, katherinew2202@gmail.com

The Sunflower Movement of 2014: How Commitment to Democratization Drives Activism in Taiwan

Katherine Wagner

College of the Holy Cross

Washington Semester Program

December 15, 2022

Advisor: Professor Maria Rodrigues

I. Introduction

In the far East corner of the globe, there is a small island known by many names. Formosa, Chinese Taipei, the Republic of China, Taiwan. Taiwan, as it is most commonly known, is possibly the most well established democracy in Asia.[1] Despite its shining record, Taiwan was not always the global beacon of democracy of today in the past. At the conclusion of World War Two, the Chinese Civil War resumed as Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party fought an increasingly embattled Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese Nationalists (hereby referred to as the Kuomintang). On December 7th, 1949, Chiang evacuated his forces from the mainland to Taipei, Taiwan where the Nationalist government was established. Martial law was declared in May of 1949 and the Kuomintang ruled with impunity for nearly 37 years until 1986.[2] During this period of time known as the White Terror, the Kuomintang constituted the only real political force on the island, and maintained control of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

Throughout the White Terror, the Kuomintang arrested, tortured, killed, and forcibly disappeared thousands of intellectuals and socially elite individuals who were perceived as being pro-communist.[3] Despite the implementation of a dictatorial regime, the KMT made efforts to "democratize" the nation in the face of a newly established communist People's Republic of China. The KMT hoped that the island would be perceived as a "free and democratic China," in direct opposition to the totalitarian, communist mainland.[4] As time went on, the KMT carefully imbued the electorate with more pluralistic elements, allowing independent candidates to run.

---

[1] Lindsey W. Ford, Ryan Hass, "Democracy in Asia," *Brookings Institute*, January 22, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-in-asia/.
[2] *Britannica Library*, s.v. "Nationalist Party," accessed November 14, 2022, https://libraries.state.ma.us/login?eburl=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary-eb-com.holycross.idm.oclc.org&ebtarget=%2Flevels%2Freferencecenter%2Farticle%2FNationalist-Party%2F55024&ebboatid=301196.
[3] Caroline Gluck, "Taiwan sorry for white terror era," Asia-Pacific, *BBC News*, July 16, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7509805.stm.
[4] Ching-hsin Yu, "Parties, Partisans, and Independents in Taiwan," In *The Taiwan Voter*, edited by Christopher H. Achen and T. Y. Wang. University of Michigan Press, 2017: 75. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvndv9z7.7.

The momentum behind independent candidates grew and ultimately solidified into the *tang-wai* movement, or "outside the party." This movement laid the foundation for the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party in 1986, which finally brought the country out of single-party rule into a new era of dual-party competition and democratization.[5]

Taiwan continued to democratize over the course of the 1990s into the early 2000s, with the first truly direct, free, and fair Presidential election being held on March 23, 1996. A series of social movements precipitated these changes which ultimately resulted in the democratization of Taiwan, and the importance of this new political system and value leads to the question of "what is the primary motivator for political activism in Taiwan in the 21st century?"

The case study that will be utilized for this thesis will be the Sunflower Student Movement of 2014. This movement came to be after the ruling KMT party passed the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) with the PRC through the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan's legislative body, without a clause-by-clause review. There was widespread dissatisfaction with the bill as it was perceived by many as opening Taiwan to economic coercion by the PRC, as well as anger over the KMT's lack of transparency. This resulted in the Legislative Yuan building being occupied by protestors for 23 days, during which the protestors demanded the end of the CSSTA and legislation for supervising cross-strait agreements.

Using the Sunflower Movement of 2014 as a case study, the findings of this paper show that the fundamental desire for democracy is completely ingrained in Taiwanese society, which plays a significant role in political activism. While there may be other facets that contributed to

---

[5] *Britannica Library*, s.v. "Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)," accessed November 14, 2022, https://libraries.state.ma.us/login?eburl=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary-eb-com.holycross.idm.oclc.org&ebtarget=%2Flevels%2Freferencecenter%2Farticle%2FDemocratic-Progressive-Party%2F29901&ebboatid=301196.

the build-up of the movement, the driving force for activism and primary motivation is the commitment to ongoing democratization.

In the sources of literature consulted, nearly all of them state directly or indirectly that a Taiwanese movement for democracy became solidified after the end of the Martial Law period in 1986 during which the country went through the process of liberalization after authoritarianism. Even though the formation of Taiwanese identity relies on the belief that Taiwan is an independent country with its own national character that is democratic, identity is not necessarily a motivating factor for activism. Additionally, fear and dislike of China is certainly something that people contend with but the authoritarian legacy of the Martial Law period is a more tangible motivator. The initial cause for the Sunflower Movement was protest against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) by the ruling Kuomintang and the PRC. In Taiwan, an ongoing commitment to democratization drives activism, and the sources consulted analyze the participants and ethos of the Sunflower Movement.

II. Literature Review

There is extensive research that has been conducted on the causes for people's mobilization, what makes them start a social movement or a protest, and in particular, when attachment to democratic values are an important explanation for the onset of activism.

Scholarly work on the origins of political activism mobilization in Taiwan focuses on the evolution of the demobilized and disconnected communities of activists beginning in the 1970s. In the case of Taiwan, many scholars have found that the beginnings of a social movement or a protest are rooted in a historical "elite-inspired easing of restraints," that originate from the end of the Martial Law Era.[6] In a study by Teresa Wright, she found that openings of political

[6] Wright, Teresa, "Student Mobilization in Taiwan: Civil Society and Its Discontents," *Asian Survey* 39, no. 6 (1999): 986–1008, https://doi.org/10.2307/3021149.

opportunity allowed for the seeds of protest movements to be planted. However, Wright notes, the ability for Taiwanese liberalization and democratization to continue once begun was not set in stone. The repeated acts of mobilization that "waxed and waned" with the amount of control exerted by the KMT created the foundation for the ability to start a protest in Taiwanese civil society.[7] Wright's study found that "there was no predetermined link between the democratization of national political institutions and campus liberalization," and without mobilization, the universities of Taiwan may have remained under strict political rules to this day.[8] This clearly demonstrates a commitment to democratic ideals and democratization on a multi-level scale in the form of activism. Dr. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao concurs with Wright's findings, arguing that "democratization requires institutionalized political changes, more than just a relaxation by the authoritarian state," and that the continual pushing of civil society will force the state to acquiesce and institutionalize these changes.[9]

Dr. Hsiao's initial response was published in 1990 when these democratic reforms were still in the height of their action. In 2010, he published a re-examination of the linkages between civil society and democracy-making. While many scholars of the 1980s had evaluated social movements, particularly in Taiwan, to have a secondary and possibly damaging role in the establishment of democracy, Hsiao found the opposite to be true. In Taiwan, collective action and social movements were an "integral component"[10] of freeing themselves from authoritarianism and that social movements were the "most critical sector"[11] of civil society in the project of

---

[7] Wright, "Student Mobilization," 1007.
[8] Ibid, 1008.
[9] Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, "Emerging social movements and the rise of a demanding civil society in Taiwan," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 24 (1990): 180, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.2307/2158893?casa_token=vlnFwUSk3ucAAAAA:3As5jF2Unh0TEAdbd8rq-oWmBhcYOyztKujNEszKXJuT9IDzTtRmaWm6JgWt8L1PAG4N-AexyQ.
[10] Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao and Ming-sho Ho, "Civil society and democracy-making in Taiwan: Reexamining the link," In *East Asia's New Democracies* 43 (2010): 42-60.
[11] Hsiao and Ho "Civil society," 45.

democracy. He and co-author Ming-sho Ho critically analyze Taiwan's social movements and their push for democracy through five stages.

During the first stage of the "authoritarian crisis," the KMT had been able to shape civil society in a way that was completely in line with their political goals, both against communism and for industrialization. However, the removal of Taiwan from the United Nations in 1971 severely damaged Taiwanese people's perception of the legitimacy of their government. The combination of a heavily restricted civil society and growing awareness of their national and international standing led to the formation of several intellectual groups that became the first "voice" of civil society following the establishment of Taiwan. It was at this point that the KMT government loosened some of their tight grip, doing so in order to maintain their support among Taiwanese society. Having had a taste of some freedom, these groups then began to modify their messaging to include liberal reforms, such as freedom of speech, a core component of democracy. These opposition groups were focused on "political liberties as well as the social plight of the lower class,"[12] demonstrating that even in the most restrictive of environments, these first small social movements were in support of democracy.

Following the first period came the rise of social movements under soft authoritarianism during the 1980s. The social movements of this era arose from advocacy for the lower classes and grassroots protests that addressed the liberalization of different sectors of society ranging from environmentalism to women's rights. One such example is the women's movement pioneered by the *Awakening* magazine.[13] The participants in this group were young, educated Taiwanese women who campaigned for the liberalization of abortion rights, arguing that the "miseries" of strict abortion laws were repressing them. This is also the period during which the

[12] Ibid 47.
[13] Ibid 48.

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) arose in the *tangwai* movement, and became the first accepted opposition party with democracy as their primary focus. Many of the leaders of these social movements and groups went on to be the founding members of the DPP, indicating that those involved in mobilization and activism held democracy in the core of their values and goals. These movements were lent credibility and salience by the large swaths of middle-class professionals and small-business owners that participated in these pro-rights organizations, and demonstrated people participated and mobilized on behalf of democratic values such as respect for human rights.

After the second period came one characterized by popular upsurge during liberalization in the late 1980s and early 1990s.[14] As the DPP began to formalize as an organization to fight for democracy, social movements grew to include a wider range of groups within civil society upon the end of the Martial Law in July of 1987. Even the Hakka ethnic groups, once regarded as a rural, conservative pillar of KMT influence, rose up in protest of undemocratic governance as it related to farmer's associations, their main source of livelihood and employment. The fact that even the most conservative of social groups were participating in mass demonstrations for democracy shows the importance of social movements and mobilization for democracy in Taiwan. A series of protests in 1988 and 1989 occurred against workers who protested KMT control of their unions. These pro-union strikes are greatly indicative of support for democratic values of human rights and economic freedoms. It was at this point that many former activists initiated their political careers, taking their experience fighting for freedom to the next stage; government.

Despite much liberalization occurring, in 1989 the KMT took a hardline stance against social movements, attempting to undo some of the reforms that had been made and repressing

[14] Ibid 49.

social movements that advocated for democratic reforms. While the reimposition of oppressive policies sidelined social movements for a brief period of time, these policies ultimately failed due to 1) high levels of public support for social movements and, 2) the political alliance between social movements and the DPP.[15] An opinion survey in 1992 showed a high level of public support for social movements, which had grown in comparison to the years before the re-repression, demonstrating the people were willing to support and mobilize for the movements. The political alliance between the leaders of social movements and the DPP also fomented pressure on the KMT to move away from authoritarianism, and the levels of their success on the grassroots and electoral stages made their push for democracy all the more salient, clearing the path for further democratization.

The fourth stage is the recognition of a movement society in the democratizing period of mid-to-late 1990s. During this period, social movements became "a recognized, accepted, and routine phenomenon in Taiwan's new democracy," officially ingraining them in the fabric of Taiwanese society.[16] While the DPP slowly began to move away from their association with social movements, they were able to mobilize independently of the party using new pathways established by democratization. Following the first free election of the Legislative Yuan in 1992, Taiwanese feminist groups were able to lobby on behalf of women's rights. Issues such as civil regulations on marriage, sexual offenses, and domestic violence were all democratically revised in new legislation.[17] Additionally, many of the liberal professors who had participated in mid-1990s social movements now took a "professional turn"[18] in their activism, coming together to fight for judicial reform. This is another aspect for mobilization for democracy, not just in

[15] Ibid 52.
[16] Ibid 53.
[17] Ibid 53.
[18] Ibid 55.

voting and electoral systems, but to ensure that the progress they had mobilized for was officially codified. The incorporation of some social movements into government helped contribute to its legitimacy, as the democratic mobilization and goals of these groups helped build both government and civil society.

The final period in Hsiao's analysis focused further on the incorporation of social movements and its discontents under the newly elected DPP government in 2000. While the incorporation of social movements into the government allowed them greater access to policy making, it prevented them from making meaningful change through the DPP's weakness. The combination of a hostile KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan and DPP abandonment led to a need, yet again, for mobilization. The weakness of the DPP government "invited counter-mobilizations" from those who disagreed with social movements. In recalling the Wright study's conclusion that liberalizing movements do not guarantee democracy, it is clear that the counter-mobilizations highlight the true potential for that contingency. As a result social movements had to "fight an increasingly uphill battle" against conservatism and to continue the path of more liberalizing, democratic reforms.[19]

In his conclusion, Hsiao articulates a critical factor in Taiwan's social movements. This factor is the rebuilding of grassroots movements in the face of an elected KMT government. In 2008, then-President Ma Ying-jeou's cozying up to China was met with fierce public protest, which was met with an aggressive police response. The "dramatic comeback" of student protest for human rights and democracy makes it clear that "threats embodied in the form of negation of previous movement gains turned out to be a stimulating force,"[20] demonstrating that people will continue to rally for democracy and are motivated by its ideals. He concluded that social

[19] Ibid 57.
[20] Ibid 59.

movements in Taiwan are "partly causes, partly effects and almost invariably concomitants of democratic freedoms" to participate in civil society, demonstrating that people's motivations for mobilization and belief in democracy are inextricable from one another.[21] From the 1970s to reelection of the KMT in 2008, the link between social movements and democracy are positively correlated. As the years went on, the number of socioeconomic groups, professions, and ethnic minorities grew to express their desire for a more democratic society, ultimately culminating in the democracy that is Taiwan today. The collective values of these democracy-making social movements are "equality, autonomy, sustainability, and mutual respect," all of which are "in sync with modern democracy,"[22] showing that Taiwanese people have and will continue to rally through movements for democracy.

There is empirical evidence to suggest that civic identities in Taiwan are greatly influenced by support for democratic values and are predictive of their likelihood to engage in social movements related to it. In a comparative study that profiled student's civic identity, researchers found that Taiwan's political system provided a conducive environment for civic values and that Taiwanese respondents had strong commitment to support for democratic values. On the individual level "*Support for Democratic Values* stood out as the most important civic value positively influencing… social movement citizenship,"[23] solidly establishing the link between mobilization and attachment to democracy. It was found that "strong support for democratic values" translates into " the emergence of a set of values that stays with these students… into more radical forms of protest as witnessed in the Sunflower Movement,"[24] demonstrating that people's belief in democracy has the potential to impact their participation in

[21] Ibid 60.
[22] Ibid 60.
[23] Kerry J. Kennedy, Li Lijuan, and Cheung Hin Wah, "CIVIC IDENTITY PROFILING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF HONG KONG AND TAIWAN YOUTH," *Current Politics and Economics of South, Southeastern, and Central Asia* 25 (3): 196.
[24] Kennedy et. al., "CIVIC IDENTITY," 196.

nontraditional forms of engagement such as social or protest movements. Furthermore, the study indicated that Taiwanese respondents held skepticism towards "attitudes towards their own country" and "trust in civic institutions,"[25] suggesting that negative attitudes towards these factors demonstrate a positive attitude towards social movements.

Having established the precedent for participation due to attachment to democratic values, Ming-sho Ho articulates a pattern in mobilization for movements. Ho explains that in "the KMT's decision to railroad the CSSTA not only violated regular legislative procedure but also created an acute sense of threat that encouraged movement participation" giving rise to the opportunity for mobilization in protest of violated democratic norms.[26] When Taiwan's democratic procedures suffer in attempts to push forward controversial legislation, the idea that the politicians are acting undemocratically creates an unstable environment where the idea of protest is legitimized, which then actually occurred for the Sunflower Movement.

In more recent literature that analyzes collective identity, organization, and public reactions in the case of Taiwan, author Anson Au was able to prove that "the Sunflower Movement managed to frame a collective identity congruent with the values of the public," which in this case was democracy.[27] Au calls attention to the historical precedent for democracy activism set by Chiang Kai-shek and his policies of forced sinicization, as attempts to mobilize for democracy and to democratize institutions was "the only way of resisting the Kuomintang's oppressive resinicization" leading to the imbibement of "themes of democratic development" in an oppressed society.[28]

---

[25] Ibid 197.
[26] Ming-sho Ho, "Occupy Congress in Taiwan: Political Opportunity, Threat, and the Sunflower Movement," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 15 (2015): 75-85, https://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~msho/book.files/journal/Occuoy%20Congress%20in%20Taiwan.pdf.
[27] Anson Au, "Collective Identity, Organization, and Public Reaction in Protests: A Qualitative Case Study of Hong Kong and Taiwan," *Social Sciences* 6, no. 4 (2017): 2-6, https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci6040150.
[28] Au, "Collective Identity," 6.

In analyzing the conditions for mobilization, Au confirms Ho's prior finding that the poor social and political environment of the Sunflower Movement encouraged mobilization.[29] This was driven in part by wide public support of up to 70% of respondents in a poll who agreed with the demands of the movement. This demonstrates that the movement was able to foster widespread support in the public through the shared values of democracy. He goes on to outline the reasons individuals joined the movement, finding that "protests against free speech infringements, of which the CSSTA is a part"[30] were the basis of student activism. The activists who participated in the Sunflower Movement had many participants of past democracy movements, and their collaboration helped to frame the narrative as a continuation of the struggle for the democratic value of free speech. The past mobilizations for democracy and its values created a sense of obligation to continue. Au then connects democracy as an element of Taiwanese identity, which could have aided in mobilizing those who share that identification, but that the "representation of these sentiments" of democracy drew many other people to the movement.[31]

Ultimately, Au came to the conclusion that democratic ideals were firmly entrenched in Taiwanese society, which was viewed as "a continuation of this long-standing fight for democracy through alliance with previous movements" allowing the movement to connect with the wider public gaining both sympathy and popular support.[32]

Au's follow-up research findings additionally clarify the role of the CSSTA in the movement, arguing that "although the Sunflower movement was fundamentally organized around a trade agreement, the CSSTA's significance was interpreted to be political, not

[29] Ibid 3.
[30] Ibid 8.
[31] Ibid 6.
[32] Ibid 13.

economic," and that criticism of the CSSTA was because of its passage "representing "black box politics" (opaque decision-making),"[33] focusing on the issues of democratic governance and not on its actual content.

Scholar Dafydd Fell paints a picture of a resurgent civil society in Taiwan that uses social movements as an expression of their belief in democratic ideals. Fell confirms early in his research that "protecting Taiwan's democracy" is where Sunflower Movement derived its key source of legitimacy.[34] He expounds on this statement by revealing that societal fears of Taiwan's democracy being undermined in many ways played a key role in social movement activism. In examining the roots of the movement Fell finds that in the case of the Sunflower Movement, the link between social movement activism and KMT rule in Ma Ying-jeou's second term was strengthened.[35] The growing association of the need for activism with the historical role the KMT played in repressing democracy highlighted people's fears of a return to a regime in which their democratic values could be eliminated. In remembering the brutal government responses to past movements, there was "a perception of a return to authoritarian government practices" that "played an important shaping role on activism."[36] An additional factor for mobilization is the emphasis on protecting freedom of the media and democracy as an effective tool.

Fell concludes that the critical role of social movements is not to be underestimated, as they have proven to further consolidate democracy in their demands for oversight and strengthening democratic rights.[37] Taiwan's mostly-stable democracy is in part due to a strong

---

[33] Anson Au, "The Sunflower Movement and the Taiwanese national identity: Building an anti-Sinoist civic nationalism," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 27 (2017): 5. https://tinyurl.com/4wjeseus.
[34] Dafydd Fell, "Social movements in Taiwan after 2008: From the strawberries to the sunflowers and beyond," In *Taiwan's Social Movements under Ma Ying-jeou*, Routledge, (2015): 2-17.
[35] Fell, "Social movements," 6.
[36] Ibid 7.
[37] Ibid 17.

party system, but when the government falls short, civil society and social movements play an essential part in filling in the gaps in order to protect and strengthen democracy in Taiwan.

In the initial analysis of the question "what is the primary motivator for political activism in Taiwan in the 21st century?", there were frequent connections in scholarly articles between the Sunflower Movement and the wider creation of a Taiwanese national identity. Many of the sources in the initial literature review made a connection between a new Taiwanese identity as a motivator for the Sunflower Movement. However, as demonstrated in the literature above, the consensus is that the Sunflower Movement was a student-led protest movement in reaction to undemocratic governmental practices. While the Sunflower Movement may be tied to the formation of and an association with a Taiwanese identity, it was a social movement and not an identity movement. In an identity movement, people come together not through the belief in a specific idea but because they recognize each other as a specific identity, which is the rallying cause. Identity is about who someone is, not necessarily what they value, even though they can be related.

The role of identity was further clarified in the Sunflower Movement by examining the demographics of the participants. The formation of Taiwanese identity was greatly suppressed alongside democracy during the Martial Law period, and the progression of Taiwanese people who began to identify themselves as such increased as Taiwan inched closer to democratization. Consequently, much of the older generation views themselves either Chinese or both Taiwanese and Chinese while the younger generation born during and after democratization views themselves as Taiwanese. In National Cheng-chi University's 1992 survey on Taiwanese and Chinese identity in Taiwanese people, they found that 46.4%[38] of respondents identified as

[38] "Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992~2022.06)," Election Study Center. National Chengchi University. New Taipei. June 2022. https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961.

Taiwanese and Chinese, 25.5% as solely Chinese, and 17.6% as solely Taiwanese. The responses from 1992 reflect Taiwan's political landscape; nearly half of the respondents believed that they were both Taiwanese and Chinese, and which is indicative of the changing times from an authoritarian government that prioritized Chinese-ness to a democracy that embraces the creation of new identities. From 1992 to 2014, the percentage of people who solely believe they are Taiwanese jumped 40 points to 60.6%.[39] However, the high levels of public support for democracy as articulated by Hsiao beginning in the 1990s shows that regardless of identity, people support democracy.

The role of the older generation in the Sunflower Movement and in the great transformation of Taiwan's political system to a democracy can't be disregarded. In an interview with Sunflower Movement participant Jasmine Chan, she explained that "the aftereffects of martial laws and white terror in the past still has not disappeared, and it causes older people to still be afraid of being persecuted in the name of interfering in politics."[40] The feelings of unease in the older generation are justified having lived through the horrors of Taiwan's authoritarian regime. These fears were further exacerbated by the participation of Martial Law-era KMT politicians in government. By 2014, President Ma's political career with the KMT spanned more than 25 years. Ma's long history in the KMT did not go unnoticed by protestors and observers alike.[41] In fact, as noted by Ho, Au, and Fell, the older generation's memory of KMT authoritarianism played a significant role in modern fears of undemocratic behavior.

Additionally, the Sunflower Movement was not an anti-free trade movement despite some scholars attempts to characterize it as an anti-neoliberal movement. Attempts to classify it

---

[39] "Changes in Taiwanese/Chinese," National Chengchi University.
[40] Symin Chang, "WHAT THE SUNFLOWER MOVEMENT UNVEILED FOR TAIWAN," *New Bloom*, July 7, 2014, https://newbloommag.net/2014/07/04/what-the-sunflower-movement-unveiled-for-taiwan/.
[41] Brian Hioe, "Taiwan's Democratic Crisis: The Sunflower Movement One Month On," *Medium* (blog), May 5, 2014, https://medium.com/@brianhioe/taiwans-democratic-crisis-a695a4d16bb1.

as such are contradictory. Scholar Chih-ming Wang attempts to profile the conceptualization of the Sunflower Movement by Taiwanese youth as an "affective-political outburst of discontents"[42] in reaction to what seems to be an inevitable future of neoliberal globalization links. In doing so, the actual substance of the movement is painted with a sloppy, all encompassing brush and neglects the historical precedent for pro-democracy movements. Furthermore, the student participants in the movement contradict themselves when it comes to a position on neoliberalism. While some took positions against large transnational agreements and partnerships as creating risk for Taiwan, they were simultaneously in support of capitalism which does not explain mobilization.[43] In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, movement leader Lin Fei-fan explained that "[we] definitely aren't against more trade flow,"[44] and that there is not anything necessarily wrong with the establishment of free fair trade agreements. The level of ambivalence both towards and against actual proposals in the CSSTA does not paint a clear picture for people's motivations in supporting the Sunflower Movement whereas other scholars clearly establish democracy as a mobilizing motivator.

III. How Did Taiwanese Democracy Evolve?

In order to understand the role that commitment to democracy plays motivating activism, there must be an analysis of how Taiwan's fledgeling democracy developed. The next three sections will address the fomentation of democracy in Taiwan from the Martial Law period, the democratization period, and movements for democracy that establish a pattern of mobilization on behalf of democratic values in Taiwan. The coming sections will serve as evidence of the previous literature that explains what motivates people to start a protest movement and why.

---

[42] Chih-ming Wang, "'The future that belongs to us': Affective politics, neoliberalism and the Sunflower Movement," *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 20, no. 2 (2017): 177. https://tinyurl.com/2p8mthmz.
[43] Wang, "The future," 181.
[44] Jenny W. Hsu, and Eva Dou, "Taiwan Student Leader: 'We Can't Let Go of This Spot," *Wall Street Journal*, last modified April 1, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-21378.

IV. The Martial Law Period

This section will address Taiwan's history of authoritarianism from 1949 to 1986, especially as it connects to the older generation's views on mobilizing in support of democracy.

The island of Taiwan was not initially placed under Martial Law by Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT forces, but the people of Taiwan had been placed under autocratic rule since the island's initial occupation by Han Chinese settlers in the midst of the Qing Dynasty.[45] In combination with occasional occupation by Portuguese and English traders, the Han settlers decimated the indigenous populations of Taiwan. At the end of the Qing Dynasty, Taiwan was quickly annexed by the Empire of Japan, of which it remained a territory until their defeat in 1945 in the Second World War. Under Japanese occupation, both indigenous Taiwanese and Han settlers, many of whom had been residing in Taiwan for nearly 300 years, were subject to poor treatment. Non-Japanese people living in Taiwan were treated as second-class citizens as their cultures and languages were suppressed. It is the constant suppression and forced assimilation by an occupying force that limited the opportunities for the development of a democracy unique to Taiwan.

The potential for the creation of a Taiwanese democracy was further suppressed once Chiang and his supporters fled China to Taiwan. This is what many political scholars have deemed to be a "transplanted government,"[46] as the former Republic of China established a new government with nearly identical laws and codes on Taiwan, creating a *de facto* state. However the government and KMT were not the only things brought from the mainland to Taiwan. In

---

[45] Chang-Yen Tsai, "National identity, ethnic identity, and party identity in Taiwan." *Maryland series in contemporary Asian studies 2007*, no. 1 (2007): 12-14, https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1187&context=mscas.

[46] Tay-sheng Wang, "Translation, Codification, and Translation of Foreign Laws in Taiwan," *Washington International Law Journal* 25, no. 2 (2016): 323, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/267982097.pdf.

addition, nearly 2 million people emigrated to Taiwan. This group of people known as *wàishěngrén* immediately became an elite ruling class whose influence lasted throughout the Martial Law era. Their proximity to the ruling KMT put them at odds with the *bénshěngrén*, a large group of Southern Chinese immigrants that arrived on Taiwan before 1945 during Japanese rule, as well as the indigenous Taiwan peoples.

Being Chinese, the KMT and the *wàishěngrén* population made it their cultural and social responsibility to thoroughly sinicize the population of Taiwan, as the KMT felt they were not significantly Chinese having been occupied by Japan for 50 years.[47] The re-sinification efforts undertaken by the KMT were additionally motivated by a sort of culture war with the People's Republic of China across the Taiwan Strait. Chiang felt that the communist regime of the PRC was a perversion of Chinese culture, and that true Chinese culture must be instituted and preserved in Taiwan. The enforcement of this unfamiliar culture and system and the brutality at which it was imposed left the civilian population with a strong dislike of the recolonizing mainlanders.

Only two years prior to the Nationalist government fled to Taiwan, many of the tensions during this period came to a head in what would come to be known as the February 28 Incident, also known as the 228 Incident. On February 27, 1947, a group of KMT agents raided an illegal cigarette vendor's shop and in their attempts to arrest her, violently beat her, inciting an anti-government riot outside that ultimately turned into an island-wide massacre of civilians.[48] It was at this time that martial law was first instituted on the island, which would lifted following the end of the violence in which an estimated 30,000 civilians were tortured, raped, and

---

[47] Tsai, "National Identity," 14.
[48] James Carter, "The 228 Incident and the ambiguities of Taiwanese identity," in This Week in China's History, *The China Project*, March 2, 2022, https://thechinaproject.com/2022/03/02/the-228-incident-and-the-ambiguities-of-taiwanese-identity/.

murdered. The brutal response to what was initially a small incident soon became the basis of longstanding resentment held by the population of Taiwan against the KMT's dictatorship. While any discussion of the February 28 Incident was suppressed until the end of the second Martial Law period, the memory of it was a potent factor in future pro-democracy movements.

Until the mid 1960s, civil society was far too weak and repressed to actively mobilize against repression. By 1979, having dealt with several decades of continued repression under the Chiang regime and martial law, people had become increasingly frustrated with the failed promise of increasing democracy. The KMT had begun to allow small, local elections in constituencies, but there were no elections for the National Legislature, the members of which were appointed for life and could not be contested. Candidates for office could only run as a KMT member or would otherwise need to run as an independent. This led to the rise of the *tangwai* movement and the publication of the Formosa magazine, which claimed to be "the magazine of Taiwan's democratic movement" in the face of authoritarianism.[49] The publishers planned a rally in Kaohsiung City on December 10 which the UN declared to be International Human Rights Day and were predictably arrested by the police. In response, thousands came out in protest which resulted in mass brutalization and arrests.

Despite the negative outcome, the Kaohsiung Incident marks the first mass movement through which people were motivated to participate in a movement supportive of democracy, specifically the democratic value of freedom of speech, which had demonstrably been silenced by the KMT.

V. Democratization Period

[49] James Carter, "The Formosa Incident: The protest that sparked Taiwan's democracy," in This Week in China's History, *The China Project*, December 7, 2022, https://thechinaproject.com/2022/12/07/the-formosa-incident-the-protest-that-sparked-taiwans-democracy/.

This section will address how Taiwan shifted from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime, as well as the concurrent evolution of democratic values in the post-Martial Law generation.

Democracy in Taiwan began not with large scale protests or movements, but through small, localized grassroots movements. As Ming-sho Ho would argue, the tumultuous circumstances of the KMT's arrival in Taiwan that brought nearly 2 million émigrés created a "highly sterile environment for social movements."[50] Ho focuses on three distinct periods of social movements in Taiwan, with democratization being the theme of the most recent one beginning in 1980. The foundations for a democratizing social movement were additionally laid by what Ho characterized as a period of economic transformation. The KMT began a gradual shift away from the strict militarism of the initial occupation to a system that allowed for more mobility among the populace in regard to their socioeconomic status. As the dream of economic prosperity even in the face of cutting diplomatic ties with the United States was realized, a newly prosperous civil society played an essential role in the formation of citizen's groups.

While the KMT avoided returning to heavy-handed authoritarianism, the framework of a martial-law system remained, limiting free speech and right to assembly.[51] Despite this, people found ways to establish organizations that "circumvented KMT control,"[52] creating organizations such as the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, which still functions as an important NGO to this day. The trend of political activism through these groups continued throughout the late 1980s, and "signs that the unorganized wave of self-relief activism had matured into a bona-fide social movement"[53] became more than apparent as Martial Law was lifted in 1987.

---

[50] Ming-sho Ho, "Understanding the Trajectory of Social Movements in Taiwan (1980–2010)," *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 39 no. 3 (2010): 3-22. https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261003900301.
[51] Ho, "Understanding the Trajectory," 6.
[52] Ibid, 6.
[53] Ibid, 7.

A. The Wild Lily Movement

The liberalization of politics as the end of Martial Law combined with lessened fear of a KMT crackdown blossomed into a wide growth of social activism. This growth was accelerated with the return of the right to assembly and civic organizations returned in 1988 and 1989, and the number and intensity of these movements with it. This led to the first major democracy movement and protest of the post-Martial Law era, dubbed the Wild Lily Movement. In March 1990, a group of student activists stormed and occupied the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial in response to what they considered to be a rising conservative faction in the KMT. Their protest was in response to the paternalistic nature of the National Assembly as well as attempts to augment the powers of assemblymen.[54] The perception was that the National Assembly electing the president instead of Taiwanese citizens was deeply undemocratic, and many people were afraid that the continuation of this system created the potential for Taiwan to backslide in authoritarianism. The demands of students were as follows:[55]

1. Dissolve the National Assembly
2. Abolish the "Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of the Communist Rebellion"
3. Hold a national conference to discuss constitutional changes
4. Set a timetable for political and economic reform

In response President Lee Teng-hui, a moderate KMT politician, held discussions with the student protestors in which he promised to fulfill their third and fourth demands. He held to his promise and the subsequent national conference led to the abolition of the "Temporary Provisions," establishment of constitutional amendments allowing for parliamentary elections,

---

[54] Stephen Smith, and Ching-hsin Yu, "Wild lilies and sunflowers: Political actors' responses to student movements in Taiwan." In c*onference of the 56th Annual Conference of the American Association for Chinese Studies on China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Chinese diaspora*, Washington, DC, (2014): 10-12, https://aacs.ccny.cuny.edu/2014conference/Papers/Stephen%20Smith.pdf.

[55] Nancy Liu. "Taiwanese student sit-in for democratic reform (Wild Lily Movement) 1990," *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, last modified April 4, 2015. https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/taiwanese-student-sit-democratic-reform-wild-lily-movement-1990.

and for direct popular presidential elections.[56] The institution of these promises helped to eliminate the vestiges of authoritarianism that remained in the Taiwanese political system, thus allowing for the realization of the protestor's goals.

The success of this movement marked a turning point in Taiwan's history as it progressed to a full democracy, and continued a precedent for future movements. It laid the groundwork for what would become the Sunflower Movement more than 20 years later.

B. The Wild Strawberries Movement

The next major pro-democracy movement to occur did not happen until nearly 10 years later during the Wild Strawberries Movement. In 2008, the KMT regained power from the opposition DPP in the Legislative Yuan and the presidency with Ma Ying-jeou being elected. The return of the KMT to power led to a revival of social movements in Taiwanese civil society, and the arrival of Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits Chairman Chen Yunlin led to a wave of protests. In preparation for Chen's visit Taiwanese police removed visible signs of Taiwan's differentiation from China, removing Taiwanese flags, breaking down doors of businesses playing Taiwanese music, and arresting known activists. Police brutality and rights to assemble became the rallying cause for protest and in response, hundreds of students participated in a month-long occupation of a public square. The demands of the students followed as such:[57]

> 1. Ma Ying-jeou and Executive Yuan president Liu Chao-shiuan apologize to the people of the nation
> 2. Wang Cho-chiun, head of the National Police Agency, and Tsai Chao-Ming, head of the National Security Bureau, resign immediately
> 3. Legislative Yuan amend the Assembly and Parade Act

These demands were not met or considered by the government, and the protest was broken up by police. Despite the unsuccessful outcome of the movement, democracy was once

---

[56] Smith, "Wild lilies," 12.
[57] "The Wild Strawberry Movement: The Most Direct Predecessor of the Sunflower Movement?," Daybreak Magazine, July 25, 2017, https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2017/07/25/wild-strawberry-movement/.

again brought into national conversation. The movement was named in reference to the prior Wild Lily Movement, linking the two movements and establishing a pattern of a desired continuation of mobilizing for democratic beliefs. The participants of the movement incited the protest in support of freedom of assembly and against human rights abuses (police brutality), demonstrating the democratic character of their ideals. The Wild Strawberries Movement was the first pro-democracy movement of the 21st century in Taiwan and was a direct predecessor of the Sunflower Movement.

VI. Sunflower Movement

A. Overview of events leading up to and of protest itself

By 2014, Taiwan was well-established as a democracy in East Asia, complete with free and fair elections and a thriving civil society. Despite their authoritarian history, the KMT was able to reform itself and release its control through an intense process of liberalization through the efforts of President Lee from 1988 to 2000. Lee's presidency brought about many reforms that established a more thorough Taiwanese identity, instituted a merit-based political system, and firmly entrenched democratic values throughout the country.

Despite losing the presidency to the DPP's Chen Shui-bian in 2004, the KMT was voted back into power in the 2008 presidential election with Ma Ying-jeou at the helm of the government with a KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan. With Ma in power, Taiwan's foreign policy made a notable shift from a state of agitation and uncertainty in their relationship with the PRC to one of quiet flexibility. It is through this quiet flexibility that the potential for broader cross-strait economic cooperation was allowed, and Ma pressed for the creation of a bilateral trade agreement between Taiwan and the PRC.

In 2010 Taiwan and the PRC had signed a free trade agreement dubbed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which was purportedly the first step in deepening trade between the two countries by removing tariffs in several key industries.[58] The passing of this trade agreement was incredibly controversial in Taiwan. While being structured as highly beneficial to Taiwan, many DPP politicians believed that it was opening the door to economic coercion by the PRC and could make the Taiwanese economy reliant on that of the PRC, and inextricably link the two.[59] Despite the criticisms, the ECFA remained and was passed into law.

The Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement was formulated as a follow up treaty to the initial ECFA. The goal of the CSSTA was for the creation of frameworks for "economic, trade and investment cooperation"[60] to further liberalize and integrate the economies of Taiwan and the PRC. It was negotiated and signed in June of 2013. There are two primary actions that occurred that damaged the public's perception of the treaty and led to the perception that it was undemocratic. The first action was the contents of the CSSTA itself, as many of the planned agreements were perceived as damaging to Taiwan's democracy. The second and more salient was the "black-box" review of the CSSTA that prevented the opposition DPP and outside observers from reviewing the contents of the bill before it was passed.

There was wide backlash from the opposition DPP party, civil society groups, and industry representatives who were shut out from the review process of the bill, after which the CSSTA was sent to the legislature for a clause-by-clause review. Both the KMT and DPP held public hearings, but the KMT, eager to pass the bill, rushed through their hearings within a week

---

[58] "Taiwan and China sign landmark trade agreement," *BBC News*, June 29, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/10442557.
[59] Vincent Y. Chao, "First televised debate on ECFA ends in disagreement," Home Page, *Taipei Times*, April 6, 2010, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/04/06/2003469904.
[60] "Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (English Translation)," *Ministry of Economic Affairs*, Taipei, Taiwan, last modified May 7, 2010. http://www.ecfa.org.tw/EcfaAttachment/ECFADoc/ECFA.pdf.

while limiting NGO and civil groups access to participation.[61] It was at this time that the public tide began viewing these negotiations as "a 'black box' (*heixiang*) process in which public oversight was minimal," a term which harkened back to the Martial Law era of KMT suppression.[62] The policy making during the Martial Law era was characterized as taking place in a "black box," hidden away from opposition and citizens, and the outcome of which was usually to their detriment. This historical precedent greatly damaged the KMT's public perception during the CSSTA review process.

On March 10, 2014, the CSSTA moved forward to the Legislative Yuan and was set to be reviewed. However, the review session was delayed for a week after KMT officials refused to allow the review committee to be chaired by a DPP politician. On March 17, KMT lawmaker Chang Ching-chung became chair of the committee and was prevented from entering the podium by DPP politicians. Instead, he announced from a private microphone that the CSSTA was finished, ready for plenary review, and hastily and formally ended the proceedings leaving all in attendance "bewildered" at the flagrant parliamentary abuse.[63] This came to be known as the "30-second incident" and was essential to the narrative of the whole movement, as it became the catalyst for the occupation of the Legislative Yuan and Sunflower Movement itself.

This two-pronged reaction to the events surrounding the CSSTA makes a strong case for the belief in and desire to protect Taiwan's democracy as being the motivating factor in the call to action. The incident "could be seen as a threat that encouraged movement participation," demonstrating how undemocratic actions are cause for mobilization.[64]

---

[61] J. Michael Cole, "Taiwanese Occupy Legislature Over China Pact," *The Diplomat*, March 20, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/taiwanese-occupy-legislature-over-china-pact/.
[62] Ho, "Occupy," 78.
[63] Ibid 79.
[64] Ibid 80.

In response, activist groups planned to storm the Legislative Yuan in protest of the KMT's push through of the CSSTA on March 18. While the initial storming constituted about 50 participants, word of the protests spread quickly over social media and the number grew to 200. Later that night, nearly 2,000 people had gathered on adjacent streets in a show of solidarity.

B. Student Demands for Democracy

Upon occupying the Legislative Yuan building, the students made their way to the Legislative Chamber and established their camp. Many participants held banners, some of which had slogans such as "啟程去台灣人民要求頭條審查"[65] ("Seventy-five percent of Taiwanese people demand thorough review"), while crowds outside chanted "台灣加油, 反黑箱"[66] ("Come on Taiwan, anti-black box"). Once in control of the Legislative Yuan, the activists inside began to outline their demands for the KMT and President Ma:[67]

1. Withdraw the CSSTA from the legislature
2. Enact the bill on Cross-Strait Agreement Supervision (CSAS)
3. Legislate the CSAS bill before the legal review of CSSTA
4. Convene a citizens' constitutional conference

These demands were angrily rejected by the KMT and they denounced the occupation as undemocratic. The occupiers then raised the stakes of their occupation, inciting the occupation of the Executive Yuan building not far from the Legislative Yuan. The police dispersed the Executive occupation but were greatly criticized by the public for perceived "state violence," leading to concessions by the KMT. On April 1st, President Ma re-presented an old draft of the CSAS and announced a national conference on trade, both of which were distortions of the protestor's demands. By the first week of April many of the protestors left due to sheer exhaustion and the stalemate between the occupiers and the government. Facing declining public

---

[65] *Students Ask Ma to Apologize, Demand Premier Jiang to Resign and Police to Retreat*, Photograph, Democracy at 4am, March 19, 2014, https://tinyurl.com/mrcdt34u.
[66] *Students Raised the Scale of Demonstration, While the Occupation Continues. No Response from Ma*, Photograph, Democracy at 4am, March 21, 2014, https://tinyurl.com/yt56u9rx.
[67] Ho, "Occupy," 85.

support and increasing threats of removal through violence, the movement was preparing for a final showdown with the KMT.

However, on April 6 KMT President of the Legislative Yuan Wang Jin-pyng intervened by promising to not put the CSSTA on the floor until the CSAS law was properly reviewed and implemented. It was after this announcement that the occupiers of the Sunflower Movement decided they would end their occupation, finally exiting on April 11. Upon their exit, a message was posted to the official Facebook page of the Sunflower Movement:

> "This occupation has awakened our strategic vision, raised the Taiwanese voice to Chinese society, and allowed the world to see Taiwan... In this historic scene, let us proudly claim: this occupation demonstrated the 'democratic rights' of the constitution, turning ideals into reality, and our generation of Taiwanese experienced all of this.'"[68]

This was a clear declaration of the intention of the movement: to actively assemble in order to demand their democratic rights be safeguarded in theory and in practice. In mentioning "our generation of Taiwanese," the role of past movements and generations is confirmed as having participated in and set a precedent for mobilization on behalf of democracy.

In their list of demands, the students made it clear that their ultimate goal was the preservation of democratic ideals. The first demand of withdrawing the CSSTA from the Legislative Yuan was intended to rectify the 30-second incident.[69] In eliminating the undemocratic process by which the CSSTA was passed, the movement's goal was to ensure that the true democratic process would be followed, setting a precedent for the future.

The second demand advocated for the legislation of the Cross-Strait Agreement Supervision. This bill intended to enact oversight procedures for the execution of the CSSTA to ensure that once put into practice, there would be transparency. Oversight and government transparency is an essential part of a participatory democracy, and the participants in the

[68] Au, "The Sunflower," 6.
[69] Ho, "Occupy," 80.

movement were galvanized by the opacity of the 30-second incident and the memory of black box politics. In addition, the third demand intended to pass the CSAS oversight legislation before the CSSTA, strengthening the democratic process by eliminating the potential for a lack of oversight.

The fourth and final demand echoes the demands of the Wild Lily and Wild Strawberry movements as a call to further citizen action in the government process. By demanding a constitutional conference on the events of the CSSTA, the movement ultimately hoped to entrench democratic values in the most authoritative document, that which had been changed in the past to become more democratic. While these demands were not met, it is clear that their language and principles behind them intended to more effectively

VII. In Their Own Words

In analyzing and proving democracy to be the motivator for political activism in the case of the Sunflower Movement, one cannot solely rely on scholarly articles written after the fact. One of the most essential resources in demonstrating the primacy of democracy in this movement is in the words of the participants themselves. Executive Director Russell Hsiao of the Global Taiwan Institute provided resources that were of use in doing so.. One of the most helpful resources was the work of Brian Hioe. Brian Hioe is an independent journalist, translator, and editor of New Bloom, an online magazine he co-founded with students and activists in 2014 at the conclusion of the Sunflower Movement.[70] Hioe is a prolific writer and from 2014 to the present day, he has interviewed several participants of the Sunflower Movement including key student leaders Lin Fei-fan and Chen Wei-ting.

A. Interview with Lin Fei-fan

[70] "ABOUT NEW BLOOM / 關於破土," About (blog), *New Bloom*, 2014, https://newbloommag.net/about/.

Lin was the primary leader of the Sunflower Movement, and had previously been involved in the Wild Strawberries Movement of 2008. In the interview with Hioe, a range of topics were discussed from his beginnings in social movements, the occupation, and people's reasons for joining the movement. In this interview, Lin clarifies the preeminent cause of the Sunflower Movement: support for democracy in Taiwan. As the leader of the movement itself, Lin is an authoritative figure and source.

Lin explains that he first became interested in politics and social movements in 2008 when President Ma invited a Chinese minister Chen Yunlin to discuss closer cross-Strait ties, leading to fears that "Taiwan[ese] sovereignty would be slowly drained away both politically and economically,"[71] which directly threatens Taiwan's democracy. In response, several thousand students mobilized against police when Chen's visit occurred. Lin continues that following 2008, a series of land reform protests, a Chinese tycoon buying media companies in Taiwan, and rising national identity led to greater fears over Taiwan's democracy and sovereignty. The convergence of these issues led Lin to believe that "in 2012… these movements started to merge together,"[72] in what would become a proto-movement that began the basis of the Sunflower Movement. It was this convergence that also led to many of the leaders of prior movements to be connected to and lead the Sunflower Movement as well. Lin then went on to say of the 2012 era of social movements that "you couldn't just look at national identity issues or issues of democracy and not pay attention [to] issues of class or developmentalism as well,"[73] which could suggest that the Sunflower Movement was not only a democracy movement, but a conglomerate of other issues plaguing Taiwanese society at the time.

---

[71] Lin Fei-fan, interview by Brian Hioe, conducted September 18th, 2017, transcript, *Daybreak Magazine*, published February 23, 2018. https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2018/02/23/interview-lin-fei-fan/
[72] Lin & Hioe, *Daybreak Magazine*.
[73] Ibid.

Lin then explained the importance of movements in Taiwanese society, and that perceptions of movements as a mode for change began to reappear. Because Taiwan is no longer under authoritarian rule, has elections, and globalization has led to a greater flow of information, Lin believed that people had felt comfortable with their involvement being limited to other forms of participation like voting. He went on to say that "political participation wasn't just voting in elections, like in the past," and that engagement through "watching the news or writing some commentary on the Internet"[74] is not the same as taking true physical action. While it was initially a shock to some people, Lin argued that having a "more direct means and taking action" led to people realizing that "you could make changes"[75] to actively change society. Ultimately, he argued that the change brought on by movements was large enough that it "changed how many people look at politics,"[76] demonstrating that people will continue to rally for important causes.

Having established the importance of movements in Taiwanese society in the modern age, Lin goes on to define why he and other people joined the Sunflower Movement and what they joined to fight for. Lin said that the emphasis of the movement "is placed on maintaining democratic process," which confirms the notion that the Sunflower Movement was a democracy movement. The actions taken by KMT Committee Chairman Chang were the "main reason that these people would stand up…because the bill was forced through in 30 seconds,"[77] further establishing that people were incited to mobilize by the violations of their democracy. Furthermore, Lin stated clearly the beliefs of the participants: "they think that democracy is what is most important."[78] This statement from the most central figure of the movement confirms that the Sunflower Movement was a democracy movement. Of the participants, Lin said the

[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.

"proportion" of people who believed democracy to be most important "was quite large" specifically "because of the emphasis on democracy."[79]

While establishing democracy as the motivation for the movement, Lin also clarifies the role of other potential causes such as Taiwanese identity, anti-neoliberalism, and fear of China, dispelling the notion that the Sunflower Movement was any other sort of movement. Lin does say that he believes Taiwanese identification and the movement to be connected, but eliminates the link between identity and support for democracy. In his words, many people "have an internalized sense [of] Taiwanese identity" who certainly wouldn't "say that they support unification or the CSSTA,"[80] but there are several levels to people's participation motivations. Furthermore Lin says that there "may be people with multiple senses of identity"[81] that aren't limited to Taiwanese and that their participation was supported by their belief in democracy.

B. Chen Wei-ting

Alongside Lin, Chen is one of the most recognizable figures from the Sunflower Movement's leadership. In his interview with Hioe, they discuss the occupation, role of democracy in the movement, and its outcomes. Similar to Lin, Chen had been a prior participant in other pro-democracy movements in Taiwan in the mid 2000s. Chen's interview continues to build the case for the Sunflower Movement being a democracy movement as his answers, similar to Lin's, are dissuasive of the notion that Taiwanese identity, free trade, or China are causes for mobilization within the movement. Chen argued that civil society is the proponent of movements in Taiwan, and that while "Taiwanese society already has a very strong opposition to the Chinese Communist Party, … that has no inherent connection to a desire for democracy."[82] This clearly

[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Chen Wei-ting, interviewed by Brian Hioe, conducted September 28th, 2017, transcript, *Daybreak Magazine*, published February 22, 2018. https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2018/02/22/interview-chen-wei-ting/.

demonstrates that desire for democracy is a completely separate issue from the China factor in Taiwanese society. Chen goes further to say that both of these issues stem "from the era of KMT control"[83] in instituting hatred of China and their repression of democracy, drawing a supported link between the KMT's historical authoritarianism and current fears of its return.

Chen then went on to address the wider character of movements in Taiwan, arguing that "in the end, whatever issue is at stake, [it] is always linked back to human rights or democracy,"[84] affirming that democracy is at the core of the Sunflower Movement and those which came before. This is supported by the groups that participated in the protests, most of which were led by participants in the pro-democracy White Lily Movement that had occurred nearly 20 years prior. He further stated that the discourse of the Sunflower Movement was "built up around the movement was regarding [the] democratic process"[85] and not about opposition to China or free-trade, both reaffirming the Sunflower Movement's democracy-focused core and countering suggestions that it may be about China or free-trade.

Chen continued by arguing that the Sunflower Movement was "the last turning point for Taiwan's democratic movement"[86] and was the final transition to a democracy, as it had not been completed at the end of the Martial Law period. He went on to explain that even though in "2000 to 2008, the DPP took power…there was no way to accomplish much of the fundamental work of democratization"[87] due to the majority control by the KMT. In this argument Chen irrefutably connects democracy to the movement, as the movement's inherent goal was a more democratic society which was accomplished after its conclusion. Chen concluded his interview by supporting the role of social movements and mobilization as "a reflexive defense mechanism"[88]

---

[83] Chen & Hioe, *Daybreak Magazine*.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.

in Taiwanese society. The Sunflower Movement made clear that once a democratic "line is crossed, an eruption occurs"[89] amongst people, leading them to mobilize.

C. Interview with June Lin

June Lin was a student at the time of Sunflower Movement and worked at the Formosan Association for Public Affairs in Washington DC at the time of her interview. In her interview with Hioe, she discussed her participation in the movement, her reasons for why, and her path following the end of the movement. She states without question that her reasons for joining the movement is because she personally felt that the preservation of democracy was of the utmost importance and that it was being threatened.

Lin is unique among the participants that were interviewed, as she states early that she had never participated in a social movement prior to the Sunflower Movement whereas most of the leadership had previously participated in other movements. While she had supported movements in the past, she had not been compelled to join. However, the incident of the 30-second passage of the CSSTA was a call to action for someone "like [Lin] who was outside of social movement circles."[90] Lin directly stated: "I participated in 318 because at the time… hearing that the CSSTA had passed in 30 seconds contributed to the sense that our democratic system was really breaking down,"[91] showing that Lin mobilized in support of her attachment to democratic values. This continually shows that ordinary people in Taiwan that had little to no connection to social movements joined on behalf of preserving democracy.

Lin continued to expand on the importance of mobilization, explaining that "no matter how it influence[d] Taiwanese politics, or the establishment of democracy or society," the ability

---

[89] Ibid.
[90] June Lin, interviewed by Brian Hioe, conducted September 30th, 2016, transcript, *Daybreak Magazine*, published December 11, 2016. https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2016/12/11/interview-june-lin/.
[91] J. Lin & Hioe, *Daybreak Magazine*.

to respond in support of these issues is what was most important about the movement. Because democracy in Taiwan already existed, the movement "allowed Taiwanese to think of ways to respond to this question"[92] of whether or not they wished to join. The choice to mobilize or not is answered by the mass participation in the movement, showing that people answered the question that they wanted to support democracy. Lin continued that the impact of the Sunflower Movement led to a greater involvement in social movements, and that "regarding the establishment of social movement groups, I myself was someone entered…after 318, as a part of the founding of Democracy Kurishio,"[93] demonstrating the democracy centered nature of the Sunflower Movement as having inspired the creation of democracy advocacy groups.

D. Interview with Huang Kuo-chang

Huang Kuo-chang was another leader of the Sunflower Movement and belongs to an older generation in Taiwan having been born towards the end of the Martial Law era. He was formerly the chairman of the New Power Party. In his interview with Hioe, he explains he initially became involved in social movements through his work as a legal scholar arguing for social reform. He explained that he began to become involved in social movements as a legal advocate for democratic reforms, especially during the Wild Strawberries movement. When explaining the role of Taiwanese identity in his activism, Huang argued his work didn't "need to be completely explained in terms of Taiwanese identity," and that his and others' participation can be explained by his "regard [for] democracy, freedom, and rule of law,"[94] and other similar principles.

---

[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Huang Kuo-chang, interviewed by Brian Hioe, transcript, *Daybreak Magazine*, published April 13, 2019, https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2019/04/09/interview-huang-kuo-chang/.

Huang continues by stating that for him, one of the most important aspects of opposing the black box CSSTA was "how to establish a democratic system of oversight"[95] in light of undemocratic actions that threaten Taiwan. To this end and as a legal scholar involved in activism, Huang said that doing so "touches on strengthening the power of the legislature, and the system of checks-and-balances"[96] to avoid further undemocratic actions. The collective push for establishing democratic oversight was the main theme of the Sunflower Movement in Huang's formulation. He clearly stated that "opposing the black box CSSTA… was the main demand"[97] of the movement.

He continued to connect the role of social movements and in support of values, especially those in connection with an attachment to democracy. He argued that "when pushing for social movements, you usually have a set of values and ideals that you are pushing for" and in order to have said values be realized through social movements one must "[push] those in power to take action."[98] Without this push, these ideas will be left unrealized. Huang explains that a popular slogan at the time was "'save your own country'" from further undemocratic actions taken. He concludes that this slogan is a response to the actions taken in the 30-second incident, and that it actually represents how young people in Taiwan were "awakened to this awareness"[99] and took action to foment democratic change.

E. Interview with Meredith Huang

At the time of her interview, Meredith Huang was the New Power Party city councilor for the Shilin-Beitou neighborhood in Taipei. She participated in the Sunflower Movement as a spokesperson for the occupants. In her interview, she and Hioe discussed her role and the impact

[95] Huang & Hioe, *Daybreak Magazine.*
[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.

of the movement on Taiwanese society. Prior to the Sunflower Movement, Huang had not been a major participant in other preceding movements. She explained that before college, "you might only know that you were interested in… or you may see books that discuss ideas such as human rights, or liberalism, or democracy,"[100] but that people "might not personally encounter social movements" unless they were inspired to do so. Huang personally was inspired by the events of the Wild Strawberry Movement, but did not participate. However later on she began to participate in different movements in larger capacities.

Upon passage of the CSSTA and the advent of the Sunflower Movement, Huang was "already very angry," and joined to support others protesting its passage.[101] She explained she was quickly drawn in and was given the job to be a spokesperson for the goals of the movement. Of her job, she said she "felt that the means and aims of the movement should be consistent," and that it needed to be a democratic process. In her words, "it's only meaningful"[102] if the call to action is backed up by an explanation of what people are being directed to do and the aim of the movement. To Huang and many others, "it was important for [participation to be democratic"[103] as democracy was the reason for the movement's inception and action. Huang argued that by not allowing equal participation "there would be a conflict between [it] and the logic by which you participated in social movements," showing that the movement was a democratic one.[104]

Following the conclusion of the Sunflower Movement, Huang stated that "many Taiwanese people there remain concerned about the development of democracy in Taiwan," and that the Sunflower Movement was hugely impactful in creating more awareness for the

---

[100] Meredith Huang, interviewed by Brian Hioe, conducted March 14, 2019, transcript, *Daybreak Magazine*, published March 29, 2019, https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2019/03/28/interview-meredith-huang/.
[101] M. Huang & Hioe, *Daybreak Magazine*.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.

importance of the democratic process by bringing it to the forefront of Taiwanese citizens' minds.[105] To support the impact and democracy-focused character of the Sunflower Movement Huang points to the role of transparency in governance. She explained that "everyone thinks that open transparency is a principle now… But if you look at before the Sunflower Movement, nobody would be talking about it in the same way," showing that transparent governance is now a social norm imbued by the core democratic protestation of the movement.[106]

Huang then speaks to the importance of continued mobilization in support of democracy. While Taiwan is "already a democratic society… reform comes slower," and the need for mobilization to ensure that it continues is essential.[107] Furthermore she stated that people are willing to continue mobilizing in support of democracy and continue to do so through deliberative democracy. As a result of the Sunflower Movement many institutions will now "justify themselves as having gone through processes of deliberative democracy in order to take into account people's opinions," showing that the fight for democracy is alive. Huang then states that the Sunflower Movement and its fight for democracy "influenced the views of an entire generation of young people toward politics and political participation," demonstrating that the onset of activism in relation to democratic values continues in perpetuity.[108] She concludes her interview by arguing that mobilizing "is the most precious thing," and that it is "something which we need in realizing a democratic society" which she felt that the Sunflower Movement has influenced people to do.[109]

---

[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Ibid.

VIII. Overview of Social Media Sites Used

The Sunflower Movement saw numbers of mobilization in massive proportion, but physical mobilization could not have occurred without the assistance of social media. In addition to mobilization through word of mouth and proximity to the protests, a community of online support created an infrastructure for the movement's pro-democracy messages to be spread.

A. g0v.tw

G0v is an online "hacktivist" social movement community that predates the Sunflower Movement, committed to the "support [of] freedom of speech and information transparency"[110] through disseminating digitized information to people in order to improve government function and society as a whole. Their participation in the Sunflower Movement ranged from providing technical support to occupiers, coordinating crowdsourced info on the Internet, and compiling information on the movement to be shared with all people. Being "dedicated to principles of democracy and open governance," g0v's involvement in the Sunflower Movement was greatly reflective of the greater mobilization for democracy.[111] The information sourced by g0v was shared on the movement's mainstream social media platform of Facebook and Twitter, which helped to further direct people to mobilize.

B. Democracy at 4am

Democracy at 4am is a website founded by "a group of concerned citizens" with the goal of documenting a complete timeline of the events of the occupation.[112] The website's intention is to document the events of the movement for a Taiwanese and international audience to show how the movement was a peaceful, democracy-making process. Because the local media in Taiwan was susceptible to influence from political figures, the publishers of Democracy at 4am

---

[110] "g0v Manifesto," *g0v.tw*, last edited October 20, 2019, https://g0v.tw/intl/en/manifesto/en/.
[111] "g0v," Daybreak Magazine, June 14, 2017, https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2017/06/14/g0v/.
[112] "Who We Are," Democracy at 4 am, published March 19, 2014, https://4am.tw/.

aimed to show the truth of what was happening, and to raise awareness and support. It gained traction in the international community and was featured in the New York Times, helping to spread the democratic message of the movement beyond Taiwan's borders.

IX. Conclusion

Daybreak editor Brian Hioe states that taking to the "streets in protest and realiz[ing] democracy in movement the most effective, and sometimes only way, to affect political change.[113] This message rings true for the participants of the Sunflower Movement, whose participation and cause for mobilization originates from a long and hard fought historical struggle for democratization in Taiwan. While democracy may not have been an inkling in the minds' of the protestors in the February 28 Incident, its memory sparked movements for greater freedoms of speech, right to assembly, and human rights as demonstrated in the Kaohsiung Incident, the Wild Lily Movement, and the Wild Strawberry Movement. As per the views of the participants as detailed prior, democracy and its preservation is held in high regard. Participants from all walks of life joined the movement, whether they identified themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both, all in protest of anti-democratic behavior from the government. Despite the protests occurring in the context of a trade bill, the tenet of participation was not economic in nature but against the undemocratic way in which it passed.

Time after time Taiwanese people stood up against authoritarianism in defense of democratic values, and the repeated instances demonstrate a clear attachment and form an undeniable pattern of mobilization. The Sunflower Movement is the latest iteration of an organized movement in support of deepening democracy in Taiwan and "reflects the core importance of democracy in Taiwanese society."[114] Whether or not there will be another

---

[113] Brian Hioe, "Was The Sunflower Movement A Radical Democracy?," *Daybreak Magazine*, July 20, 2017, https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2017/07/20/radical-democracy/.
[114] Hioe, ""Was The Sunflower Movement."

movement in the future remains to be seen but rest assured, if Taiwan's democracy is threatened, expect activism that aims to protect it.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

"ABOUT NEW BLOOM / 關於破土." About (blog). *New Bloom*. 2014. https://newbloommag.net/about/.

"Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU (1992~2022.06)," Election Study Center. National Chengchi University. New Taipei. June 2022. https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961.

"Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (English Translation)." *Ministry of Economic Affairs*. Taipei, Taiwan. last modified May 7, 2010. http://www.ecfa.org.tw/EcfaAttachment/ECFADoc/ECFA.pdf.

"g0v Manifesto." *g0v.tw*. last edited October 20, 2019. https://g0v.tw/intl/en/manifesto/en/.

"g0v." *Daybreak Magazine*. June 14, 2017, https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2017/06/14/g0v/.

"Taiwan and China sign landmark trade agreement." *BBC News*. June 29, 2010. https://www.bbc.com/news/10442557.

"The Wild Strawberry Movement: The Most Direct Predecessor of the Sunflower Movement?" *Daybreak Magazine*. July 25, 2017. https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2017/07/25/wild-strawberry-movement/.

"Who We Are." Democracy at 4 am. published March 19, 2014. https://4am.tw/.

Au, Anson. "Collective Identity, Organization, and Public Reaction in Protests: A Qualitative Case Study of Hong Kong and Taiwan." *Social Sciences* 6, no. 4 (2017): 2-6. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci6040150.

Au, Anson. "The Sunflower Movement and the Taiwanese national identity: Building an anti-Sinoist civic nationalism." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 27 (2017): 5. https://tinyurl.com/4wjeseus.

Britannica Library, s.v. "Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)." accessed November 14, 2022, https://libraries.state.ma.us/login?eburl=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary-eb-com.holycross.idm.oclc.org&ebtarget=%2Flevels%2Freferencecenter%2Farticle%2FDemocratic-Progressive-Party%2F29901&ebboatid=301196.

Britannica Library, s.v. "Nationalist Party." accessed November 14, 2022. https://libraries.state.ma.us/login?eburl=https%3A%2F%2Flibrary-eb-com.holycross.idm.oclc.org&ebtarget=%2Flevels%2Freferencecenter%2Farticle%2FNationalist-Party%2F55024&ebboatid=301196.

Carter, James. “The 228 Incident and the ambiguities of Taiwanese identity.” in This Week in China’s History. *The China Project*. March 2, 2022. https://thechinaproject.com/2022/03/02/the-228-incident-and-the-ambiguities-of-taiwanese-identity/.

Carter, James. “The Formosa Incident: The protest that sparked Taiwan’s democracy.” in This Week in China’s History. *The China Project*. December 7, 2022. https://thechinaproject.com/2022/12/07/the-formosa-incident-the-protest-that-sparked-taiwans-democracy/.

Chang, Symin. “WHAT THE SUNFLOWER MOVEMENT UNVEILED FOR TAIWAN.” *New Bloom*. July 7, 2014. https://newbloommag.net/2014/07/04/what-the-sunflower-movement-unveiled-for-taiwan/.

Chao, Vincent Y. “First televised debate on ECFA ends in disagreement.” Home Page. *Taipei Times*. April 6, 2010. https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/04/06/2003469904.

Chen Wei-ting, interviewed by Brian Hioe. conducted September 28th, 2017. transcript. *Daybreak Magazine*. published February 22, 2018. https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2018/02/22/interview-chen-wei-ting/.

Cole, J. Michael. “Taiwanese Occupy Legislature Over China Pact.” *The Diplomat*. March 20, 2014. https://thediplomat.com/2014/03/taiwanese-occupy-legislature-over-china-pact/.

Fell, Dafydd. "Social movements in Taiwan after 2008: From the strawberries to the sunflowers and beyond." In *Taiwan's Social Movements under Ma Ying-jeou*, Routledge. (2015): 2-7.

Ford, Lindsey W. and Hass, Ryan. “Democracy in Asia.” *Brookings Institute*. January 22, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/democracy-in-asia/.

Gluck, Caroline. “Taiwan sorry for white terror era.” Asia-Pacific. *BBC News*. July 16, 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7509805.stm.

Hioe, Brian. “Taiwan’s Democratic Crisis: The Sunflower Movement One Month On.” *Medium* (blog). May 5, 2014. https://medium.com/@brianhioe/taiwans-democratic-crisis-a695a4d16bb1.

Hioe, Brian. “Was The Sunflower Movement A Radical Democracy?” *Daybreak Magazine*. July 20, 2017. https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2017/07/20/radical-democracy/.

Ho, Ming-sho. “Occupy Congress in Taiwan: Political Opportunity, Threat, and the Sunflower Movement.” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 15 (2015): 75-85. https://homepage.ntu.edu.tw/~msho/book.files/journal/Occuoy%20Congress%20in%20Taiwan.pdf.

Ho, Ming-sho. “Understanding the Trajectory of Social Movements in Taiwan (1980–2010).” *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 39 no. 3 (2010): 3-22. https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261003900301.

Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael and Ho, Ming-sho, "Civil society and democracy-making in Taiwan: Reexamining the link." In *East Asia's New Democracies* 43 (2010): 42-60.

Hsiao, Hsin-Huang Michael, "Emerging social movements and the rise of a demanding civil society in Taiwan." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 24 (1990): 180. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.2307/2158893?casa_token=vlnFwUSk3ucAAAAA:3As5jF2Unh0TEAdbd8rq-oWmBhcYOyztKujNEszKXJuT9IDzTtRmaWm6JgWt8L1PAG4N-AexyQ.

Hsu, Jenny W. and Dou, Eva. “Taiwan Student Leader: 'We Can't Let Go of This Spot.” *Wall Street Journal*. last modified April 1, 2014. https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CJB-21378.

Huang Kuo-chang, interviewed by Brian Hioe. transcript. *Daybreak Magazine*. published April 13, 2019. https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2019/04/09/interview-huang-kuo-chang/.

June Lin, interviewed by Brian Hioe. conducted September 30th, 2016. transcript. *Daybreak Magazine*. published December 11, 2016. https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2016/12/11/interview-june-lin/.

Kennedy, Kerry J., Li, Lijuan, and Cheung, Hin Wah, "CIVIC IDENTITY PROFILING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF HONG KONG AND TAIWAN YOUTH." *Current Politics and Economics of South, Southeastern, and Central Asia* 25 (3) (2016): 196-197.

Lin Fei-fan, interview by Brian Hioe. conducted September 18th, 2017. transcript. *Daybreak Magazine*. published February 23, 2018. https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2018/02/23/interview-lin-fei-fan/

Liu, Nancy. “Taiwanese student sit-in for democratic reform (Wild Lily Movement) 1990.” *Global Nonviolent Action Database*. last modified April 4, 2015. https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/taiwanese-student-sit-democratic-reform-wild-lily-movement-1990.

Meredith Huang, interviewed by Brian Hioe, conducted March 14, 2019, transcript, *Daybreak Magazine*, published March 29, 2019, https://daybreak.newbloommag.net/2019/03/28/interview-meredith-huang/.

Smith, Stephen and Yu, Ching-hsin. "Wild lilies and sunflowers: Political actors’ responses to student movements in Taiwan." In *conference of the 56th Annual Conference of the American Association for Chinese Studies on China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Chinese diaspora.* Washington, DC. (2014): 10-12. https://aacs.ccny.cuny.edu/2014conference/Papers/Stephen%20Smith.pdf.

Students Ask Ma to Apologize, Demand Premier Jiang to Resign and Police to Retreat, Photograph, Democracy at 4am, March 19, 2014, https://tinyurl.com/mrcdt34u.

Students Raised the Scale of Demonstration, While the Occupation Continues. No Response from Ma. Photograph. Democracy at 4am. March 21, 2014. https://tinyurl.com/yt56u9rx.

Tsai, Chang-Yen. "National identity, ethnic identity, and party identity in Taiwan." *Maryland series in contemporary Asian studies* 2007, no. 1 (2007): 12-14. https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1187&context=mscas.

Wang, Chih-ming. "'The future that belongs to us': Affective politics, neoliberalism and the Sunflower Movement." *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 20, no. 2 (2017): 177. https://tinyurl.com/2p8mthmz.

Wang, Tay-sheng. "Translation, Codification, and Translation of Foreign Laws in Taiwan." *Washington International Law Journal* 25 no. 2 (2016): 323. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/267982097.pdf.

Wright, Teresa. "Student Mobilization in Taiwan: Civil Society and Its Discontents." *Asian Survey* 39, no. 6 (1999): 986–1008. https://doi.org/10.2307/3021149.

Yu, Ching-hsin. "Parties, Partisans, and Independents in Taiwan." In *The Taiwan Voter*. edited by Christopher H. Achen and T. Y. Wang. University of Michigan Press (2017): 75. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvndv9z7.7.