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Understanding NGOs and their Effectiveness through a Comparative Study of their Role in REDD+

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Table Of Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACT	Amazon Conservation Team
BNDES	Brazilian Development Bank
CAN	Climate Action Network
CCB	Climate, Community, and Biodiversity
CCBA	Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Alliance
CER	Emission Reduction Credits
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CI	Conservation International
CIMI	Missionary Council of Indigenous Peoples
CIREFCA	International Conference on Central American Refugees
COIAB	Coordinating Body of Indigenous Peoples of Brazilian Amazonia
CPT	Pastoral Land Commission
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Dominican Republic of the Congo
ECAM	Equipe de Conservação da Amazônia
ECOSOC	United Nations Social and Economic Council
EDF	Environmental Defense Fund
EU	European Union
FBOMS	Social Movements for the Environment and Development
FETAGRI	Federation of Agricultural Workers of Pará
FIFA	International Federation of Football Association
FOE	Friends of the Earth

FPIC	Free, Prior, and Informed Consent
FUNAI	Brazil's National Indian Foundation
FUNBIO	Brazilian Biodiversity Fund
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GTA	Amazonian Working Group
ICV	Instituto Centro de Vida
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDESAM	Amazonian Institute of Sustainable Development
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IGO	International governmental organization
IMAFLORA	Institute of Management and Certification of Forests and Farms
INESC	Brazil's Institute for Socio-Economic Studies
INGO	International Non-governmental Organization
IPAM	Brazilian Institute of Amazonian Environmental Research
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISA	Socioenvironmental Institute
Itamaraty	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations
Kanindé	Association for Ethno-environmental Defense
KI	Katoomba Incubator
LBA	Large-Scale Biosphere-Atmosphere Experiment in Amazonia
MCT	Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communication
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank

MMA	Brazilian Ministry of the Environment
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NICFI	Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
NORAD	Norway Agency for Development Cooperation
NRDC	Natural Resources Defense Council
PCFS	Surui Forest Carbon Project
PDD	Project Design Document
PPG-7	Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rainforests
REDD+	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation
SCF	Save the Children Fund
TAN	Transnational Advocacy Network
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
USAID	United Nations Agency for International Development
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VCS	Verified Carbon Standard
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization

WHI	World Resources Institute
WWF	World Wildlife Fund-International

1

Introduction: Exploration of NGO Effectiveness

After researching non-governmental organization (NGO) effectiveness for my final paper for Introduction to International Relations class with Professor Denis Kennedy, I became enthralled with the complexities of the non-profit sector. My passion for learning about the sector grew further when I took Natural Resource Conflicts in Latin America with Professor Maria Rodrigues. This work is a product of the opportunity for combining my two passions: climate change issues and NGOs. One of the reasons I chose this topic is that it vividly illustrates the external and internal constraints faced by NGOs involved in either advocacy or implementation efforts, when trying to accomplish their missions. This project questions the common assumption that all NGOs' work and efforts positively help NGOs' beneficiaries. Even though NGOs strive to listen to their beneficiaries' needs, they also have to satisfy their donors' demands in order to survive.

RESEARCH QUESTION

Before the 1970s, research on NGOs was limited in the field of International Relations and global governance. The rise in interest on the topic was directly affected by three important factors: decreased U.S. security risk since the United States withdrew from the Vietnam War and eased tensions with Russia; increase in economic risks due to the 1971 deterioration of the Brett Wood monetary system and the 1973 oil crisis; and the expansion of counter-cultural trends as a result of 1968 student demonstrations and the emergence of significant human rights and environment activism groups. While interest in transnationalism in the 1970s was leading to relevant research, it was still quite difficult to understand the role of NGOs in the process. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane paid attention to religious congregations and international corporations,

but neglected NGOs. Yet, NGOs continue to gain relevance in International Relations research. Due to the increasing numbers of NGOs, in the 1990s, especially those advocating for humanitarian intervention in Bosnia and those working with the United Nations to address global challenges, scholars could not longer disregard them.[1]

Yet, there has been no consensus on the role NGOs play in the global arena. In this thesis, I will investigate their role(s), and specifically inquire about their effectiveness. In other words, what roles do NGOs play and how effective may they be in efforts at global governance? I will argue that independent of the multiplicity of roles that NGOs play, their effectiveness is a function of the level of their legitimacy with their beneficiaries, their capacity to overcome bureaucratic constraints, and their ability to establish powerful partnerships. As we will see in chapter 2, the literature on NGOs does not often discriminate between their roles as advocates and as project implementers.[2] It is my contention that NGOs tend to be much more effective when they act as the first rather than as the latter.

METHODOLOGY

To answer my research question, I conducted a comparative case-study analysis of NGOs advocating for REDD+'s[3] inclusion in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and NGOs involved in implementing REDD+ projects, specifically the Suruí Forest Carbon Project (PCFS), located in the state of Rondônia, Brazil. I will examine the efforts of the following NGOs as they take on the role of advocates: the US-based Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC), and the Brazilian organizations, Brazilian Institute of Amazonian Environmental Research (IPAM) and

[1] William E. DeMars, *NGOs and Transnational Networks*, 36-38.
[2] William E. DeMars, *NGOs and Transnational Networks,* 46-47.
[3] REDD+ is a mechanism accepted by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 2005 that allows countries to be compensated for reducing their carbon emissions at the national level. It does not allow for individual/isolated carbon offset projects.

Socioenvironmental Institute (ISA). In comparison, I will evaluate the efforts of a different set of NGOs as they take on role of policy implementers: the US-based Amazon Conservation Team (ACT) and Forest Trends/Katoomba Incubator (KI), and the Brazilian organizations, the Association for Ethno-environmental Defense (Kanindé), the Amazonian Institute of Sustainable Development (IDESAM), Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO), and Equipe de Conservação da Amazônia (ECAM); the latter joins this group in a later phase of the period covered in this study. I will analyze the limitations of NGOs as they attempt to be advocates and policy implementers for their beneficiaries.

I chose the PCFS to examine effectiveness of NGOs when acting as policy implementers because this project is historically considered the first REDD+ project and one of the most successful REDD+ projects. In addition, Alvarez finds that "there is a scarce number of researches regarding the involvement of local actors at REDD+ governance."[4] As a result, studying this project may help advance people's understanding of NGOs' level of effectiveness when they act as policy implementers, especially in the context of REDD+ projects. There are a few reasons why it is advantageous to compare these two sets of NGOs. First, both sets focus on a single initiative, REDD+. Second, both sets are focused on the same country, Brazil. Third, both sets deal with the same political social context, where they both faced opposition, whether it be from the government and European NGOs or from Brazilian agencies and members of the Paiter Surui clans. Fourth, and arguably most important, these two sets illustrate the complete cycle of NGO advocacy and operation, from coming up with the idea and preparing plans to advance it to operationalizing it.

[4] Guineverre Alvarez, Maria Elfving and Célio Andrade, "REDD+ governance," 135.

Case study #1: Bringing REDD+ TO THE UNFCCC

The first case study examines NGOs taking on the role as advocates. NGOs involved in advocating for REDD+ were concerned with staying relevant after the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the UNFCCC excluded forests.[5] As a result, these NGOs had basically two options: see their relevance in global negotiations reduced, or ensure that forests were included in the UN climate change negotiations. Of course, these NGOs decided to fight to remain relevant. As a result, NGOs created the Reducing Emissions for Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) mechanism because their beneficiaries, specifically Brazilian grassroots, wanted to conserve and protect the forests. By listening to their beneficiaries' needs, these NGOs were also able to maintain their competitiveness in the non-profit sector.

To gain support for the inclusion of forest in the climate change discussions, NGOs engaged with their beneficiaries from the local people to key officials in the Brazilian government. NGOs encouraged scientists to establish a direct link between forests and climate change to show to their donors that there was still a need to fund forest protection projects and their opposition that forest must be included in the climate change negotiations. Finally, to fully defeat the opposition, once and for all, these NGOs partnered with the key members of the Brazilian government, including Marina Silva, which played a major role in the UNFCCC's acceptance of REDD+ in 2005.[6]

Case study #2: Implementing the Surui Forest Carbon Project (PCFS)

The second case study examines NGOs when acting as policy implementers. After REDD+ is accepted into the UNFCCC, pro-forest NGOs took on a new role: that of policy

[5] The CDM "allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries to earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits…[which] can be traded and sold, and used by industrialized countries to a meet a part of their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol" ("Climate Change," United Nations).
[6] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, "Bringing Local Voices," 131.

implementers. NGOs sought out Chief Almir Surui and the Paiter Surui indigenous people to initiate a REDD+ project, later called the Suruí Forest Carbon Project (PCFS), in order to capitalize on the REDD+ popularity in the international sphere. Since there was no national Brazilian legislation, outlining the procedures to implement a REDD+ project in Brazil, these NGOs implemented a forest carbon offset project and just "repackaged" it as a REDD+ project to maintain their relevancy for funding purposes.[7]

Initially, NGOs consulted the Paiter Surui people about the project during the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) phase, but the consultations diminished as the project progressed.[8] Even though these NGOs were able to enter into a partnership with Google and obtain the project certifications, namely the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity (CCB), needed for the Paiter Surui people to earn income from the PCFS, their efforts did not address the two underlying issues contributing to the deforestation levels in the Amazon: logging and mining.[9] As a result, the project ended in September of 2018.[10]

The following chapter will provide a summary of the existing literature on NGOs and their roles. I will discuss the main issues facing NGOs that either help or hinder their efforts to accomplish their missions: their capacity to establish legitimacy through their interactions with beneficiaries, their capacity to overcome bureaucratic constraints, and their skill in establishing strong partnerships with other political actors or organizations. Chapter 3 will show evidence of the NGOs' role when acting as advocates (voices for the voiceless). I will focus on NGOs' fight to put forest protection at the forefront of the United Nations Framework Climate Change Conventions (UNFCCC) from the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 to the UN Conference in Copenhagen

[7] Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 6.
[8] Thiago Avila "Free, Prior, and Informed," 17.
[9] Google Earth Outreach, "Chief Almir and the Surui Tribe;" Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 7.
[10] Steve Zwick, "The Story of Surui."

in 2005. This chapter will show that if NGOs have legitimacy, overcome bureaucratic constraints, and establish powerful partnerships, then NGOs will achieve success. Chapter 3 will show evidence of NGOs acting as policy implementers. I will focus on NGOs' efforts to implement REDD+-related initiatives in the PCFS in the state of Rondônia, Brazil from 2004 to the project's suspension in 2018. This chapter will show that if NGOs have limited legitimacy, are unable to overcome bureaucratic constraints, and do not establish powerful partnerships, then NGOs will achieve limited success. Chapter 4 will provide the conclusion, summing up the findings on NGOs as advocates and as policy implementers, putting such findings in dialogue with existing literature on the nature of NGOs, and providing recommendations for future research.

2

The Non-Profit Industry

NGOs perform life-saving work, from providing healthcare and food, to preventing human right violations in regions where people would die without their help. And yet, despite their work, 821 million people do not have food and more than 68 million people are affected by war and oppression.[11] This realization has scholars and practitioners calling into question the degree of NGO effectiveness. On one hand, individuals like Binder-Aviles and Wapner have argued that NGO staff members are in control of the organizations' actions and thus, contribute to their inefficiencies.[12] On the other hand, scholars such as Gent and Bendell have suggested that the NGOs' donors are the ones responsible for NGO ineffectiveness.[13] NGOs have an impact on people who are in need and suffering from injustices; however, these organizations face complex political, economic, and social constraints that hinder their ability to fulfill their agendas/goals. In this section, I review these limitations while highlighting NGO assets. Of course, NGOs have many assets that help them pursue their goals, but my goal here is to better understand the limits to their effectiveness.

DEFINING NGOs

For the purposes of this work, I use Peter Willetts' broader definition of NGOs: "an independent voluntary organization of people acting on a continuous basis, for a common purpose, other than achieving office, making money, or illegal activities."[14] In order to address injustices, NGOs typically give support, meaning that they "breed new ideas, advocate, protest,

[11] United Nations, "UN-Food;" United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees, "Forced Displacement."
[12] Hilary Binder Aviles, *The Ngo Handbook*, 54; Paul Wapner, "Defending Accountability in NGOs," 201.
[13] Stephen E. Gent et. al, "The Reputation Trap of NGO Accountability," 428; Jem Bendell, "Debating NGO accountability," 72-73.
[14] Peter Willetts, "What is a non-governmental organization?," 231.

and mobilize public support," as well as "shape, implement, monitor, and enforce national and international commitments" to people who need their help.[15] Specifically, they create awareness of conflicts occurring in the world, give resources to social movement leaders, and put pressure on government officials to amend or change policies.[16] Because of the vast amount of issues they deal with, including destruction from natural disasters, child marriages and forest degradation, there are a variety of NGOs, such as humanitarian, human rights, and environmental.

Rodrigues makes it clear that there is a distinction between NGOs and grassroots groups. NGOs usually have headquarters in a particular region and professional, permanent, and paid staff members, whereas grassroots groups may not have these features. NGO personnel often are not directly affected by the problem, but the issue usually directly affects grassroots group members. NGOs have to prioritize the issue they want to fund, whereas grassroots groups tend to not do so. While there are differences between grassroots groups and NGOs, McCormick (referenced in Rodrigues) sees a similarity between the two types of organizations: they are political actors who use their power, resources, and support to try to change a policy at different levels of government, ranging from local to international.[17] In this thesis, I will not be examining the effectiveness of grassroots groups.

NGOs did not always have a presence in society. It was not until Word War I (WWI) that there was an emergence of NGOs. Prior to WWI, mainly states with assistance from local churches and local people were helping those who were suffering in their communities. Walker and Maxwell give the French Protestants escaping Catholic Europe for fear of religious persecution in the 17th century as an example. Many Protestants sought refuge in Protestant

[15] Alexander Cooley and James Ron, "The NGO Scramble," 9.
[16] Clifford Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion*, 2.
[17] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, *Global Environmentalism and Local Politics,* 6-8.

England. The British government, local protestant churches, and people living in the region helped provide food and shelter to these refugees when they arrived on English soil. The nature of the humanitarian system in the 1840s was heavily made up of individual state actors, not NGOs or inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). States themselves were seen as responsible for the alleviation of their people's suffering.

During the Irish famine, coined the Great Hunger (1845-1852), local churches also provided shelter and scraps of food to help the impoverished people because the British colonial power as well as other states around the world refused to send aid. Similar to Ireland, Manji and O'Coill explain how colonial powers also did not want to send aid to colonies in Africa in order to help suffering Africans. Rather, Africans had to rely on charities and missionary groups to provide them with what they needed.[18] During the 19th century, local churches, states, and members of the local population also fought against other issues, such as prison reform, mental health hospitals, and colonialism. States had yet embraced the idea that there is a moral obligation to help others.[19]

The atrocities that occurred during the Battle of Solferino in 1859, however, changed the system. Henry Dunant witnessed first-hand the mistreatment of wounded soldiers on both sides of the battle. Moved by this mistreatment, Dunant created the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), which provides care and aid to individuals regardless of conflict sides. Thus, the modern humanitarian system was born.[20] Slowly, there was an increase in the fragmentation of the humanitarian system, allowing more NGOs to enter the system. It became more evident that people believed that they had a moral obligation to help other people and act efficiently. During WWI, the IFRC "operated for the first time as a truly international movement, visiting

[18] Firoze Manji and Carl O'Coill, "The missionary position," 3.
[19] Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell, *Shaping the Humanitarian World*, 14-22.
[20] Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell, 17.

prisoners on both sides and highlighting the plight of civilian internees." The first true NGO called Save the Children Fund (SCF) was created in 1919. While the IFRC receives some of its funding from governments and other organizations, SCF raises its own money for its victims of abuse initiatives. In 1961, the World Food Programme was created in order to provide food aid in times of emergencies. Oxfam, CARE International, and World Vision were all other successful organizations that developed in the post-war period.[21]

After World War II (WWII), in 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill joined forces to create the United Nations (UN). Their vision of the UN was "essentially an international welfare net that would make the world safe for capitalism."[22] Under Article 71 of the UN Charter, NGO could consult with the UN about global issues. However, in the 1940s and the 1950s, NGO participation in the UN activities were limited to only certain UN agencies namely the ECOSOC, UN Department of Public Information, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNESCO, and WHO.[23] Later, in the 1980s and 1990s, the UN started to become a very important entity for coordination efforts and facilitation of discussions among global actors, as seen in the Rwanda and Somalia conflicts.[24]

International Relations scholars, however, are divided on the reasons why there was an explosion of NGOs in the public sector. On one hand, many scholars, as Reiman points out, argue "bottom-up explanations" for the rise of NGOs in the system. For example, Skjelbaek and Nye and Keohane (referenced in Reimann) suggest that the rise of democracies, democratic values, and the development of world economies played a major role in this growth. Other scholars, such as Lipschutz and Matthews (referenced in Reimann), make the claim that the

[21] Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell, 14-25.
[22] Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell, 39-44.
[23] Reimann, "A View from the Top," 45-46.
[24] Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell, 63-71.

increasing amount of information and media coverage on issues in different countries has, in part, led to "borderless nature of activism," which increased the number of NGOs.[25]

On the other hand, Reimann and Walker and Maxwell, argue "top-down" explanations to justify the growth of NGOs. For example, Walker and Maxwell discuss how states' divestment of their political responsibility to their people paved the way for NGOs' increased participation in the world. They argue that state inaction has led to the need for NGOs to enter a region and provide aid to the suffering people. For example, during the Rwandan genocide, the Rwandan government did not want to help its people and turned a blind eye to the atrocities occurring in the country. As a result, many Tutsi survivors of the genocide fled to Goma refugee camps in the Dominican Republic of the Congo (DRC). MSF, IFRC, and World Health Organization, stepped in and gave assistance to these people.[26]

Reimann makes the point that due, in part, to the expansion of private foundations, bilateral aid agencies and international organizations (IGOs), namely European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), NGOs were able to obtain more monetary resources. These two opportunities allowed NGOs to establish a place in the system. In the 1990s, private foundations really started to provide substantial amounts of revenue to NGOs. For example, in the United States alone, in 1994, private foundations gave $996 million to international NGO initiatives; in 1998, they gave 1.6 billion.[27] Bilateral aid agencies, specifically Britain's Department for International Development (DFID), provided about 8% of its aid to NGOs.[28] Reimann finds that since international entities have an increased responsibility to deal with more national and transnational problems, these organizations began to heavily rely on NGOs as "partners,"

[25] Kim D. Reimann, 45-46.
[26] Peter Walker and Daniel Maxwell, 39-44.
[27] Kim D. Reimann, 54.
[28] Firoze Manji and Carl O'Coill, 11.

"contractors," "service providers" and "advocates" for their initiatives.[29] As a result of this relationship, many NGOs receive major sources of revenue from these organizations.

Starting in the 1970s, the EU gave NGOs about $2.5 billion dollars, and that number continued to rise through the last years of the century. It was also in the 1970s and 1980s that states began to substantially fund NGOs. Some of the leading states giving assistance were the US, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada and the Nordic countries. For example, in the 1990s, the UN provided NGOs $2 billion per year for their projects. With more money, NGOs are able to create and support more initiatives, which raises their international visibility. The majority of the money, however, went to NGOs that implemented UN projects.[30]

Reimann and Manji and O'Coill agree that this rise in funding was also due to promotion and acceptance of neo-liberal principles. Manji and O'Coill best summarize the core features of neo-liberalism. One feature of the ideology is that the purpose of a country's economic policy is to "safeguard the 'right' of a minority to accumulate profits at the highest rate possible (euphemistically referred to as 'growth')." According to neo-liberalism, a person's right to make money must not be curbed, so that the country and other people living in the region can benefit from this individual's success. Thus, states should primarily focus their efforts on initiatives that would expand their economies, not policies or projects associated with public services. Since developing countries, namely in Africa, heavily relied on funds from other donor states and international organizations for growth, these developing countries were in a way forced to adopt neo-liberal ideas to continue to receive funding.

In fact, the Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) with approval from bilateral aid agencies decided the level of developing states' involvement in

[29] Kim D. Reimann, 59, 48.
[30] Kim D. Reimann, 48-55.

its social sector, and coerced states to enforce strict liberal economic policies, which led to unemployment and poverty. The international community believed that the developing countries were solely responsible for unsuccessful implementation of neo-liberal policies. As a result of the decline of social programs in developing countries, the international community was willing to give funds to initiatives focused on "'mitigating' the social dimension of adjustment,'" and lessening "the more glaring inequalities that their policies had perpetuated."[31] Since neo-liberalism emphasized the retrenchment of the state in providing social services, these funds were primarily given to NGOs. This increase in funding significantly helped to expand the non-profit sector and NGOs' beneficiary base.

In addition to funding increases, growth of the UN allowed NGOs to participate more in UN initiatives, giving NGOs international political access to decision-making platforms. NGOs began to have a presence in the 1970s, but 1980s and 1990s were the moments when NGOs really started to gain visibility at the UN. In the 1970s, UN allowed NGOs to attend UN international conferences, which "have provided international opportunities for activists to organize and have encouraged the formation of new NGOs."[32] It is crucial to note, however, that only those NGOs that were given consultative statuses in Article 71 were allowed to participate in these high profile events. In the 1980s and 1990s, this requirement began to fade, and more NGOs, especially from developing countries, were able to be part of these conferences. NGOs also started to attend UN General Assemblies (UNGA) and work with UNGA personnel on different policy areas. In fact, in the 1990s, the UN Secretary General created a directive, forcing all UN agencies to have a "NGO liaison officer." For Reimann, this stark sense of acceptance in the international sphere also added to the NGOs' legitimacy, which is key for any

[31] Firoze Manji and Carl O'Coill, 9-12.
[32] Kim D. Reimann, 46.

NGO for a variety of reasons from obtaining donor funding to creating state and local partnerships for mobilization efforts.[33]

Reimann makes the point that these political opportunities for NGOs would not be possible without the international community promoting the "pro-NGO norm." Due to "normatively charged" rhetoric and political pressures, many states officials, especially from the developing world, recognized the importance of NGOs and gave them access to their countries. For example, these international entities portrayed NGOs as the "voice of the people," "vehicle of private initiative," "crucial partner in development," "enforcer of good governance," and "vehicle for democratization." State officials also emphasized that NGOs were a necessity for democratic states and free markets to function correctly at UN conferences. In addition, since donor states knew that financial disincentives, namely the "difficulty to incorporate as a nonprofit," "lack of tax breaks" and restrictions on political actions, hindered NGOs' projects, the countries' officials pushed for laws that reduced these limitations. For example, in the 1980s, World Bank personnel compelled Asian countries to have more lax regulations for NGOs working in the region. In the 1990s, IGOs and other members of the international community voiced that NGOs should also take part in local, national, and international policy-making decisions, since they were considered the voices of civil society. As a result of their advocacy, many NGOs became involved in UN initiatives. One example is the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA), which is required to have NGOs participate in its forum.[34]

Manji and O'Coill explain another reason why there was an expansion of NGO presence in the world: the Marshall Plan. Due to the Marshall Plan in 1948, it became very unlikely that

[33] Kim D. Reimann, 57-59.
[34] Kim D. Reimann, 62.

Europe would face mass suffering and starvation any time in its near future. As a result, humanitarian NGOs, namely Oxfam, Plan International, and Save the Children, redirected their attention on other regions and issues to make their organizations' mission remain relevant. These organizations adopted the emerging development motif, focusing their efforts on root causes of issues, like poverty. UN Freedom from Hunger Campaign and UN Decade of Development's acceptance of the development discourse in the 1960s proved to be very advantageous for Oxfam, Plan International, and Save the Children. With the UN endorsement, NGOs had an easier time marketing their development-focused initiatives in developing countries to obtain donor funding. For instance, Oxfam was able to receive funding from donors, namely states, when its personnel framed the issues in Africa as helping the "underdeveloped Africans." It is important to note, however, the colonial powers of Africa only allowed NGOs to help the people if the organizations remained silent on the colonial administrations' treatment of Africans. Thus, NGOs were not really free to help the people in any way they wished.[35]

THE DEBATE ON NGO EFFECTIVENESS

DeMars best summarizes the important debate about the nature of NGO working in the global sphere. He argues that NGO literature can be divided into three main approaches: pluralist, globalist, and realist. Pluralists such as Salamon and Anheier, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Thomas Princen see NGOs as "the articulate and organized element of civil society, acting largely independent of government."[36] DeMars also notices that some pluralists see NGOs as "prophetic voices of the voiceless lobbying governments and the UN,"[37] and believe that NGOs in transnational advocacy networks especially help give a voice to the powerless.[38] Thus, for

[35] Firoze Manji and Carl O'Coill, 6-8.
[36] William E. DeMars, 36; Lester M. Salamon,, S. Wojciech Sokolowski, and Regina List, *Global Civil Society*, 369.
[37] William E. DeMars, 36.
[38] Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*, x.

pluralists, NGOs are advocates for the voiceless on the world stage, and champions for change on their behalf.

Globalists, however, have a different view of NGOs and how they may be effective in transnational governance efforts. DeMars observes that globalist scholars see NGOs as:

> UN's extension agents or Texas Rangers, bringing authority and order to the hinterland…passively **implementing** and enforcing the global norms that emanate from UN organs and multilateral agreements.[39]

Harold Jacobson views INGOs as "sophisticated communication devices, instruments for transmitting and relaying messages and coordinating actions" that governments use in order to further their own political agendas.[40] He also discusses how INGOs sometimes act as agents for international governmental organizations (IGOs). He argues that IGOs, namely the UN, have used INGOs to lobby states to accept IGOs' conventions.[41] Peter Willetts also agrees with Jacobson because he finds that Save the Children, an INGO focusing on child human rights and assistance, often implements UN policies and regulations where it serves. Willetts believes that NGOs "must therefore continue to make maximum use of the existing UN human machinery to keep the government on their toes and ensure that the Human Rights Commissioner has the necessary support to do his job properly."[42] Thus, Willetts seems to think that NGOs are policy implementers for international organizations like the UN.

Similar to Jacobson and Willetts, Laura MacDonald and Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss argue that NGOs, especially those in developing countries, tend to act as envoys, but rather between states and donors. MacDonald argues that there is an inherent danger in "romanticizing NGOs and exaggerating their ability to represent the disenfranchised and

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[39] William E. DeMars, 37-38.
[40] Harold K. Jacobson, *Networks of interdependence,* 416-419.
[41] Harold K. Jacobson, 175.
[42] Peter Willetts, *The Conscience of the World,* 273.

contribute to democracy."[43] NGOs have to listen not only to their beneficiaries but also to states and donors. MacDonald and Minear and Weiss finds that state governments heavily impact NGO operations because they give NGOs increasingly large amounts of funding, which often come with strings-attached. As a result, NGOs have to satisfy the needs of the states by promoting state policies that may not directly relate to helping their beneficiaries.[44]

While pluralist and globalist scholars agree that NGOs have some influence in world politics, realists argue that NGOs do not really have much impact. Realists hold this view partly because they believe that NGOs "address issues with which states are not concerned, or that they are political epiphenomena acting on behalf of state interests."[45] In other words, any actions taken by the NGOs either do not pertain to the pressing issues in the world, or are simply state-driven. As a result of this stance, realist scholars have generated little academic literature on any aspect of NGOs.

For scholars such as DeMars, NGOs do not fit neatly in any of these three categories. DeMars argues that pluralist, globalist, and realist views all "prejudge politics of NGOs in a restrictive way that blinds scholars to the complexity of NGO power." DeMars asserts the following: realists presume that states have more substantial power than NGOs; pluralists prejudge that people give power to the state, which then gives power to NGOs; and globalists presuppose that NGOs power flows from the international sphere to states.[46] Due to the complicated nature of NGOs, DeMars calls NGOs "wild cards" because some NGOs act differently than others depending on the circumstances, such as the level cooperation with

[43] Laura MacDonald, *Supporting Civil Society,* 7.
[44] Laura MacDonald, *Supporting Civil Society,* 6-10; Larry Minear and Thomas George Weiss, *Mercy under fire*, 8.
[45] William E. DeMars, 7.
[46] William E. DeMars, 39.

governments, donor finances, and the availability of staff members to work on the ground for their operations.[47]

Since there has been an increase in NGO presence in global politics and governance and a spike in NGO scholarly literature, NGOs' effectiveness is progressively becoming a focus of interest. It is important to note that there is no clear definition of effectiveness applicable to NGOs; however, different factors have been highlighted as relevant. These factors include the following: the ability of the NGO to set its own objectives, attain its goals, and be accountable to its constituents.[48] It is critical to also point out that since the early 1990s, many NGOs, especially those from the Global North, have become more involved in being part of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) in order to "scale-up" their efforts.[49]

Adil Najam argues that NGO effectiveness can be attained if NGOs "…maintain the right balance between the contradictory forces, expectations, demands and processes associated with preforming complex task, in collaboration with resource-poor powerless people…"[50] In other words, an NGO can be considered effective if it takes into account the needs of their constituents, while trying to negotiate with the other parties involved, including donors, on how to meet their concurrent demands and expectations. Rodrigues, examining environmental NGOs, observes that success depends partly on the ability to create and execute operations that "promotes local environmental preservation."[51] Thomas Princen and Matthais Finger have investigated how NGO involved in network lobbying efforts affect the creation of treaties and other governmental policies.[52] Amagoh asserts that NGOs are, in a way, effective in pursuing

[47] Clifford Bob, 5.
[48] Adil Najam, "Searching for NGO Effectiveness," 307; Lecy et. al., "Non-Governmental and Not-for-Profit Organizational Effectiveness," 447-445; Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 4; [48] Jordan and Tuijl, "Political Responsibility."
[49] Alan Hudson, "NGOs' Transnational Advocacy Networks" 333.
[50] Adil Najam, 309.
[51] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 4.
[52] Matthias Finger and Thomas Princen, *Environmental NGOs in World Politics,* 1.

their goals and initiatives because they provide many oppressed people with resources they need to survive.[53]

Others, such as Haque, Wapner, and Bendell, however, believe that NGOs are ineffective and lack legitimacy because their work simply does not meet the needs of their constituency, therefore, having a low impact.[54] This way of thinking can be due to the belief that NGOs are "self-selected,…poorly rooted in society," and "lack the kind of institutional constraint that hold states accountable to their people…"[55] In other words, NGOs are not accountable to their constituency, or nothing holds them so. This negative perception of NGOs also may due to the fact that NGOs' personnel are not elected officials, so they are not representative of any particular group of people.[56]

Clifford Bob argues that it is hard to measure how NGO support affects outcomes, even if an individual is looking at particular variables. The first reason he cites is that the success of a movement is partly dependent on the "character and ambition of an insurgency's goals." If the goals are too ambitious, it may be difficult to see immediate success. The second reason for this ongoing debate is that it is difficult to "separate the impacts of national and international factors." In other words, it is hard to come to the conclusion, with any degree of certainty, that a NGO's action influenced or caused a particular outcome. For example, if a law is repealed, then people might have trouble determining whether the change in policy resulted solely from the local groups pressuring the government, from other allies in the region or from NGO advocacy.[57]

One has to remember that NGOs' partners play a key role in the survival of the organizations and in the pursuit of NGOs' agendas. Societal partners can provide volunteers

[53] Francis Amagoh, "Improving the Credibility," 225-226.
[54] Shamsul M. Haque, "The Changing Balance of Power," 426.
[55] Paul Wapner, 204.
[56] Jem Bendell, 204.
[57] Clifford Bob, 182.

who can help run the organization. Foundations or private sector partners can give monetary support and material resources to conduct NGO activities. Thus, DeMars believes that "partners give substance and shape to abstract principles of NGO salient missions." If partners are not allowed to attach their objectives to NGOs, they may be less inclined to give material support to the organization. If they do not have these partners, NGOs would not have sufficient revenue, project prospects, or staff members.[58] Therefore, NGOs need external partners to maintain their effectiveness.

In this thesis, I will contribute to the debate about the nature of NGOs through an analysis of NGOs working to promote the concept of REDD+ in the UNFCCC and operationalize it in the Brazilian Amazon region. This work will explore the question: how do NGOs work on behalf of their beneficiaries and how effective are they in that mission? In this thesis, NGOs' effectiveness is defined as the ability to advocate and implement projects on behalf on their beneficiaries. Are NGOs primarily the "voices for the voiceless," whose effectiveness is a function of the impact of their advocacy, or are NGOs primarily policy implementers, whose efficiency depends on their capacity to implement specific projects on behalf of their beneficiaries? How does one evaluate NGOs' effectiveness when working in global governance schemes? The literature suggests that such effectiveness is a function of a) their relations with their beneficiaries, b) the bureaucratic constraints under which they operate, and c) the nature of their partnerships (domestically and internationally). In the next pages, I discuss these variables in more detail.

[58] William E. DeMars, 47-48.

a) Relations with Beneficiaries

NGOs have to take into account staff member recommendations, particularly the board of directors, comprised of individuals who give input on NGO tactics. Hilary Binder-Aviles observed NGOs' operations by looking at some important factors, including NGOs' projects and activities.[59] She finds that if an NGO fails to show headway in an initiative, the board can make recommendations, and the NGO is inclined to adhere to them. In fact, with international NGOs, the financial donors often are far away from the local populations the organization helps. Thus, the donors heavily rely on the staff to communicate the NGO's progress to them.

As a result, NGO staff members wield a significant amount of power. DeMars argues that the staff members of the NGOs mostly control the information flow from the local population to the donors as well as the flow of monetary and non-monetary resources from the donors to the NGOs' beneficiaries. Due to the amount of power given to NGO personnel, many scholars such as DeMars and Cooley and Ron are concerned about NGO staff accountability. DeMars argues that the NGO staff has "tremendous discretionary power, unaccountable to either beneficiaries or supporters, to massage information to reflect the expectations of the partners rather than the reality of the mission."[60] In other words, due to the financial pressures from donors, some NGOs' staff members will distort NGO progress in the region, especially when NGO operations are not producing positive results, to appease the donors. If the NGO staff relays bleak results, the partners may be less inclined to increase or even continue funding the project. Cooley and Ron and DeMars agree that staff members of the NGOs can "distort information harmful to their [NGOs'] interests"[61] and even "bend or suspend the official mandate in order to hold a critical partner on the fly as they compete for an operational niche in a

[59] Hilary Binder-Aviles, 39.
[60] William E. DeMars, 7.
[61] Alexander Cooley and James Ron, 15.

new crisis or country."[62] NGOs must adhere to directives from their board of directors. So, in practice, "NGOs are not completely on their own to act as they see fit."[63]

Because external sources and competition with other NGOs affect NGOs' ability to carry their projects, NGOs have to be very careful when selecting their projects. In order to deal with financial pressures, maintenance of reputation, and NGO rivalries, many high power NGOs, over the years, have increasingly taken on the role as gatekeepers. For Bob, gatekeepers are NGOs "whose decisions to back a movement activate other organizations and individuals across the world." In this capacity, gatekeepers investigate different social movements' capacity to use funding and resources appropriately in order to further their cause. Because of gatekeeper NGOs' reputation and credibility in the field, many smaller organizations, called follower NGOs, take into consideration which social movements the gatekeepers choose to fund. These organizations rely on gatekeepers for guidance because they lack the resources, expertise, and personnel in order to perform their own investigations.[64] Thus, these gatekeeper NGOs have a significant amount of power in the NGO realm, often determining what agendas or social movements an NGO should support.

These financial and governmental restrictions as well as competition among NGOs for "qualified" clients create an unequal power relationship between the NGOs and their beneficiaries. On one hand, local populations need help, such as resources and money, from the NGOs to advance their cause. On the other hand, NGOs have to appease their donors, and ensure their organizations' survival and maintenance.[65] Beneficiaries' participation in transnational advocacy networks does not "automatically guarantee their meaningful

[62] William E. DeMars, 49.
[63] Paul Wapner, 205.
[64] Clifford Bob, 18-19.
[65] Clifford Bob, 5.

participation."[66] Local groups have a difficult time obtaining and maintaining NGO support if they do not match NGOs' expectations.

Bob finds that NGOs try to select beneficiaries by "matching" with groups with similar goals, cultural patterns, tactics, ethics, and organizational needs as their own. NGOs tend to select groups that align with their central mandate, ranging from broad issues like human rights and environmental preservation to more specific issues, such as controlling the spread of Ebola or cholera. When prospective beneficiaries think about their issue, it is key to "strip their conflicts of complexity and ambiguity."[67] Bob argues that prospective beneficiaries should present a clear timeline and history of the conflict, the specific sources of the problem, and the effects the issue had on the population, so that NGOs can provide this information to other interested parties in the domestic and international sphere.[68]

For cultural patterns, NGOs usually select beneficiaries who have a strong organizational structure that often resemble their own, such as one with a "director, a staff, an office, a mission statement, regularized fund-raising procedures, and written strategy documents."[69] Having this culture signals to NGOs that the group is competent to handle their demands and conduct activities in order to promote their cause. NGOs often use different methods, strategies, practices, materials and contacts to advance their projects.[70] For instance, some NGOs focus on conducting activities and research on the ground, and others are more distant and rely on international institutions such as the World Bank.[71] NGOs also have to uphold certain ethical standards, and have a "global moral compass."[72] They advocate for peaceful protest instead of

[66] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 13.
[67] Clifford Bob, 29-30.
[68] William E. DeMars, 19.
[69] Clifford Bob, 33-34.
[70] William E. DeMars, 12.
[71] Clifford Bob, 33-34.
[72] William E. DeMars, 8.

mass violence. NGOs tend to not select groups whose project causes them to disregard ethical standards. For example, if a group needs to use force, then its members often portray these instances of violence as legitimate acts of self-defense in order to push back against a repressive power.

NGOs also tend to pick groups who have a sense of unity. Since NGOs have to deal with opportunity costs, NGOs are also reluctant to select groups that are unknown, and do not exhibit strong capabilities to sustain their projects.[73] After all, NGOs are very concerned with their image and reputation. If donors do not believe that the NGO is competent, then they will withdraw funding. Therefore, in order to better match NGOs' organizational needs, it is important for prospective beneficiaries to have international visibility, which can be achieved through lobbying, media, websites, and other forms of mass communication.[74] For example, groups have sent representatives to places, such as New York and London, to gain exposure for their cause. This exposure allows groups to control their narrative, concerning the current situation at home. This strategy is really only possible for groups that have monetary resources to travel across the world.[75]

It is crucial to note out that the process of matching and framing issues to align with NGOs' agendas is a double-edge sword for prospective beneficiaries. On one hand, framing increases the likelihood that groups would gain NGO support. On the other hand, it causes the groups to relinquish some of their freedom and autonomy. A movement's primary goals and agendas often conflict with those of the NGOs, so they have to conform to NGOs' wishes. As a result, the movement may lose some of their leaders because they refuse to change their message. Groups that do choose to conform, especially for environmental activists, run the risk

[73] Clifford Bob, 36-40.
[74] William E. DeMars, 175.
[75] Clifford Bob, 24.

of "becoming instruments of legitimation for environmental activism."[76] This is partly because NGOs and their donors tend to use their beneficiaries "as exemplars of larger problems or broader agendas."[77] In other words, NGOs tend to use these groups in order to advance their own agendas internationally. Consequently, prospective beneficiaries have to be very careful in the ways in which they frame their issues when they seek support from NGOs.

b) Bureaucratic Constraints

NGOs have to worry about their organization's maintenance, survival, and growth, just like any other organization.[78] NGOs cannot always address every problem in its entirety in the precise manner the oppressed populations want. In order to execute their mission in a particular region, NGOs need help from outside sources. For DeMars, many NGOs often have to "bind to society and political partners in several countries."[79] This is due to the fact that NGOs, for the most part, are non-profit, voluntary citizen groups that are not associated with any government.[80] According to Kenneth and Boulding, NGOs also lack destructive and productive power because they do not have wealth or military force. As a result, they have to heavily rely upon assistance from outside sources in order to carry out their policy agenda, since NGOs do not make money from the programs or campaigns they conduct. For Kenneth and Boulding, however, NGOs do have a competitive advantage for gaining revenue and partners because they have an "integrative power," meaning they have capabilities to draw in societal and political entities from places across the world to help their cause.[81]

[76] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 13.
[77] Clifford Bob, 184-185.
[78] Clifford Bob, 14.
[79] William E. DeMars, 43.
[80] Peter Willetts, 328.
[81] William E. DeMars, 43.

Because NGOs have linkages between societal and political partners, many scholars, such as DeMars, argue "NGOs carry and channel latent agendas, becoming institutional sites of both cooperation and conflict between partners." When partners become involved with NGOs, they try to use NGOs to push their own agendas. As a result, their goals may not coincide with the NGOs' mission, operations, or even the NGOs' other partners, causing conflict.[82] These donors will only invest in NGOs that "…guarantee that their scarce resources are being distributed to competent and effective organizations."[83] In other words, the donors only invest in NGOs that they believe will have the capability to ensure that there will be progress in the region using the resources provided. Donors' concern with the impact of their donations heavily constrains NGOs' efforts to address problems.

Since NGOs need funding to survive, they sometimes resort to shortcuts to show donors they are worthy of continued funding. They "focus efforts on achieving immediate policy accomplishments that are easily attributable to the NGO," allowing NGOs to show tangible progress and their success to their donors.[84] As a result, many donors give NGOs a specific time that they will cease to give funding. For example, according to a study concerning providing support to Bosnia, Smillie and Todorovic found that donors made it clear that they would end funding in a particular time frame, ranging from three months to a year.[85] This ensures that donors are not obligated to give support if the project is not producing any desirable results.

In fact, many donor contracts include an evaluation of a project's success in order for support to be renewed.[86] In this way, the donors can see if their monetary support and other resources are being used effectively within a short amount of time. If these donors do not find

[82] William E. DeMars, 45.
[83] William E. DeMars, 45.
[84] Stephen E. Gent et. al., 428.
[85] Ian Smillie and Goran Todorovic, "Reconstructing Bosnia, Constructing Civil Society," 31.
[86] Alexander Cooley and James Ron, 15.

any worthwhile outcomes, then they have the right to not renew the contract. The ability to demonstrate their concrete achievements is a powerful indicator of a well-performing NGO. The issue here is that donors become too concerned with types of latent structural results that can be accomplished in a short amount of time. NGOs become "…hobbled by their continuous need to produce tangible results in order to maintain reputations."[87] In other words, donors are wary to give revenue to any organization that does not have the equipment to provide observable results. It is important to note that donors' concern for desirable metrics does not automatically mean that NGOs have donor-driven agendas, but donors' wishes are important factors NGOs take into consideration when implementing projects. These short-term policies may be good for funding, but they are often "at odds with long-term normative aspirations typically attributed to NGOs."[88] NGOs' need for support from donors constrains their freedom to set their own objectives. This situation leads to a division between the wants of the donors and the objectives of the NGOs, thus hindering NGO effectiveness.[89]

Cooley and Ron, Gent, and Bob all agree that the competition for donor funding among NGOs affects the way in which NGOs pursue their own agendas. When looking for causes to support, many NGOs often do not choose the people most in need. Rather, Bob argues that NGOs select their beneficiaries who are less desperate, and can demonstrate their capacity to use funding to benefit their cause at home.[90] NGOs pick groups who tend to align with their own values, goals, and agendas. In fact, Bob finds that NGOs are more likely to choose groups with a representative figure who "embodies their [NGOs'] own ideals or fulfills romantic Western

[87] Stephen E. Gent et. al., 428.
[88] Stephen E. Gent et. al., 426.
[89] Ian Smillie and Goran Todorovic, 31.
[90] Clifford Bob, 186.

notions of rebellion" than groups with a leader detached from Western ideals and key values of NGO agendas.[91]

NGO beneficiary selection process, however, has been criticized for being unethical because there is little correlation "between a group's degree of oppression and its level of external acclaim," and that NGOs simply use local populations as "poster children" in order to achieve their own larger objectives.[92] This more problematic process occurs partly because NGOs may not have the time, ability, or resources to fund populations most in need for a long period of time.[93] Over the last few years, Gent has found that NGOs' efforts have become "…small, temporary and perhaps even counterproductive accomplishments."[94] Cooley and Ron claim there is a sense of marketization occurring in global sphere where NGOs have to show concrete positive results in order to compete with one another for project funding.[95]

c) Partnerships

NGOs have to engage with domestic institutions such as regional and national governments and international institutions such as World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations (UN). These entities collectively affect NGOs' level of success with their beneficiaries by either constraining or offering opportunities for NGO activism. In particular, Risse (referenced in Sikkink) makes the claim that domestic opportunity structures, such as "state structure (centralized vs. decentralized), societal structure (weak vs. strong), and policy networks (consensual vs. polarized)," have a strong influence on the outcome of NGOs' operations.[96] Sikkink makes the claim that

[91] Clifford Bob, 49.
[92] Clifford Bob, 7.
[93] Clifford Bob, 186.
[94] Stephen E. Gent et. al., 426.
[95] Alexander Cooley and James Ron, 11-12.
[96] Kathryn Sikkink, "Patterns of Dynamic Multilevel Governance," 153.

international opportunity structures, referring to the "degree of openness of international institutions to the participation of transnational NGOs, networks, and coalitions," also play a role in an NGO's project outcomes. It is critical to point out, however, that international structures can vary, especially in different issue areas and in different regions in the world. For Sikkink, NGOs' level of impact depends on the extent to which domestic and international institutions are open or close to NGOs and to their targeted beneficiaries.[97]

In order to assess whether the international and domestic opportunity structures are open or close, Sikkink contends that it is ideal to examine the mechanisms allowing NGOs and local population to work with these international institutions. On one hand, entities part of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) are considered open international opportunity structures because they allow NGOs to obtain "consultative status," attend meetings, and provide information that will be included in the meeting minutes. On the other hand, institutions like the WTO and IMF are considered closed international opportunity structures because these organizations do not create a space for NGO to participate in their operations. Likewise, if an authoritarian or a democratic government suppresses people's ability to advocate for their cause and excluding people from activities, then one can likely categorize this government as a closed domestic opportunity structure. Sikkink makes it clear, however, that examining the type of government does not automatically make it close or open. For her, one can also look at the extent to which local populations are allowed to protest in order to get a deeper understanding of these opportunity structures.[98]

It is critical to note that Sikkink's method of examining domestic opportunity structures in order to judge particular outcomes has been criticized. Critics believe that social movements'

[97] Kathryn Sikkink, 156-157.
[98] Kathryn Sikkink, 157.

level of effectiveness can vary greatly, even if they have these opportunity structures. Sikkink believes that this argument is only plausible if these domestic structures do not change at all. Since they do vary over time, Sikkink makes the assertion that the variation in domestic opportunity structures can actually bring to light the possible reasons why certain social movements are more successful than others.[99] Thus, it is advantageous for the NGOs and their beneficiaries to be aware of certain blessings and obstacles, internationally or domestically, which may impact their desired missions.

Sikkink describes four different situations with varying domestic and international opportunity structures in order to show how the nature of distinct structures affects NGOs' impact. In the first situation, activists are faced with closed international opportunity structures, causing them to hit obstacles when advocating for change. An example of this scenario is when people demand a different monetary policy in Latin America. The Central Bank makes it hard for people to speak out against a regulation because it only gives groups very limited access to discuss policy amendments. The Central Bank is then deemed to be a closed international opportunity structure. Since these NGOs have to contend with this closed structure, they will likely exhibit a low level of activism and effectiveness. Sikkink does point out, however, that effectiveness in activism is possible in this situation, but activists are faced with a lot of barriers, hindering their mission objectives. In the second situation, there are open international opportunity structures but closed domestic opportunity structures. As a result, there is room for NGOs to advocate for their beneficiaries internationally; however, they need the support from international partners to combat the repressive government.[100]

[99] Kathryn Sikkink, 157-158.

[100] Kathryn Sikkink, 155-156.

In the third situation, there are open domestic opportunity structures, but the governments engage with international institutions through agreements. Since these international agreements tend to transfer government decision-making power to international entities, this situation forces NGOs to work primarily with international institutions with either semi-open or semi closed opportunity structures. However, NGOs still take advantage of these domestic opportunity structures by organizing protests, lobbying, and conducting activities to pressure the government to change policies. In the fourth situation, both domestic and international opportunity structures are open. NGOs faced with this scenario tend to prioritize using domestic structures first, and then secondly utilize international institutions. One of the reasons for this is that it is better for NGOs to conduct activities in the location of the issue. [101] Thus, this type of environment allows for relatively high levels of activism.

Due to the restrictions placed on NGOs by their partners, NGOs have been criticized for minimized impact and lacking legitimacy. Hudson and Keck and Sikkink agree that NGOs have to face many obstacles trying to participate in the domestic and international sphere.[102] As a result, many NGOs tried to find different ways to make more of an impact. Starting in the 1970s, more NGOs have 'scaled up' efforts and banded together to become part of transnational advocacy networks. According to Keck and Sikkink, transnational advocacy networks are composed of "relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchange of information and services."[103] As a result, scholars, particularly Sikkink and Rodrigues, began to look at the level of effectiveness of NGOs part of these networks.

[101] Kathryn Sikkink, 159-164.
[102] Alan Hudson 331; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 7-12.
[103] Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 2.

In fact, it was really over the last three decades that the "number, size, professionalism, density, and complexity of their international linkages have grown dramatically…"[104] In the realm of international environmental politics, being a member of transnational advocacy networks is highly advantageous for an NGO. For instance, Rodrigues finds that these networks are organizationally flexible, can readily give out information to others, and have the ability to conduct operations in different countries.[105] For Evans, he finds that transnational advocacy networks allow Third World populations to connect with national organizations and other political actors, "affect[ing] decisions in hegemonic global networks."[106]

Through these transnational advocacy networks, NGOs perform specific actions in order to further legitimize their advocacy. Hudson finds the following ways that NGOs try to claim legitimacy: giving technical expertise, taking part in discussions in the domestic and international sphere, providing transparent monitoring of projects' success and progress, working with grassroot groups, and complying with international and domestic laws and regulations.[107] It is important to note that since NGOs have a number of different partners with varying views on legitimacy, it is hard for NGOs to be seen as legitimate by every single entity. Even though participation in transnational advocacy networks increases the likelihood that NGO will make more of a difference in a region, Hudson makes it clear that these networks still have to deal with different stakeholders who have differing objectives and agendas.[108] Thus, NGO participation in these transnational advocacy networks allow them to make more of an impact, but does not eliminate their need to engage with other entities to advance their goals.

[104] Margaret E. Keck, and Kathryn Sikkink, 10.
[105] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 2.
[106] Peter Evans, "Fighting Marginalization with Transnational Networks," 231.
[107] Alan Hudson, 335-336.
[108] Alan Hudson, 337.

Jordan and Tuijl criticize the discourse surrounding transnational advocacy networks, and show how these networks can negatively impact NGOs' beneficiaries. Jordan and Tuijl assert that using the phrase 'scale up' causes NGOs to make a commitment of larger levels of impact to their beneficiaries, and "thus encourage NGOs to tip the balance in their actions and resource allocation towards the global arena," rather than toward efforts on "how to better cooperate and integrate advocacy and operations in the scope of activities which reaches from local to global areas."[109] In other words, these transnational advocacy networks have the potential to exclude members of the local population from participating in efforts that help their cause. Therefore, these networks can make NGOs less accountable to its beneficiaries.

Jordan and Tuijl offer four different types of NGO relationships that can occur as a result of NGOs' participation in these transnational advocacy networks. Jordan and Tuijl coin the first relationship between NGOs and their beneficiaries, "The Cooperative Campaign," where NGOs are most accountable to its constituents. In this situation, for the most part, NGOs actively consult their beneficiaries in order to make strategy plans and set agendas. NGOs are jointly involved in reviewing these strategies and fulfilling their political responsibilities such as distributing resources and translating information, so people can read it. There is also a significant flow of information from the NGOs to their beneficiaries and vice versa. The second relationship is called the "Concurrent Campaign" where there is a medium level of accountability. In this situation, NGOs are still involved in reviewing strategies and co-managing their political responsibilities; however, there is a lower level of information flow compared to the "Cooperative Campaign," and differing but congruous agendas among NGOs.[110]

[109] Lisa Jordan and Peter Van Tuijl.
[110] Lisa Jordan and Peter Van Tuijl.

The third relationship is the "Dissociated Campaign" where there is only a low level of accountability. In this situation, different NGOs are part of divergent arenas with clashing objectives. There is an uneven flow of information because local NGOs tend to give more information than they receive from international NGOs. NGOs tend to review strategies and agendas very infrequently and uphold only the political responsibilities that pertain to their own political sphere. The fourth relationship is the "Competitive Campaign" where there is no NGO accountability to their beneficiaries, thereby having inauspicious effect on the NGOs' level of impact. In this situation, NGOs have different agendas and tend to not coordinate their efforts with one another. There is a significant lack of information flowing from most of the NGOs involved. Most NGOs do not review strategies in this campaign and do not uphold their political responsibilities.[111]

In the next section, I evaluate the effectiveness of the first set of the NGOs (EDF, IPAM, WHRC, and ISA) in advocating for the inclusion of REDD+ in the UNFCCC. As argued in this thesis, their effectiveness in accomplishing this goal will be evaluated as a function of a) their capacity to establish legitimacy through their interactions with beneficiaries, b) their capacity to overcome bureaucratic constraints, and c) their skill in establishing strong partnerships with other political actors or organizations.

[111] Lisa Jordan and Peter Van Tuijl.

3

NGOs as Advocates (Voices for the Voiceless)

"Voices that are suppressed in their own societies may find that [transnational advocacy] networks can project and amplify their concerns into an international arena, which in turn can echo back into their own countries. Transnational networks multiply the voices that are heard in international and domestic policies. These voices argue, persuade, strategize, document, lobby, pressure, and complain. The multiplication of voices is imperfect and selective-for every voice that is amplified, many others are ignored-but in a world where the voices of states have predominated, networks open channels for bringing alternative visions and information into international debate."

–Margret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*, x.

In an effort to forge a consensus among NGOs and scientists to favor forests in climate change discussions, a coalition was formed that included the following organizations and individuals: US-based Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), especially Steve Schwartzman who at the time was the Director of Tropical Forest Policy, Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC), especially Daniel Nepstad who was at the time a senior scientist at WHRC, Paulo Moutinho from Brazilian Institute of Amazonian Environmental Research (IPAM), and Marcio Santilli from Socioenvironmental Institute (ISA). Together, they created the proposal for Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) and provided scientific justifications as to why forests should be part of the UNFCCC's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). IPAM and ISA were especially instrumental in UNFCCC's acceptance of REDD+ because IPAM helped provide the scientific evidence (that forests are carbon sinks), and ISA provided the social science evidence (that indigenous peoples should be compensated for the service they provide in protecting the forest).[112]

In this chapter, I evaluate the effectiveness of NGOs when working to give a voice to the voiceless according to the three criteria that I have argue affect such effectiveness: their

[112] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 136.

legitimacy or relations with beneficiaries; bureaucratic constraints they face; and the partnerships they build.

a) Relations with Beneficiaries

When closely examining NGOs' pro-REDD+ advocacy efforts, it is evident that the NGOs closely engaged with their beneficiaries when they were advocating for the inclusion of forests in climate change discussions. In fact, the beginnings of REDD+ can be traced to Brazilian rubber tappers and small farmers. These groups fought to be "compensated for their work to maintain globally valued forests."[113] This idea partly grew out of the work of Chico Mendes, the Brazilian leader of the rubber tappers in Acre, Brazil.[114] In the 1980s, timber companies were slowly taking away land from rubber tapper communities. Many people in these professions were exiting their communities. This situation was problematic for those who remained in the community because the timber companies were then able to acquire more land, further marginalizing the rubber tappers.[115]

Chico Mendes then became involved in the rubber tappers' movement with one of his colleagues named Wilson Pinheiro, who was later murdered by rural elites for his efforts to preserve the forests. Chico Mendes joined the movement, "denouncing developmentalism, and working to protect the rubber tappers who remained in the forests."[116] The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), specifically Dr. Steve Schwartzman, became interested in Chico Mendes and his cause. During the 1970s and 1980s, Chico Mendes and Dr. Steve Schwartzman collaborated on a number of initiatives to conserve tropical forests. In October of 1985, the rubber tappers organized their first meeting in Brasilia, the capital of Brazil.[117] Present were

[113] Sian Sullivan, "Things of Value."
[114] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, "Bringing Local Voices," 126.
[115] Linda Rabben, "Chico Vive," 11-12.
[116] Linda Rabben,13.
[117] Bruce Rich, *Mortgaging the Earth*, 130.

prominent individuals who later became involved in forest preservation efforts in Brazil: Dr. Steve Schwartzman from EDF, Mary Allegretti, who later founded the Institute for Amazon Studies, and Tony Gross who worked for Oxfam Brazil. At the meeting, Marry Allegretti asked Dr. Steve Schwartzman to talk about the importance of forest conservation, biological diversity, and species extinction.[118]

Together, the indigenous people worked with the rubber tappers to create an alliance with other groups of indigenous people in order to widen their support base. The rubber tappers later formed the National Council of Rubber Tappers (CNS) and created an alliance with the Union of Indigenous people (the alliance was named the Amazonian Alliance of the Peoples of the Forests). The Alliance criticized the Brazilian government and the World Bank "for the devastation of the forest exemplified in Polonoroeste and called for a new Amazon development policy based on the principle of 'Amazonia for Amazonians.'" [119] Due to the efforts of Steve Schwartzman and Allegretti, discussions regarding the importance of forests among different groups were possible.[120]

The staff of EDF also provided Chico Mendes with tools and resources to explore his idea regarding the creation of extractive reserves in the Amazon. Chico Mendes ultimately argued that:

> Government should give forest communities secure land and resource-use rights, as well as investing in social services and economic alternatives, in exchange for which the communities would undertake to manage their forests sustainably, under a contract with the government environmental agency.[121]

In 1984, Chico Mendes and Dr. Steve Schwartzman along with Barbara Bramble and Jose Lutzenberger, environmental activists, were part of Adrian Cowell's film series entitled *The*

[118] Molly Moore, "EDF's Schwartzman."
[119] Bruce Rich, 130.
[120] Bruce Rich, 130.
[121] Molly Moore, "EDF's Schwartzman."

Decade of Deforestation. This film was used as a tool to show people in Brazil and abroad the horrible impact of deforestation on communities. For Bruce Rich who is a Senior Attorney at EDF, this film series "became important weapons in the fight to conserve the remaining rainforests in northwest Brazil, and in helping the Brazilian activists strengthen their link with nongovernmental groups and sympathizers."[122] In 1987, Dr. Steve Schwartzman invited Chico Mendes to a meeting with Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), where Chico Mendes was introduced to officials in IDB as well as members of the United States Congress. In addition to working with Chico Mendes to conserve the forests, EDF also helped thwart multilateral development bank (MDB) projects that had a negative effect on forests.[123]

EDF also engaged with Yolanda Fleming, Governor of Acre, Brazil. With Fleming, the NGO representatives discussed their involvement in ending destructive MDB projects that harm the Amazon. They also talked about implementing Chico Mendes' extractive reserves idea in the rubber tapper communities. In particular, Dr. Steve Schwartzman helped and supported Mendes when he was negotiating with the government of Acre to accept the proposal. This negotiation was successful because the government agreed to have the first 40,000 square-hectare reserve in Seringal São Luis de Remanso.[124] Unfortunately, Amazonian elites' hired gunman assassinated Mendes at the age of 44 shortly later on December 22, 1998.[125]

It is important to note that Mendes did not die in vain. He was originally a minor figure; however, after a significant amount of international exposure, namely through a New York Times article entitled "Brazilian Who Fought to Protect Amazon is Killed," detailing the conservation efforts of Chico Mendes and the rubber tappers, Mendes became known globally.

[122] Bruce Rich, 139.
[123] EDF, "Chico Mendes."
[124] EDF, "Chico Mendes."
[125] Linda Rubben, 10.

Chico Mendes told an interviewer before he passed away, "Our biggest assets are the international environmental lobby and the international press… It was only after international recognition and pressure that we started to get support from the rest of Brazil."[126] Due to the publicity surrounding Chico Mendes, many of his ideas/proposals entered the political arena through the hands of his protégés, namely Marina Silva, who eventually became the Minister of the Environment for Brazil under the Lula da Silva Administration (2002- 2010) and helped pioneer REDD+; Jorge Viana who was Acre's governor from 1998 to 2007 and supported REDD+ initiatives; and Mary Allegretti who later became the Ministry of the Environment's Coordinator of Amazonia and was instrumental in bringing the REDD+ concept to Marina Silva.[127] EDF continues to fulfill Chico Mendes' mission to protect the forest.[128]

Because of EDF's efforts to show that the Amazon needs to be conserved, Dr. Steve Schwartzman was able to gain international approval from organizations such as the World Bank (WB) and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) for the creation of Chico Mendes' extractive reserves.[129] In fact, Chico Mendes' death "sparked worldwide attention to the plight of the Amazon forest communities and led to the establishment of Brazil's extractive reserves, protected forest areas that are inhabited and managed by local communities."[130] It was the first time that Brazilians saw the issue of deforestation, as Steve Schwartzman says, as "their issue."[131] Schwartzman soon became involved with groups in Brazil interested in bringing the REDD+ concept to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

In the quest to further Chico Mendes' mission and gain more support for the inclusion of forests in climate change discussions, environmental organizations also helped several

[126] Molly Moore, "EDF's Schwartzman."
[127] Kelley Hamrick, "Acre and Goliath."
[128] EDF, "Chico Mendes."
[129] EDF, "Chico Mendes."
[130] Kelley Hamrick, "Acre and Goliath."
[131] Brian Beary, "Brazil on the Rise," 279.

individuals such as Jorge Viana who was a close ally of Chico Mendes. Because of EDF's dissemination of information about the importance of forests, Jorge wanted to continue Chico Mendes' legacy and share Mendes' ideas when he became governor of Acre. One of Chico Mendes' ideas was "Florestania" (Floresta/Forest + Cidadania/ citizenship). This concept unites together six dimensions of sustainability: "economic, environmental, political, cultural, social and ethical."[132] It is the idea that people of the forest have rights; however, these rights are intrinsically linked to the forest. According to Viana, "We are a forest people and we defend Florestania, which is citizenship from the point of view of one who lives in the Amazon region. Florestania is happiness, respect for the environment, and make money with the forest, without destroying it."[133] In other words, people have rights and can do what they want with the forest as long as they are mindful of sustainability and preservation of the forest.

During Chico Mendes' time, there was a canal that had trash and sewage in it running through the capital. In an effort to uphold "Florestania," Jorge cleaned up the canal and made the region into a park.[134] Furthermore, Governor Jorge Viana, along with his successor, Binho Marques, went to the indigenous peoples' communities in Acre, Brazil, in order to discuss their concerns and grievances. After understanding that the people wanted more control over their land and resources, Viana and Marques decided to implement projects dealing with health, education, and land management. These programs directly coincided with Chico Mendes' vision of Florestania. Indigenous leaders believed that the government's recognition of the indigenous peoples' concerns was "instrumental in establishing trust and opening possibility between indigenous leaders and the state government."[135]

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[132] Agazeta. "Conceito."
[133] EcoAgência de Notícias, "Programa."
[134] Molly Moore, "EDF's Schwartzman."
[135] Maria DiGiano et. al., "The Twenty-Year Old-Partnership," 2.

Mary Allegretti was especially concerned with the rights of the Amazonian communities over their resources and land. As a result, she became involved in the Amazonian Working Group (GTA), whose primary goal was to have a voice in the PPG-7 projects. Due to international pressure to preserve the Amazon, in the 1980s and 1990s, Brazil gathered monetary and non-monetary resources from the seven wealthiest countries, the World Bank, and international NGOs to create the Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian rainforests (PPG-7) to monitor and protect Amazonia. According to Garo Batmanian, PPG-7 manager, the initiative "showed the world that it was possible to build an international environment partnership based in a country and that it would be lasting."[136]

After the death of Chico Mendes, Dr. Steve Schwartzman worked closely with Mary Allegretti in order to prepare a study, showing "economic, legal, and financial feasibility of setting up extensive reserves in the Brazilian Amazon."[137] In an effort to show this study to US officials, in 1987, EDF sent the study to the United States Department of Treasury, which then gave it to the World Bank and the IDB. After some deliberation, the World Bank and IDB began to support Chico Mendes' idea of extractive reserves. In fact, World Bank and IDB gave funds to the project, and US environmentalists approved it. A testament of the success of the proposal is seen in 1992. By that year, 19 extractive reserves were present in Brazil with over three million hectares of land and 28 more reserves were in the works.[138] While there was a number of factors that could have contributed to the World Bank and IDB's decision, one thing is for certain: EDF's involvement certainly helped the indigenous people of Brazil protect their forests. The World Bank's support, in part, allowed rubber tappers to gain even more recognition from

[136] World Bank, "Brazil's largest environmental."
[137] Bruce Rich, 130.
[138] Alison Brysk, *From Tribal Village*, 234.

NGOs "that could exercise political pressure nationally and internationally," and "help channel international funding to Acre and other states in Brazil's Amazon to support conservation."[139]

When EDF and its partners needed international support for their proposal to include forest in the United Nations' climate change discussions, NGOs formed a close relationship with their beneficiaries and allowed them to be included in their efforts. One initiative that heightened indigenous people's awareness of the UNFCCC is the Brazilian Forum of NGOs and Social Movements for the Environment and Development (FBOMS), which was created in 1990. This forum helps to "foster and facilitate civil society's engagement in the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)" and "monitor and participate in environmentally sustainable public policy processes as well as in international processes, such global negotiations on climate change and protection of biodiversity."[140] In other words, this forum opened the door to conversations about the importance of forest protection in the context of climate change discussions. If more people bought this idea, beyond the indigenous people, then REDD+ Transnational Advocacy Network (REDD+ TAN) would increase its political leverage.

b) Bureaucratic Constraints

Bureaucratic constraints are some of the biggest obstacles for NGOs to adequately serve their beneficiaries. NGOs have to adhere not only to their beneficiaries' needs, but also to their donors' demands. If donors do not believe that the NGOs are producing real concrete results, then the donors have the power to withdraw their funding from the NGO. NGOs need outside funding in order to speak out on issues that negatively affect their beneficiaries and provide technical assistance for on-the-ground projects. Since NGOs receive financial pressures from

[139] Bruce Rich, 130-132.
[140] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 137-138.

their donors, it is important for NGOs to participate in projects, showing they are productive and are helping the people they aim to serve.

In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol came into existence. This document "calls for industrialized countries and economies in transition—the so-called Annex B countries—not to exceed certain greenhouse gas (GHG) emission targets during the first commitment period (2008–2012)."[141] After the Kyoto Protocol was introduced, there were discussions surrounding the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which became completely operational in 2000. The CDM "allows emission-reduction projects in developing countries to earn certified emission reduction (CER) credits…[which] can be traded and sold, and used by industrialized countries to a meet a part of their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol."[142] It is important to note that, at the time it was introduced, countries were unable to count the amount of forests they conserved toward their overall national carbon emissions target.[143] This means that countries that took efforts to reduce deforestation were not rewarded through the mechanism. The failure to include forests in the CDM posed a significant problem, especially for environmental NGOs and INGOs whose focus was on forest protection.

It is not surprising to see that environmental NGOs, namely EDF, WHRC, IPAM, and ISA were advocating for forests to be included in the CDM.[144] In order to stay relevant at the forefront of environmental advocacy and keep their donors interested in their cause to preserve the forests, forest-focused environmental NGOs needed to advocate for the inclusion of forests in global discussions that were the focus of the world's attention. Having the CDM disregard avoided deforestation projects put these environmental NGOs at a disadvantage when competing

[141] Franck Lecocq and Philippe Ambrosi, "The Clean Development Mechanism," 135-136.
[142] United Nations, "Climate Change."
[143] Philip Fearnside, "Environmentalists split over Kyoto," 295-296.
[144] Fernanda Viana de Carvalho, "The Brazilian position," 161.

for attention of donors. Thus, they needed to either change their focus to stay relevant or find a way to include forests in the UN climate change discussions.

Since its founding, EDF has been involved with environmental issues. When Dr. Steve Schwartzman joined EDF, he had a particular concern with forests, especially the Amazon. Schwartzman previously "represented Brazil's Institute for Socio-Economic Studies (INESC), served as coordinator of the U.S.-Brazil Tropical Forest Action Network, and consulted for the Anthropology Resource Center and other indigenous rights organizations."[145] As a result, Schwartzman acquired a wide array of knowledge concerning deforestation. Furthermore, EDF's strong history with Chico Mendes and his legacies shows EDF's commitment to preserving and protecting forests in the Amazon.

WHRC also has prioritized climate change as their main issue since George Woodwell created the organization in 1985. In fact, WHRC "always worked with land based ecosystems, and climate change. Dr. Kilaparti Ramakrishana was the person who led the climate efforts on behalf of WHRC and the focus of the work was always on land use change."[146] Today, one of WHRC's core initiatives is forest monitoring. In order to increase the monitoring capabilities, WHRC scientists developed the Woods Hole Carbon Monitoring System (Woods Hole CMS), a satellite device that helps scientists observe and document "changes in forest carbon." This tool proved to be very useful for people who want to track carbon emissions in order to gage how much carbon credits they can sell to other people or organizations under the REDD+ program.[147]

At the time of the CDM discussion at the UNFCCC, IPAM was a relatively new organization, as it was started in 1995. Its primary area of interest was sustainable development in the Amazon forest. In 1999, IPAM was involved in the creation of a tool called Risque that

[145] EDF, "Steve Schwartzman."
[146] Interview with Georgia Carvalho, former WHRC staff.
[147] Woods Hole Research Center, "Forest Monitoring."

helped to enact legislation regarding the management of fires in the Amazon. In 2001, IPAM was involved in a project called "Seca Foresta," which was a study to determine the effects of rain reduction on the Amazon forest.[148] As one can see, from its birth, IPAM was concerned with forest conversation. Likewise, ISA also was very forest-oriented and focused on the preservation of forests and indigenous peoples' rights over their lands and natural resources.[149]

Even today, IPAM and ISA continue to have a strong interest in the preservation of forests. ISA is the orchestrator of a program that "produce[s] and publicize[s] information that can influence decisions about public policies and government actions concerning the defense of collective rights and the protection and conservation of Brazil's environmental heritage."[150] In fact, from 2013 to 2015, IPAM, ISA and WHRC, were among the NGOs that received a grant from Norway Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) to help enforce Brazil's Forest Code in one of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative's (NICFI) projects. For this project, NGOs "carry out applied research, advocacy, gauging transparency, monitoring implementation results and mobilising and increasing awareness of civil society."[151] From their involvement in this project, it is obvious that these environmental NGOs specialize in forest protection initiatives.

Starting in the 1970s, there was a slow emergence of scientific inquiry regarding climate change. Physicist Freeman Dyson believed that climate change was a serious threat to the world and wanted to find solutions in order to try to combat the problem. He found that with the rising levels of carbon dioxide due to the ever-expanding industrial world, one of the short-term solutions to help is to plant trees. This moment was essentially the beginning of the discussions

[148] IPAM, "Our Purpose."
[149] ISA, "By Laws."
[150] ISA, "Monitoring of Protected Areas."
[151] Norad, "Forest Code Observatory."

of how forests can help with climate change. As result of this science, there were also efforts by a humanitarian organization called CARE in 1974 in Guatemala to use trees as a way to combat climate change. There was also the beginning of research in the late 1900s and early 2000s on how deforestation directly affected climate change. For example, World Resources Institute (WHI) employed Mark Trexler to examine the relationship between forests and climate change. He argued that while it is a good solution to plant new trees, it is also critical to focus on efforts to decrease deforestation and save the trees. If newly planted trees are chopped down, then these trees are not helping to combat climate change.[152] Despite the emerging science, there was still no distinctive link between forests and climate change.

In order to include forest in the climate change discussions, NGOs encouraged scientists to establish this direct link, especially since there was a strong opposition from European NGOs, European green parties, and many environmental organizations present in the Global South to consider forests as part of the climate change debate.[153] One of the reasons why these NGOs opposed the inclusion of forests in the CDM was that these organizations saw, as Fearnside puts it, an "opportunity to strike a blow at the USA." Some NGOs in the opposition believed that the proposal "would become a means for developed countries [like the United States] to include their own forests to account for emissions reductions."[154] European green activists were also concerned that "wealthy nations like the United States would simply buy their way out of the their international obligations to permanently cut their burgeoning emissions."[155] European countries and organizations resented the United States for a number of things, but the primary

[152] Ecosystem Marketplace, *Full Circle: REDD*, 8-10.
[153] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, "Bringing Local Voices," 130.
[154] Sergio Abranches, "The Political Economy," 10.
[155] William Laurance, "A New Initiative," 20.

reason was United States' increased use of greenhouse gas emissions, and its efforts to weaken global warming policies.[156]

Even though there was some opposition from the Global North, a number of Brazilian organizations and US NGOs were in favor of the inclusion, namely Brazilian Amazonia Brazilian Amazonia affiliate of Friends of the Earth (FOE), the Socioenvironmental Institute (ISA), Environmental Research Institute of Amazonia (IPAM), Amazon Institute of People and the Environment (IMAZON), a wide array grassroots groups, National Council of Rubber Tappers (CNS), the Amazonian Working Group (GTA), the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), the Federation of Agricultural Workers of Pará (FETAGRI), the Coordinating Body of Indigenous Peoples of Brazilian Amazonia (COIAB), Conversation International (CI), Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC). Mario Monzoni who was the climate coordinator of FOE-Brazilian Amazonia best illustrates why so many Brazilian organizations were in favor of including forests in a press interview (referenced in Fearnside): "It is very easy to be in Washington or Amsterdam saying what nongovernmental organizations in the south (developing world) should do. We live here, this problem [deforestation] is here."[157]

While these Brazilian organizations and US NGOs put up a good fight, they were defeated, and forests did not become part of the CDM. According to Marcio Santilli, Coordinator of the Program on Politics and Social Environmental Rights at ISA (referenced in Rodrigues), "there was a planetary mental block regarding the connection forest-climate. Forests were to be addressed by the Convention on Biodiversity, while the Climate Change Convention

[156] Philip Fearnside, 296; Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 143.
[157] Philip Fearnside, 296-297.

was about industry and energy. As we predicted, we lost that 'round' ten to zero!"[158] Pro-forest inclusion NGOs believed that if they could establish that forests were carbon sinks, this evidence would strengthen their proposal to include forests in climate change discussions. Many European governments and NGOs, however, were skeptical of this argument. As a result, the UNFCCC commissioned the Large-Scale Biosphere-Atmosphere Experiment in Amazonia (LBA) to investigate this connection between forests and climate change.[159] The LBA was considered "the largest cooperative international scientific project ever to study the interaction between the Amazon Forest and the atmosphere and climate."[160] The study focused on whether forests are carbon sinks, specifically the Brazilian Amazon forest. Carbon sinks are "natural or artificial reservoir that absorbs and stores the atmosphere's carbon with physical and biological mechanisms."[161]

There was a stark disagreement, however, among the scientists involved in the LBA. On one hand, US based scientists and many Brazilian scientists believed that the Amazon was a net carbon sink. These scientists favored the idea that forests should be included in climate change discussions. On the other hand, European scientists and a handful of Brazilian scientists conceded that the Amazon was a carbon sink and an emitter of carbon dioxide; however, they held the position that the forest had no significant role in climate change discussions. Ultimately, the opponents of the REDD+ proposal believed that the "inclusion of forests in the Kyoto Protocol would make it easier for countries to meet their national emission reduction targets, thus reducing incentives to limit energy consumption."[162] Even though there was a major divide on the forest as a carbon sink issue, the LBA results were in favor of Brazilian

[158] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 126.
[159] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 131.
[160] Julia Kerr Casper, *Changing Ecosystems*, 70.
[161] Ocean and Climate Platform, "The ocean, a carbon sink."
[162] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 134.

organizations and US NGOs. The LBA study showed that the Amazon was truly a carbon sink. Now, NGOs had leverage to negotiate at the UNFCCC for the inclusion of forests, thus proving to their donors that they remained relevant in global environmental negotiations.

c) Partnerships

During the late 20th century, forests were slowly becoming a prominent issue in discussions among states and international organizations. In order to strengthen their advocacy for REDD+ and forest protection, NGOs relied on their partnerships with Brazilian government officials. One of these officials was Jose Sarney Filho who was the Ministry of the Environment under the Cardoso Administration (1998-2002). Filho felt strongly about environmental problems affecting Brazil, and wanted to expand "dialogue between Congress and civil society on those issues."[163] Since he had the authority to create the connection, Filho provided a channel for environmental activists and the Brazilian government to come together.

Another official was Mary Allegretti, who became the Ministry's Coordinator of Amazonia, and continued to create spaces for open communication between the government and global civil society. For example, she was involved in the creation of the Manifest with the Brazilian government before COP 6 in the Netherlands in an event sponsored by IPAM. With this Manifest, Allegretti was able to bring the Amazonian communities' concerns to the government. The Brazilian government agreed to these demands and signed "Civil Society's Manifest on the Relation between Forests and Climate Change – Expectations for COP 6" along with CNS, COLIAB, and GTA.[164] The partnership with Jose Sarney Filho and Mary Allegretti was very useful because these officials, with the help of NGOs, brought indigenous people and members of the government together to discuss the Amazonian people's grievances. This

[163] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 138.
[164] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 138-139.

partnership also laid the beginning groundwork for NGOs to work with the Brazilian government later to support forest being included in the UN climate change discussions in the early 2000s.

When forests became a point of contention with the CDM at the UN climate change discussions, NGOs needed to enter into partnerships with other NGOs and government officials in order to overcome obstacles. One obstacle for these NGOs was that forests were not included in the CDM contained in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.[165] The CDM included "reforestation and carbon offset" projects, but not "avoided deforestation projects."[166] During COP 7 in Marrakesh in 2001, a number of NGOs and governments came together to discuss whether forests should be accounted for in the CDM. The decision was far from unanimous. There was firm opposition primarily from European NGOs. The NGOs part of the opposition were the following: Greenpeace International, World Wildlife Fund-International (WWF), Birdlife International, and Friends of the Earth-International (FOE).[167]

Brazilian government officials were also adamantly against the inclusion of forests in the CDM from the 1990s to the early 2000s. This was partly because Brazil did not want to face international criticism due to its increased deforestation rates from 1993 to 2003. Brazil also felt that forest maintenance was a national issue, and should be free from international intervention.[168] Abranches argues that the policies related to deforestation, namely the CDM and REDD+, were the result of the convergence of two paths: ideological and political. At the start of the deforestation advocacy, it is evident that the ideological path was unfolding first. This is because NGOs operated outside of government structures, involved their own researchers from their own organizations in order to highlight justifications for deforestation policies, and used the

[165] Franck Lecocq and Philippe Ambrosi, 136-137.
[166] Anthony Hall, "Getting REDD-Y," 194.
[167] Philip Fearnside, 296.
[168] Fernanda Viana de Carvalho, 157-158.

UNFCCC as a medium to focus international attention on the issue of deforestation. The political path was created when Marina Silva, then the Minister of the Environment (MMA), decided to engage in discussions about REDD+ with her other Brazilian government officials.[169]

While Brazil was not in favor of forest inclusion in the climate change discussions, NGOs partnered with Marina Silva, who was a Senator of Brazil at this time, to show Brazilian officials why Amazonia needed to be preserved. For example, with the cooperation of Senator Marina Silva, IPAM and ISA set up the *National Seminar on Amazonia's Development*, which took place in the Brazilian Federal Senate. The attendees were the following: Amazonian grassroots groups along with Brazilian lawmakers, members of research institutions and NGOs associated with REDD+ TAN, and ministers from departments such as the environment, transportation and science and technology. They were present to discuss the importance of forest protection and the negative effects of deforestation. IPAM and ISA decided to have David Nepstad from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) speak about the benefits that can be obtained if Brazil chose to reduce its carbon emissions. In another discussion at the event, IPAM and ISA had a representative from GTA speak about "Pro-Ambiente – a proposal for a credit policy for Amazonia."[170] Thus, this partnership was helpful because Marina Silva provided an opportunity for grassroots groups to speak with Brazilian government about community concerns and propose possible solutions to protect their lands and resources. Furthermore, the Marina Silva partnership also would become very beneficial when NGOs needed support for REDD+ from the Brazilian government.

NGOs capitalized on the active participation and fluid communication among Brazilian people to spread awareness of the concept of REDD+. One REDD+ TAN partnership was with

[169] Sergio Abranches, 1.
[170] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 140.

Fabio Feldman, a Brazilian congressman. After NGOs educated him about ideas related to REDD+, he decided to help with REDD+ efforts. This partnership was also a success because Feldman was able to set up a forum for government departments, businesses, academic scholars and other members of civil society to discuss policies related to climate change, called the Brazilian forum on Climate Change. The forum created a space where NGO representatives, Brazilian people, and government officials can discuss the benefits of including forests in the UN climate change discussions. In this way, this forum allowed the Brazilian people to engage in dialogue with their government who did not approve of REDD+, or any type of international policies that scrutinized deforestation for that matter.[171]

While REDD+ TAN was gaining momentum in the international sphere and in Brazil in the early 2000s, Brazilian officials and a number of NGOs, primarily European, still did not accept the REDD+. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations (Itamaraty) and the Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communication (MCT) did not approve of the carbon offset idea because Brazil wanted to continue to maintain control over its natural resources. In particular, Itamaraty opposed REDD+ because its officials feared that "accepting reduced-deforestation funds from industrial nations could potentially limit their future development options."[172] While Marina Silva advocated for the need to reduce deforestation, she feared that "…a RED-like mechanism would lead to complacency on the part of the Brazilian government, and the abandonment of a wider set of policies to permanently control deforestation and ensure forest conservation."[173] NGOs such as FOE, WWF, Greenpeace, CI, Climate Action Network (CAN) and Attack also continued to despise the REDD+ proposal.

Since the pro-forest NGOs continued to face stiff opposition for their REDD+ proposal,

[171] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 140.
[172] William Laurance, 21.
[173] Sergio Abranches, 12.

these NGOs reformulated their idea in order to gain Brazilian approval, specifically from Itamaraty and MCT. The new REDD+ proposal stated that countries could be compensated for reducing their carbon emissions at the national level. In other words,

> Linking REDD+ to a country's commitment to reducing its overall emissions eliminated the problem of it being applied on a limited, project-by-project basis (where reduction of emissions from deforestation by one project might be used to offset increased emissions from another project).[174]

For example, if Cameroon decreased its carbon emissions in one part of the country but increased its carbon emission in another part, then Cameroon will not receive any money. Because the net reduction of its carbon emission would be zero or even worse, there would be an increase in carbon emissions.[175] Consequently, this proposal increased the states' accountability to reduce its overall carbon emissions. With renewed confidence, REDD+ TAN submitted the proposal to COP 9 in Milan in 2003 and invited Marina Silva who, at the time, was the newly appointed Brazilian Minister of the MMA to the convention. The careful restructuring of the REDD+ proposal proved to be very successful for the pro-forest NGOs because following COP 9, for the first time, Silva, a member of the Brazilian government, was considering backing the mechanism that protected forests from deforestation.

REDD+ TAN, however, knew that they still needed more support from Brazilian officials to accept REDD+. Its partnership with Marina Silva proved to be very advantageous to make many of REDD+ TAN's opponents accept REDD+. Because Marina Silva was the Minister of the MMA, she was able to create "a political space for open discussions of deforestation reduction policies, bringing together NGOs researchers and government officials."[176] With the combined efforts of Marina Silva and REDD+ TAN scientists, namely Carlos Nobre from IPAM

[174] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 143.
[175] William Laurance, 21.
[176] Sergio Abranches, 2.

and members from the IPCC, who found evidence that the Amazon was a carbon sink, many Brazil officials began to consider REDD+. In fact, Brazilian environmental NGOs who originally opposed REDD+ agreed to support the proposal. Even more United States INGOs supported REDD+, including TNC, CI, and NRDC.

Even though REDD+ TAN gained more supporters for its REDD+ proposal, REDD+ TAN was still met with resistance from European NGOs and the Brazilian government. Once again, REDD+ TAN partnership with Marina Silva was so valuable to its objective. With the help of the Norwegian government, Silva was able to create a "pro-RED coalition within the Coalition For Rainforest Nations," consisting of all countries in the developing world such as Costa Rica, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Malaysia, with the exception of Brazil.[177] Since these countries were all advocating for REDD+, it became politically problematic for European NGOs to reject REDD+ any longer. If they continued to oppose the proposal, then these European NGOs could be accused of "environmental imperialism," which would weaken their reputation and legitimacy. As a result, these European NGOs reluctantly embraced REDD+, another win for REDD+ TAN. This convergence of science and politics contributed to parties present at the COP 11 to accept REDD+ TAN's REDD+ proposal in 2005, allowing REDD+ to become part of the UNFCCC.[178]

It is important to note that, at this point, the Brazilian government was still not sold on REDD+. NGOs still faced some opposition from the Brazilian government following COP 11 in 2005. If the Brazil government was going to accept REDD+, then government officials wanted to set the following limits on the mechanism: "No PPG-17-like project, no commonalities, no

[177] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 146.
[178] Sergio Abranches, 12.

binding commitments, no strings attached on the way we use the money."[179] In COP 12 in Nairobi in 2006, the Brazilian government submitted a REDD+ proposal that "addressed deforestation using voluntary donations rather than carbon offsets" because they believed that the REDD+ was "infeasible" in its current form.[180] Once again, REDD+ TAN's partnership with the Marina Silva proved to be helpful because, in 2006, Marina Silva with MMA along with other government officials from different countries banded together to devise a prototype that would take into consideration Brazil's demands. This idea came to be known as the Amazon Fund, which was later presented at COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia in December 2007 at a side event.

The Amazon Fund was created, so that REDD+ could exist. The Amazon Fund was based on primarily grants and did not permit carbon offsets. The managing institution of the Fund was the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), a Scientific Committee whose role is to certify emission reductions, and an Orienting Committee that "defines criteria for investments, with representatives from various ministries, states, civil society, academia, and indigenous peoples." The Amazon Fund was highly favored because Erik Solheim, the Norwegian Minister for the Environment, readily agreed to pledge US $100 million to help fund the mechanism. [181] In 2008, the Amazon Fund became law in Brazil.

As advocates, pro-forest NGOs were very effective. The inclusion of forests and the creation of Amazon Fund were significant conquests for these organizations. Originally, forests were not included in climate change discussions. The exclusion of forest caused many pro-forest NGOs to become concerned with their capacity to obtain donor funding. As a result, the NGOs needed to ensure that their mission stayed relevant. With the inclusion of forests in the UN climate change discussions in 2005, NGOs focused on forest issues were no longer at a

[179] Sergio Abranches, 13.
[180] Sergio Abranches, 13.
[181] Maria Guadalupe Moog Rodrigues, 138-145.

disadvantage when competing with NGOs primarily concerned with climate change, energy, or air pollution issues for funding from donors. Originally, the Brazilian government was against any mechanism that would punish the country for its deforestation levels. However, the possibility, opened by the REDD+ concept, for the creation of the Amazon Fund contributed to Brazil's acceptance of REDD+. REDD+ TAN activities substantially helped Brazil evolve "from a simple veto to the proposition of alternatives" when dealing with REDD+-related activities.[182] There were three key factors that led to the effectiveness of NGOs advocating for REDD+.

First, NGOs established legitimacy or strong relationships between themselves and their beneficiaries. Specifically Dr. Steve Schwartzman from EDF, worked closely with Chico Mendes, and listened to his wishes. He wanted to create extractive resources in order to conserve the forests. EDF took steps to make Mendes' vision into a reality. EDF built a consensus around the idea of needing to preserve the Amazon among indigenous people. Due to EDF's discussions, more people, especially those from CNS and Union of Indigenous People, agreed to help protect the forest. EDF worked with the Yolanda Fleming to persuade the Acre government to approve the creation of extractive reserves. Dr. Steve Schwartzman, with help from Mary Allegretti, created a study to show the benefits of extractive reserves. After extensive research and consensus building, extractive reserves were built in Brazil. NGOs also listened to their beneficiaries when they were trying to persuade the Brazilian government to accept their REDD+ proposal. The Brazilian government was concerned about how REDD+ diminishes its national sovereignty over the Amazon. NGOs listened to the government, and reconfigured the REDD+ concept to take into account their beneficiaries' concerns. As a result of this compromise, Brazil created the Amazon Fund, so that REDD+ projects can be financed in the

[182] Fernanda Viana de Carvalho, 161-162.

country.

Second, NGOs were able to overcome their bureaucratic constraints. Knowing that the exclusion of forests in the climate change discussion would harm future donor funding, NGOs took measures to ensure that their cause to protect the forest remained relevant. As a result, they encouraged scientists to create the LBA, which investigated whether forests were carbon sinks. Since the LBA showed that forests were carbon sinks, it helped pro-forest NGOs to show donors that there was still a need to fund projects that protected forests.

Third, NGOs established lasting partnerships. They worked with a number of Brazilian officials, including Marina Silva, Jose Sarney Filho, Mary Allegretti, and Fabio Feldman, in an effort to persuade MCT and Itamaraty to support the REDD+ proposal. These individuals provided open communication channels between the people of the forest and the government. These channels allowed people to voice their concerns regarding deforestation of the Amazon with the government. In addition to NGO efforts, these discussions partly helped the Brazilian government to realize the potential advantages of REDD+, influencing them to create the Amazon Fund. Partnerships, especially with Marina Silva, even helped the pro-forest NGOs to defeat the European NGO opposition. Marina Silva was able to create a pro-REDD+ coalition with many developing countries in the international sphere, making it very hard for European NGOs to continue to adamantly oppose REDD+. As a result, European NGOs surrendered and supported REDD+.

By examining REDD+ advocacy efforts using the three criteria, it is evident that the NGOs, focusing on advocacy, achieved a high level of effectiveness. These NGOs were truly able to be the voices for the voiceless. Since forests were part of the United Nations climate change discussions, it was up to the pro-forest NGOs to implement REDD+. Now, NGOs had to

take on a different role: that of policy implementers.

4

NGOs as Policy Implementers

Once new regimes are set up, advocacy NGOs have become indispensable to their implementation and maintenance because in practice most international agreements rely on self-reporting by states and the UN machinery for monitoring and implementation is understaffed, underfunded, and often unable to complete its mandated work on its own.

–Kim D. Reimann, "A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and Worldwide Growth," 64.

After REDD+ TAN won the battle in the UNFCCC arena, forests were finally included in the UN climate change discussions, and the Amazon Fund was created. NGOs acquired a big responsibility to scout out beneficiaries who wanted to carry out REDD+ initiatives to save their forests, and implement REDD+ projects. Pro-forest NGOs' opportunity to implement REDD+ came when Chief Almir Surui wanted to conserve the area occupied by the Paiter Surui people, whom he represented. Chief Almir Surui engaged in dialogue, and eventually established partnerships with Forest Trends, the Association for Ethno- environmental Defense (Kanindé), the Amazonian Institute of Sustainable Development (IDESAM), Amazon Conservation Team (ACT), Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO), and Equipe de Conservação da Amazônia (ECAM); the latter part of this group was involved in the later phase of the project. This group of organizations has become identified in the literature as responsible for implementing the first REDD+ project in Brazil.[183]

In December of 2004, Chief Almir Surui hired ACT as a service provider, after hearing about the cultural map, documenting assets such as burial sites, and traditional hunting grounds, that ACT created for another indigenous group in a nearby state. ACT agreed to be a service

[183] It became evident, in the course of this research, that the literature's understanding is incorrect.

provider because making cultural maps was one of its specialties. In fact, ACT's Brazilian office received about two million dollars annually to create maps and document indigenous culture.[184] In order to fully comprehend the extent of deforestation in the Seto de Setembro Indigenous Territory (TISS) region of the Paiter Surui people, ACT thought it was a good idea to conduct a cultural map of the region. ACT received a $250,000 grant from Annenberg Foundation to develop a cultural map for Chief Almir Surui's people.[185]

In addition to creating a cultural map, ACT used some of the organization's funding to send Chief Almir on trips to raise money for his cause. On one of his trips to San Francisco, Chief Almir met Beto Borges who, at the time, was in charge of the Communities and Market initiatives of the NGO, Forest Trends. Chief Almir created a 50-Year Plan for forest management, and presented it to Forest Trends. Chief Almir wanted to know about the ways in which Forest Trends could help him save the forests within his people's land. This moment was an opportune time for Borges to talk about the benefits of carbon offset projects, especially the financial advantages. After hearing Chief Almir's story and his cause, Beto Borges readily agreed to help him to initiate the process of creating an avoided deforestation REDD+ project.[186]

Forest Trends listened to its beneficiaries, especially Chief Almir, at the start of the project. For example, Borges said, "He [Almir] wanted several partners, each doing what they do best, instead of one entity, because he said he never wanted to become dependent on one organization."[187] As a result, Borges identified a number of partners for the implementation of the Surui Forest Carbon Project (PCFS), including IDESAM and Katoomba Incubator (KI). The KI was an initiative of Forest Trends that provides assistance to newly created projects from

[184] Instituto Socioambiental, "Procurador pede."
[185] Steve Zwick, "Almir Surui."
[186] Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 6.
[187] Steve Zwick, "Almir Surui."

"informing policy" to "building on local capacity."[188] IDESAM first assessed whether the Paiter Surui people could implement a reforestation or afforestation project (a project allowing populations to "earn income by generating offsets for planting trees").[189] However, IDESAM believed that it would take too long for the Paiter Surui people to obtain money for such a project. As a result, Forest Trends/KI and IDESAM believed that the Surui should initiate an "avoided deforestation" project, but without inserting it in the evolving structure that the REDD+ concept was acquiring within the scope of UNFCCC. This situation meant that rather than waiting for the operationalization of REDD+ within UNFCCC, the Surui "would have to pilot untested methodologies in the voluntary carbon market."[190]

There was also no national legislation in Brazil yet, outlining the steps for the implementation of REDD+ projects. REDD+ was being implemented in Brazil through "the strategy of 'fait accompli,'"[191] which "consists in pushing ahead with ambitious projects, without worrying about either feasibility or popular support."[192] Despite the risks of piloting an initiative in "unchartered waters," Forest Trends/KI, ACT and IDESAM still decided to start a voluntary carbon offset project with the Surui people (note that the REDD+ mechanism of the UNFCCC does not allow for individual/isolated carbon offset projects) and just "repackaged" it as a REDD+ project to gain global visibility.

In 2007, in order to push the process forward and justify that the Paiter Surui people were eligible to receive income for the PCFS, NGOs needed to know the magnitude of deforestation present in the Amazon, specifically in the state of Rondônia. As a result, Vasco van Roosmalen who was the program director of ACT put Chief Almir Surui in contact with Rebecca Moore, the

[188] Jacob Olander, Beto Borges, and Almir Surui, "The Surui Project," 112.
[189] Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 6.
[190] Steve Zwick, "The Story of Surui."
[191] Chris Lang. "Interview with Cleber."
[192] Giandomenico Majone, *Rethinking the Union*, 49.

manager of Google Outreach in 2007. ACT's cultural map allowed Chief Almir Surui to gain the attention of Google that later helped him and his people upload the TISS territory to Google Earth, documenting the Amazon and the effects of illegal logging on the land.[193] While Moore only scheduled a meeting for 30 minutes, she and her team spoke with Chief Almir over three hours once Chief Almir told them about his story and his mission to save Amazonia.[194]

One of the members present at the meeting was John Hanke who was the creator of Keyhole, later called Google Earth. Moore brought her team to Lapetanha, Almir's birthplace on his reservation, in the state of Rondônia. They came with laptops, satellite telephones, camera equipment, and video beamers. Together with Google, they were able to create a video for YouTube and a website, documenting the current deforestation in their territory. The Paiter Surui people were also able to learn how to upload geo-tag material and a cultural map of their territory onto Google Earth. Even though the pictures taken did not have the greatest resolution, the pictures still showed the magnitude of deforestation plaguing the land. For example, in the photos, viewers were able to see the locations where "wood poachers and gold prospectors" have or once had a firm foothold in a particular piece of the territory.[195]

In addition to needing to know the magnitude of deforestation in Rondônia, NGOs also needed to know if the Paiter Surui people had rights to carbon credits derived from avoiding deforestation in their lands, and subsequently, were legally able to earn money from "carbon sequestration" under the REDD+ program.[196]. As a result, these organizations needed firms and companies that had the expertise in the field to produce that kind of work. A law firm was hired to verify if the indigenous people had rights to the carbon removed from the atmosphere by the

[193] Steve Zwick, "Almir Surui."
[194] Juliane Von Mittelstaedt, "Using the Internet."
[195] Juliane Von Mittelstaedt, "Using the Internet."
[196] Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 6.

trees in their lands. As a result, Forest Trends entered into a contractual relationship with the law firm of Trench, Rossi, and Watanabe, the Brazil-based office of Baker and McKenzie, in 2007 and 2008.[197]

In two studies, the law firm performed an in-depth analysis of Brazilian laws, Constitution statutes, and prior legal decisions, concerning the handling of natural resources in the Surui territory to determine the Paiter Surui's rights.[198] The purpose of the 2008 study was "to determine who owns the rights to carbon credits" from the same reforestation [or avoided deforestation] project that brought Chief Almir and Borges together."[199] The lawyers reached the conclusion that the Paiter Surui people had ownership rights over the carbon absorbed from the trees in their region of the Amazon. This conclusion had a very positive effect on Brazil's National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), the federal agency responsible for indigenous people in Brazil, because it opened the door for Forest Trends to speak with the agency about the benefits of carbon trading for indigenous people in February of 2009. After the meetings between Forest Trends and FUNAI, FUNAI encouraged the indigenous people of Brazil to explore carbon-trading projects to safeguard the Amazon.[200]

The 2009 study was also a big win for the Chief Almir Surui, the PCFS, and even other indigenous people interested in creating their own carbon trade projects to preserve Amazonia. After they deeply vetted the Brazilian laws again, the lawyers were employed to see whether the Surui people own the carbon credits and whether they can receive money from these carbon credits under the REDD+ program. This 2009 study showed similar positive results as the 2008 study. The lawyers found "economic benefits from payments for carbon credits deriving from

[197] Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 6.
[198] Jacob Olander, Beto Borges, and Almir Surui, 114.
[199] Steve Zwick, "Brazilian Tribe Solidifies."
[200] Steve Zwick, "Brazilian Tribe Soldifies."

CDM or Voluntary Market forest projects belong to the Surui."[201] To put it another way, people had the right to the carbon credits, and were able to receive income from such credits, as determined by the UNFCCC and its recently designed REDD+ program.

In 2009, the Google team taught the people how to use cellphones and Open Data Kit to record illegal logging occurring in the territory. With cellphones, the Surui people were able to take photos that automatically denoted its location. They were also able to take videos using the phones, and upload them to Google Earth using Google's mapping features. These tools allowed the Surui to document the location of illegal logging for themselves as well as for the world.[202] The Internet allowed the Paiter Surui people to "share their unique history and way of life with people all around the globe…[and] can see the effects of their [illegal loggers'] work with their own eyes."[203] When an individual uses Google Earth to look at the Amazon, he or she can view Almir's territory, which before was blank on Google's satellite images program. Furthermore, through the videos and location specific photos, people from all over the world were able to see the extent to which illegal logging was harming forest conservation efforts.

In that same year, the NGOs started the free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) phase of the project. FPIC occurred in three phases: First, Paiter Surui met without any persons external to the peoples (nations); second, project partners met with the Paiter Surui people; and third, project partners conducted field visits in Paiter Surui people's villages to gain further trust and support. The first phase happened primarily in March. In March of 2009, representatives from the four Surui clans, Gameb, Gabir, Kaben, and Makor, gathered together to discuss the PCFS. For the March meetings, the Surui people introduced the concept of REDD+ and the premises of

[201] Katoomba Incubator, "Baker and McKenzie."
[202] Google Earth Outreach, "Chief Almir and the Surui Tribe."
[203] Google Earth Outreach, "Chief Almir and the Surui Tribe."

PCFS, namely fund management and the process of receiving money from carbon credits.[204] This meeting proved to be very successful because 95% of Paiter Surui attendees agreed to have further discussion of the proposed PCFS and signed a "cooperation agreement, launching an extensive process of education and engagement to ensure the FPIC of all the Paiter people."[205]

The second phase of the FPIC occurred mostly from April until June. In April of 2009, NGOs met with the Paiter Surui people at a Metareilá Association meeting. Metareilá Association is a local NGO that ensures Paiter Surui representation in decisions affecting the peoples' community.[206] During this meeting, clan members discussed the benefits of selling carbon credits as an alternative source of revenue for the community.[207] ACT also orchestrated "an extensive process of 10 village-level information sessions covering 14 villages."[208] During these information sessions, ACT along with PCFS supporters discussed the concept of REDD+, the financial structures of a REDD+ project, and the indigenous peoples' roles in the project. On June 9, 2009, the Surui clans agreed to initiate the project by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), a document detailing the project partners and their responsibilities in the implementation of the PCFS.[209] By the time of the MOU signing, the PCFS was funded by:

> The United States Agency for International Development, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, the Overbrook Foundation, the Blue Moon Fund, the World Bank Development Grants Facility, the Global Environment Facility, the Citi Foundation, and the United Kingdom Department for International Development.[210]

In 2010, once the NGOs knew that the people can obtain income from the project and the Paiter Surui people agreed to the PCFS, FUNBIO became a part of the project. Its jobs

[204] Thiago Avila "Free, Prior, and Informed," 17.
[205] Steve Zwick, "The Story of Surui."
[206] The REDD Desk, "Metareilá Association."
[207] Thiago Avila, 33.
[208] Jacob Olander, Beto Borges, and Almir Surui, 116.
[209] Jacob Olander, Beto Borges, and Almir Surui, 112.
[210] Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 6.

predominately relate to finance. Its main responsibilities were "designing the financial mechanisms for benefit sharing and resource management" as well as "develop[ing] accurate budgets and financial projections to inform a financeable framework for the project, essentially identify overall transaction costs and break-even point."[211] This financial mechanism to disburse the money from selling the PCFS' carbon credits was later called the Surui Trust Fund.

As will be discussed later, in 2012, ACT left the PCFS, and ECAM, a former partner organization of ACT, replaced ACT in the project. Since it was up to ECAM, IDESAM, Forest Trends/KI, and Kanindé to ensure that the PCFS would be "sold" as a REDD+ project and maintain donor funding, the project required certain certifications. In particular, one certification was the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity certification from the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA), which is managed by Verra.[212] Verra is an NGO created in 2005 that is "committed to helping reduce emissions, improve livelihoods, and protect natural resources across the private and public sectors."[213] In order to obtain this certification, the PCFS was required to meet 17 different criteria from demonstrating the project's "long-term viability" to its potential "offset stakeholder impacts."[214]

To achieve Gold Level status for the Climate, Community, and Biodiversity (CCB) accreditation, the project needed to meet at least one optional criterion such as illustrating "exceptional community benefits."[215] NGOs also had to involve the four Surui clans in the development of the project to obtain this certification. Each clan decided to have different commitments from exploring fish farming to specializing in non-timber products. On March 30, 2012, the PCFS received the Gold Level for the CCB certification, meaning that "all

[211] Jacob Olander, Beto Borges, and Almir Surui, 116.
[212] The Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance, "CCB Standards."
[213] Verra, "About Verra."
[214] Verra, "CCB Standards Checklist;" for the full set of criteria for the CCB, visit https://verra.org/ccb-standards-checklist/ .
[215] Verra, "CCB Standards Checklist."

requirements [of the CCB Standards Checklist] and also at least one optional Gold Level criterion," were met.[216]

In order to qualify as a carbon offset (valued in carbon markets), the project also had to pass a validation and verification phase. To pass this phase and earn the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) certification from the VCS Program, auditors from Institute of Management and Certification of Forests and Farms (Imaflora) and Rainforest Alliance had to conclude that the Surui people were executing the PCFS, as illustrated in the Project Design Document (PDD).[217] NGOs made a "business as usual" plan, detailing the future of the Amazon if the present conditions were maintained, steps that will be taken to reduce deforestation, and the fund management procedures for the project.[218] In other words, the Surui people had to show that deforestation rates were decreasing in the TISS territory of the Amazon. IDESAM took the lead in designing this part of the project.

With the help of Forest Trends, IDESAM first used SimAmazonia, a simulation model showing possible future outcomes for the Amazon if the deforestation continued.[219] IDESAM used this model for "measuring the impact of man's action on the forest, and then for converting that impact to tons of carbon saved."[220] Since SimAmazonia was not able to take into account "logging and unregulated agriculture," IDESAM worked closely with Brazil's National Institute of Amazonian Research and France's AgroParis Tech to create another simulation model called SimSurui that took logging and unregulated agriculture into account when recording deforestation. With SimSurui, they were able to get a baseline assessment of the deforestation in the TISS territory. This baseline was key for VCS auditors to validate the project, and allow the

[216] The Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance, "CCB Standards."
[217] Steve Zwick, "Almir Surui."
[218] Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 7.
[219] Jacob Olander, Beto Borges, and Almir Surui, 119.
[220] Steve Zwick, "Don't Call it Charity."

project to move forward.[221] In June of 2012, the auditors validated the project, meaning they accepted the baseline assessment and the design of the project, illustrated in the PDD.[222] At the time, FUNAI and the Attorney General's office even supported the PCFS publicly.

Even though there was a fire in 2010, destroying some of the TISS territory, the auditors still found that Paiter Surui clans were successfully preserving the Amazon in May of 2013. In fact, the auditors found that the PCFS "prevented up to 360,000 tons of carbon dioxide from being released into the atmosphere, forming the basis of the carbon credits."[223] Consequently, the Paiter Surui people were now able to sell their carbon credits, and obtain money from them. Two of the recipients of the PCFS's carbon credits were Natura Cosméticos and the International Federation of Football Association (FIFA) for the 2014 World Cup.[224] Success was partly due to the international support for REDD+, making it easier for the Paiter Surui people and the NGOs to "sell" this carbon offset project under the success of the REDD+ concept (but not under the Amazon Fund institutional structure).

While there was initial success with the project, it soon declined. In 2015, Metareilá Association found evidence of gold and diamond mining in the TISS territory. This situation is problematic because diamond mining (called garimpo) negatively impacts the environment. Miners have to dig "up massive amounts of soil, using mercury to draw out any gold, and then burning the residue."[225] In 2016, FUNBIO no longer managed the Surui Fund. All funds and fund management responsibilities were transferred to Metareilá Association.[226] That same year, the discovery of diamonds expanded mining and the Paiter police, once again, took note of the

[221] Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 8.
[222] Fabiano Toni, Isadora A.R. Ferriera, and Igor N.R. Ferriera, "Adapting to emerging institutions," 8-9.
[223] Ecosystem Marketplace, "Indigenous Tribe Earns Validation."
[224] Kelley Hamrick, "Bioflica."
[225] Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 9.
[226] Brazilian Biodiversity Fund, "Fundo Surui."

environmental devastation from the miners.[227] This increase in deforestation due to mining and cattle ranchers negatively affected the PCFS, to the point that it was suspended indefinitely in September of 2018.

Fabiano Toni, Isadora A.R. Ferreira, and Igor N.R. Ferreira claim that PCFS project was "exceptional" due, in part, to its "resource project partners who helped them [Paiter Surui people] build a sound long-term land use plan."[228] Claudia Suzanne Marie Nathalie Vitel, Gabriel Cardoso Carrero, Mariano Colini Cenamo, Maya Leroy, Paulo Mauricio Lima A. Graça, Philip Martin Fearnside, Mariano Colini Cenamo, Mariana Nogueira Pavan, Ana Cristina Barros, and Fernanda Carvalho (referenced in Alvarez, Elfving, and Andrade), argue that the PCFS is a "fruitful and promising experience of REDD+, especially to their governance, including several organizations."[229] My research on the NGOs involved in the PCFS, however, tells a very different story.

In the next section, I assess the effectiveness of NGOs, namely Amazon Conservation Team (ACT), Forest Trends/KI, the Association for Ethno- environmental Defense (Kanindé), the Amazonian Institute of Sustainable Development (IDESAM), Fundo Brasileiro da Biodiversidade (FUNBIO), and Equipe de Conservação da Amazônia (ECAM) as policy implementers of REDD+ initiatives, specifically the Surui Forest Carbon Project (PCFS) according to the three criteria that I have argued affect such effectiveness: their legitimacy or relations with beneficiaries; bureaucratic constraints they face; and the partnerships they build.

a) Relations with Beneficiaries

Together, IDESAM, Forest Trends and its side initiative, Katoomba Incubator, ACT, and Kanindé worked with Chief Almir to communicate the idea of a carbon offset project to the

[227] Steve Zwick, "The Story of Surui."
[228] Fabiano Toni, Isadora A.R. Ferriera, and Igor N.R. Ferriera, 10.
[229] Guineverre Alvarez, Maria Elfving and Célio Andrade, 135.

Paiter Surui people. All of these organizations were chosen due to their "core expertise, proven reputation, as well as by their close association with either the Metareilá Association or Forest Trends."[230] In particular, FUNBIO had a great reputation because FUNBIO was created through a grant from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in February of 2015. To date, GEF has given over $13 million USD to upwards of four thousand environmental sustainability initiatives in over 150 countries, such as Brazil. FUNBIO worked closely with the GEF on these sustainability projects. However, after showing its ability to sufficiently disburse funds, FUNBIO became independent of GEF to disburse and manage funds for REDD+ projects. Now, FUNBIO specifically manages Amazon Fund resources and a number of forest conservation projects, namely the GEF's Amazon Region Protected Areas Program (ARPA).[231]

While Forest Trends, ACT and the other organizations worked with some of the Paiter Surui people, the NGOs never diminished the opposition against the PCFS, namely from the Missionary Council for Indigenous Peoples (CIMI)—an organization that fights for indigenous peoples' rights in Brazil.[232] CIMI strongly supported the Paiter Surui people, including Henrique Surui, who were very involved in logging projects in the TISS region and opposed REDD+ mechanisms.

According to Cleber Buzatto, the Executive Secretary of CIMI, the organization argues: "REDD is another expression of the capitalist movement…[and] the culture of disposal strengthens the movement of exploitation of natural resources, which have become commodities to feed back into the system."[233] When the Metareilá Association and Chief Almir became aware of Henrique Surui's involvement in logging, Chief Almir alerted the Paiter leadership

[230] Jacob Olander, Beto Borges, and Almir Surui, 112.
[231] Brazilian Biodiversity Fund, "GEF Agency."
[232] The Missionary Council for Indigenous Peoples, "Background."
[233] Chris Lang, "Interview with Cleber Buzatto."

since he did not have a police force to remove the loggers. Even though the Paiter leaders signed a "logging moratorium," showing that they accepted and encouraged forest carbon offset projects, the local leaders refused to help.[234]

Even though the Paiter Surui people agreed to the creation of the PCFS, it is important to note that these meetings did not always have all-important parties in attendance. Sometimes these meetings did not have all community members or the NGOs involved in the project after the MOU was signed. For instance, in June of 2009, Surui clan leaders convened another meeting with members of the Metareilá Association at the organization's headquarters to discuss evidence that the NGOs were collecting information on the state of Amazon for the Project Design Document (PDD) and documenting the negative impacts of logging on the Amazon.[235]

There was another meeting in July of 2009 that lacked NGO representation. On July 7, 2009, six clan representatives had a meeting to de-brief 115 other clan members about their visit to Brasilia, Brazil's capital. These representatives detailed how they were able to speak with officials from different federal agencies about problems facing the indigenous people as well as the possibility of receiving resources for "the development of environmental and social projects in the Indigenous Land Sete de Setembro."[236] In fact, there were also meetings, discussing project technicalities without members of the NGOs present.[237] This situation is problematic because the Surui leaders might relay misinformation about the project to others, and there is no one with technical expertise to provide clarifications.

While the Paiter Surui clan signed the MOU, the REDD+ project in Xingu territory shows the potential dangers of not communicating project features fully and comprehensively to

[234] Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 8.
[235] Thiago Avila, 33.
[236] Thiago Avila, 33.
[237] Jacob Olander, Beto Borges, and Almir Surui, 115-116.

the indigenous peoples. The Xingu people were confused about certain aspects of the REDD+ carbon offset project. They did not understand where the revenue was coming from to fund the project, and how their project was connected to REDD+. As a result, many of the Xingu people, members of ISA, Instituto Centro de Vida (ICV), IPAM and Fundacao Nacional do Indio (FUNAI) gathered in the Xingu Park to clear up the confusion in a REDD+ seminar. These organizations discussed the "origin of REDD +, the international discussions, and the decisions of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change on this [REDD+] mechanism."[238]

Since there was a lot of confusion, FUNAI recommended that the indigenous people attend more seminars, discussing REDD+ and its funding sources, namely the Amazon Fund, to further familiarize themselves with the project. The indigenous people, however, felt that there was too much talking, and not enough progress and transparency. Thus, the Xingu people decided to create the Working Group of the Xingu Management plan to manage their resources.[239] This situation is a testament to how the NGOs are not sufficiently involving their beneficiaries in the creation and implementation of REDD+ projects. As a result, the people are unaware of their roles in the project, making it harder for the project to progress and show positive results. It seems that the Paiter Surui people were being rushed by the NGOs who saw an opportunity to gain visibility by advancing the PCFS.

One of the reasons for the project's deterioration was the Fundo Paiter Surui (Surui Fund)'s slow payment dispersal for carbon credits sold. As a result, NGOs also lost legitimacy with the Surui people, leading them to seek out other opportunities to make income. At first, in 2014, the Paiter Surui people were quickly given money from selling carbon credits, especially from their 2013 transaction with Natura Cosméticos. However, the amount of money given to

[238] Amazon Environmental Research Institute, "IPAM participa."
[239] Amazon Environmental Research Institute, "IPAM participa."

the people was then greatly reduced, and some clans were not even paid. The project promised that the sums of money from transactions would be paid in two payments, but some clans are still waiting on the second payment. In a letter to the Federal Public Ministry (Ministério Público Federal) in 2015, the clans who received payments noted:

> Contracts had been signed for an amount of R$7,500.00, payable in three monthly installments of R$2,500.00; however, associations received two installments of R$ 2,000.00 and one installment of R$ 2,500.00 and when they requested the amount still due, the Metareilá Association claimed that it had no means to pay the outstanding amount.[240]

When the clans asked for receipts from past payment dispersals and a response, detailing the Surui Fund's fund management procedures, the clans received no answer. Even from the initial creation of the Surui Fund, the clans had no "transparent presentation of financial accounts for the funds received."[241]

In fact, there seems to be a significant financial transparency problem with the Surui Fund associated with the PCFS. Paiter Surui people said that clan leaders were asked to sign proof of payment receipts, even though their clan never received money for their efforts to protect the Amazon. When there was an independent audit done to examine the financial flows of the Surui Fund, the auditors only spoke to four out of twenty-five villages. According to the Paiter Surui people, these four villages were "chosen by project managers" and the people interviewed were "chosen in advance to talk about the benefits of the project."[242] Even when clans voiced their concerns about the lack of payment and the behavior of these project managers (community members managing the funds), some clan members stated that they faced punishment. Transferring fund management to Metareilá is especially problematic because

[240] Celso Natin Surui et al, "Note of Clarification."
[241] Celso Natin Surui et al, "Note of Clarification."
[242] Celso Natin Surui et al, "Note of Clarification."

indigenous people who may not have a background in finance were now expected to manage and disburse funds for a carbon offset project.

The discovery of diamonds and the slow payment disbursement from the Surui Fund caused many Paiter Surui people to take part in the mining and cattle rancher operations and abandon their efforts in the PCFS. Clans saw gold and diamond mining as a more lucrative venture than being paid for offsetting carbon emissions. People thought that they could make more money being cattle ranchers and miners than forest protectors. In fact, many of them used the money they received from their participation with miners to obtain cattle and clear forest in order to provide land for the cattle.[243] The Surui people's decision to engage in logging and mining operations is indicative of how the REDD+ was never really embraced by the indigenous people. Once they found a better way to make money, the Surui people abandoned selling carbon credits.

Even though FUNAI caught instances of illegal logging on TISS territory and authorized a raid on the illegal loggers working just outside TISS, the Brazilian government's efforts came a bit too late. The mining operations became too widespread, and it was near impossible to control. The project implementers and the remaining Paiter Surui people believed that as long as diamond miners and cattle ranchers were making a decent amount of money, there was no way for the project to continue. [244]

b) Bureaucratic Constraints

Although REDD+ TAN paved the way for pro-forests NGOs to stay relevant and compete for funding, NGOs still needed to find beneficiaries to initiate these REDD+ projects to show their donors that their work provided favorable results. Receiving funding for these

[243] Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 10.
[244] Chris Lang, "Brazil: The Surui."

projects also added to NGOs' survival, which is important for any NGO competing for funds in the global market. As a result, ACT, Forest Trends/KI, IDESAM, and the Kanindé sought beneficiaries to implement REDD+ projects. This situation was different from the REDD+ TAN advocacy efforts because Chico Mendes sought out EDF, specifically Dr. Steve Schwartzman, to help implement extractive reserves in Acre, Brazil. Then EDF tried to gather global support for extractive reserves. In the Surui project, the order is reversed. There was global support from the UNFCCC to implement REDD+ projects. Since the pro-forest already had this support, NGOs searched for indigenous people who wanted to conserve the Amazon in Brazil. So, they contacted the Surui people to create what was conceived as a REDD+ project.

Since its founding in 1996 by Dr. Mark J. Poltkin and Liliana Madrigal, ACT has been very involved in forest protection and conservation in primarily three regions: Colombia, Suriname, and Brazil. One of ACT's main areas is protecting lands through satellite surveillance and mapping. The organization believes that these images are "very powerful tools to track deforestation, revealing patterns we might not otherwise notice."[245] Similarly, Forest Trends has a central focus on forest preservation efforts. Since its birth, the organizations' board of directors had and continues to have expertise in forest-related problems with a "common desire to increase the contribution of markets to forest conservation and the livelihoods of people."[246] In fact, today, Forest Trends receives large grants from NORAD, EDF, and Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica for its forest protection project entitled, "Advancing Global Forest Governance: Ending Illegal Deforestation, Forest Conflict and the Associated Mekong Timber Trade and Defending the Living Amazon for Humanity."[247]

[245] Amazon Conservation Team, "Origins and Timeline."
[246] Forest Trends, "Mission and History."
[247] "Forest Trends, "Financial Information."

Like ACT and Forest Trends, IDESAM and Kanindé also have strong ties to sustainability efforts. IDESAM is focused on creating "creative, appropriate solutions to the unique environmental and social problems of the Amazon."[248] IDESAM sets up programs, allowing IDESAM personnel and indigenous people to monitor the environment and tracks change that may be the result of global warming.[249] In fact, IDESAM receives funding from the Amazon Fund. For example, in 2017, IDESAM received R$12 million to "strengthen community forest management in Brazil by producing and commercializing wood products and vegetable oils."[250] Like IDESAM, Kanindé also receives funding from the Amazon Fund for its deforestation and sustainability efforts in the Amazon.[251] Due to their extensive background in forest protection initiatives, it not surprising that ACT, Forest Trends/KI, Kanindé, and IDESAM agreed to help Chief Almir Surui conserve the Amazon in the TISS territory.

Capitalizing on REDD+ popularity, NGOs decided to institute a carbon offset project (different from REDD+ of the Convention), but just "sold" PCFS as a REDD+ project. In this way, NGOs would be able to jump on the REDD+ "bandwagon" and receive funding in the global competitive donor market. Saying that their organization worked under the umbrella of REDD+ added legitimacy because they were promoting an UNFCCC-recognized popular mechanism for combating climate change and deforestation. NGOs wanted to implement the PCFS quickly without needing to involve the government. This was because the government did not enact any national REDD+ implementation laws, especially pertaining to the PCFS, by 2007. The NGOs also spoke with the Brazilian Ministry of the Environment (MMA) to assess its involvement in the project. However, the MMA made it clear that "it has no authority to

[248] IDESAM, "O IDESAM."
[249] IDESAM, "Carbono Neutro."
[250] Fabiola Ortiz, "Ten Years On."
[251] Amazon Fund, "Project Portfolio."

endorse, or jurisdiction over, REDD projects in Brazil."[252] If they had to rely on the government to initiate the project, the NGOs might be waiting years for the creation of legislation on REDD+ and Amazon Fund funds in Brazil.

Since REDD+ was gaining a lot of traction in the international sphere, these NGOs wanted to take advantage of the program's popularity before it lessened. So, the NGOs hired a law firm to assess whether the Surui people or the government had the rights to the carbon. The law firm's opinion, stating that Surui people owned the rights, allowed the NGOs to circumvent the government, obtain donor funding, and institute the PCFS on their own. Michael Jenkins, the President and CEO of Forest Trends at the time, believed that this was landmark opinion because it provided an "opportunity and a path forward for indigenous groups to participate in emerging markets from a global warming deal. In fact, the indigenous groups would now be part of the solution."[253] Chief Almir was especially ecstatic about the decision, saying: "This study confirms that we have the right to carbon, and is also an important political and legal instrument to recognize the rights of indigenous people for the carbon in their standing forests."[254]

Obtaining the VCS and CCB certifications with Gold Level status was a big win for the NGOs involved in the PCFS because it allowed them to demonstrate their effectiveness in accomplishing their forest protection objectives to donors. Earning Gold Level status proved to donors that the project partners went above and beyond to ensure the success of the project. Although there was little demand for carbon offsets at the time, the Surui people was surprisingly able to sell their carbon credits at above-market rates.[255] VCS and CCB certifications were ways for the NGOs to ultimately please donors and show SFCP's upward progression. Even though

[252] Brazilian Biodiversity Fund, "Project Description," 2.
[253] UICN, "Landmark Legal Opinion."
[254] Steve Zwick, "Brazilian Tribe Solidifies."
[255] Steve Zwick, "The Surui Forest Carbon Project," 10.

these certifications helped push the project forward and allowed the NGOs to compete for funding in the competitive donor market, it did not help the NGOs or the Surui people to curb deforestation from logging or diamond mining.

While ACT's cultural mapping project helped to show the local assets of the territory, the map never addressed the underlying problems of the deforestation issue, namely loggers and miners. When Chief Almir told the clans about the map and promised jobs and a cultural revival, the chiefs agreed to suspend logging activities. However, when the mapping project was complete, logging once again commenced in the TISS region in 2006.[256] Thus, this instance of increase in logging shows that the map did not sufficiently help the Surui people to accomplish their goal of reducing deforestation in the long-term. Chiefs found that they could make money from logging, not making maps (maps did not bring in money). It is great for the Paiter Surui people to know their cultural resources, but if there is still going to be logging operations uprooting those resources, then the map, in a way, is not beneficial.

c) Partnerships

ACT did not make any partnership with EDF, IPAM, or even the Brazilian government, specifically FUNAI. In fact, ACT antagonized FUNAI with its actions. ACT was in trouble with FUNAI since 2005 and yet, still decided to work with the Surui people. In 2005, the organization was kicked out of Brazil for its President Vasco Marcus Van Roosmalen's bioprospecting activities when the organization was working with the Xingu people. Despite its removal, ACT still continued to work in the Xingu region. In addition to these allegations, its work with the Xingu people was also called into question. For example, ACT was accused of not being transparent with the Xingu people about these cultural maps. FUNAI believes that

[256] Steve Zwick, "Almir Surui."

ACT worked with the Xingu on these maps to locate the medicinal plants and patent them in the United States, since only the Xingu would have first-hand knowledge of the plants' location.[257]

Makupá Kaiabi, the current president of Atix - Xingu Indigenous Land Association, said: "They [ACT] arrived enticing, promising more than US $ 200,000. They did not give anything, they only divided the ethnic groups."[258] Former president of the Indigenous Land Association of Xingu (MT) Mairauê Caiabi said: "For me it has no future, because the community that is working with the map is not understanding what use it can have."[259] Even president of CPI of Biopiracy, Congressman Antonio Carlos Mendes Thame called into question the usefulness of ACT's cultural maps:

> There is no evidence that this work improves the conditions of the indigenous peoples of the Xingu. In the testimony of the president of the NGO [ACT], they do not want to spend a penny on the Indians, they want to minimize the cost of their projects, and what are their projects? [260]

This documentation shows that ACT was more concerned with showing that it completed the action set out by their donors' demands than showing their beneficiaries how they can positively use their cultural maps to preserve their lands.

In the interview with Thame, the Congressman also noted that these cultural maps were primarily providing the location of medicinal plants in the Amazon, so he has "no doubt that the interest of this NGO is linked to bioprospecting."[261] It is interesting that these cultural maps for the Xingu highlighted medicinal plants because, in 2005, FUNAI also accused ACT for receiving funds from biomedical and cosmetic companies to work in Brazil. Even though Vasco Marcus Van Roosmalen denied this accusation, he admitted that he received investments from a pharmaceutical company called Kiehls. In 1999, Vasco and his father, Marcus Van Roosmalen,

[257] Camara Noticias, "Presidente de ONG."
[258] Ambiente Brasil, "ONG Americana."
[259] Instituto Socioambiental, "Procurador pede."
[260] Instituto Socioambiental, "Procurador pede."
[261] Instituto Socioambiental, "Procurador pede."

were even involved in a documentary for Japanese' TV station NHK where they discussed medicinal plants in the Xingu village. When authorities found out about this segment, the Indians were given 50,000 dollars as compensation.[262]

It is important to point out that Vasco's father Marcus Van Roosmalen had a connection to ACT. While he was not on ACT's board of directors, Marcus received funding from the organization to discover different primates in the Amazon. In 2003, however, the National Institute of Amazonian Research (Ipna) fired him from his scientist position because he was shipping primates illegally out of the Amazon and collecting information about the forest without "proper record sheets."[263] In fact, ACT, namely their office in a Canarana (MT), even had ties to timber companies. In 2003, an associate of the timber company diverted more the $130,000 from ACT.[264] This controversial financial transaction tainted ACT's credibility among (potential) partners and beneficiaries. Due to these allegations and tarnished reputation, ACT reduced its initiatives in Brazil. The organization then turned its attention and resources to its other two locations, Suriname and Colombia.[265] According to an interview with David Stone who works at ACT, "since 2011, ACT does not have connection to the Surui REDD+ Project…[and] does not currently have active projects with a REDD component."

Vasco Van Roosmalen, however, decided he still wanted to focus his efforts on Brazil. So, he co-founded another Brazilian organization called Equipe De Conservação Da Amazônia (ECAM). This is a "business-like approach" because a NGO like ACT with such a tarnished reputation would be unable to achieve political clout to accomplish its objectives. In order to keep receiving donor funding, Vasco needed to create an NGO under a new name to work in

[262] Ambiente Brasil, "ONG Americana."
[263] Renata Gasper and Altino Machado, "ACT intermediates partnership."
[264] SoNoticias, "Ex-associado acusado."
[265] Amazon Conservation Team, "Amazon Conservation Team Reestablished."

Brazil. ECAM is no longer associated with ACT, and is an independent organization since 2012. According to ACT, "due to irreconcilable administrative and institutional disagreements," ECAM and ACT became two separate organizations.[266] In 2012, ECAM was involved in the baseline verification stage of the Surui project. [267]

In fact, NGOs only partnered with a 3rd party for-profit corporation, Google. While the partnership with Google allowed the NGOs to obtain evidence, showing that the Paiter Surui people were able to initiate the PCFS, these partnerships were not very powerful to sustain the project and overcome its opponents, namely loggers and miners. It is not beneficial at all for the Surui people to document deforestation if they cannot stop illegal mining or logging operations, contributing to the problem. Google posted their relationship with the Surui people, specifically Chief Almir Surui, all over the Internet. For instance, Google had Almir Surui testify to the positive impact Google had on his people. Chief Almir Surui said, "Google's technology plays an important role in helping build a better future—a future with a conscience."[268] This partnership with the Surui people was simply a public relations (PR) tool for Google, showcasing how the company is helping people in developing countries protect the environment.

As policy implementers of the PCFS, the NGOs were not very effective. Unlike the REDD+ TAN's advocacy efforts, NGOs involved in the PCFS did not have any big conquests. There were three factors that led to NGOs' low level of effectiveness. First, the NGOs failed to establish legitimacy or relationships with beneficiaries. NGOs never tried to diminish the opposition against the PCFS, namely that from CIMI and from the Surui pro-logging faction. When the NGOs did engage with the Paiter Surui people during the FPIC meetings, there were times that either NGOs or key members of the Surui clans were not present. Consequently,

[266] Amazon Conservation Team, "Amazon Conservation Team Reestablished."
[267] SXSW, "Vasco Marcus Van Roosmalen."
[268] Google Earth Outreach, "Chief Almir and the Surui Tribe."

people can become confused about the inner workings of the project, as seen in the REDD+ Xingu project. In fact, NGOs lost a significant amount of their legitimacy with the Surui people as a result of the slow payment dispersal from the Surui Fund. Since the Paiter Surui people were not getting paid for their work with the PCFS, they resorted to logging and mining to obtain income, which ultimately led to the project's demise.

Second, the NGOs were not able to overcome their bureaucratic constraints. To obtain donor funds quickly to initiate the PCFS, the NGOs "repackaged" the project as a REDD+ initiative. NGOs also entered into a contractual relationship with the law firm of Trench, Rossi, and Watanabe to make sure that the Surui people had to right to the carbon absorbed from the Amazon. In this way, the NGOs did not need to engage with the government to implement the project. The law firm's legal opinion gave NGOs the leverage they needed to attract donors to start the project. PCFS earning VCS and CCB certifications for REDD+ projects added more credibility to the NGOs and their efforts. ACT made cultural maps for Paiter Surui people; however, the organization did not show the people how to use these maps in a meaningful way, as seen with the Xingu people. ACT made these maps to appease its donors. Even though the NGOs were able to implement the project, NGOs' efforts were not able to prevent future deforestation of the Amazon from logging and mining. Consequently, NGOs were not able to showcase the project's success to donors.

Third, the NGOs were not able to establish strong partnerships. Instead of partnering with the EDF, IPAM or FUNAI, ACT actually antagonized FUNAI for allegedly engaging in biopiracy and bioprospecting, leading to the organization's removal from Brazil. NGOs really only entered into a partnership with Google. This corporation, however, primarily used the PCFS and the Paiter Surui people as a PR tool to bolster its own public image.

5

Conclusion: Rethinking NGO Effectiveness

When I first began researching this topic in the summer of 2018, I thought I was simply going to investigate NGOs' effectiveness by examining NGOs' actions when acting as advocates for REDD+, and when acting as policy implementers of REDD+ projects. Over the course of the year, however, this project became so much more, which I truly did not expect. After four months into researching my topic, I learned that the Surui Forest Carbon Project (PCFS) was suspended indefinitely in September of 2018. This fact sparked my curiosity to see if NGOs' efforts played a role in the project's termination. That moment was a major turning point for this work. After research in academic journal articles and other secondary sources became largely unsuccessful, I started to examine primary sources, mostly from Brazilian news websites. These news articles, which I had to translate from Portuguese to English, brought to light that much of the literature, concerning the PCFS, did not provide a full and complete picture of the project and the nature of its NGO partners. As a result, I knew I had an obligation to those interested in NGOs' involvement in implementing REDD+ projects to reveal this information. Thus, this thesis was created. What I found created a methodological challenge for my research: the first set of NGOs was advocating for REDD+, and the second set of NGOs was implementing a forest carbon offset project (different from REDD+ of the Convention). The information I found was the following:

First, and arguably most significant, PCFS was not a REDD+ project. Rather, it was a carbon offset project (different from REDD+ as accepted at the UN climate change negotiations). Brazil did not enact national legislation, allowing individual carbon offset projects to be implemented in the country. Brazil did set up the Amazon Fund to help finance REDD+

initiatives nationally. Yet, ACT, Kaninde, Forest Trends/KI, and IDESAM did not want to wait for the Brazilian government to enact these laws on carbon offset projects. They needed to show their donors that they are effectively protecting forests. So, NGOs created the PCFS as a carbon offset project, and marketed it as a REDD+ project to continue to obtain funding from donors for their operations.

Second, ACT acts more like, what Cooley and Ron calls, "for-profit contractors."[269] By examining the nature of ACT when implementing carbon offset projects, I find that the NGO primarily accepts work that quickly shows results to its their donors, especially the biomedical and cosmetic companies from which ACT allegedly receives funds. For example, ACT created these cultural maps for Xingu, but did not emphasize how the Xingu peoples can use these maps to preserve their lands. In fact, as stated in the previous section, these maps documented the medicinal plans of the indigenous people. ACT's decision to only highlight these plants caused it to get into trouble with FUNAI for suspected bioprospecting activities, which resulted in its removal from Brazil. This entrepreneurial "modus operandi" is also seen with ECAM. In an effort to still obtain funding from donors, a former employee of ACT Vasco Van Roosemalen created another organization ECAM to continue work in Brazil regarding the PCFS.

Third, there was a problem with the funding mechanism, the Surui Trust Fund, set up by FUNBIO to disburse funds from the sale of carbon credits. From the transaction with Natura Cosméticos and International Federation of Football Association (FIFA), the indigenous peoples were slowly receiving funds, and then none at all. When they did speak out about this lack of payment, the Paiter Surui people were threatened. As a result, they wrote a letter to the Federal Ministry to bring these problems to the agency's attention. Since these people could not sustain themselves through their work with the PCFS, Paiter Surui people resorted to mining and

[269] Alexander Cooley and James Ron, 15.

logging, which increased the deforestation levels on their lands and caused the project to be terminated indefinitely.

The comparative case-study analysis of NGOs involved in advocacy and NGOs involved in implementation of what was thought to be a REDD+ project clearly demonstrates that NGOs are effective when they are advocates (voices for the voiceless) and ineffective when they are policy implementers. Drawing from the work of Adil Najam, NGOs advocating for the REDD+ at the UN climate change negotiations demonstrates how NGOs can be effective when they acknowledge the needs of their beneficiaries.[270] This idea was demonstrated in two ways in the case study: EDF's relationship with Chico Mendes and NGOs' relationship with the Brazilian government. When Chico wanted to implement extractive reserves in Brazil to safeguard the Amazon, Steve Schwartzman from EDF took measures to ensure that these reserves were created the way Mendes envisioned them, and his efforts were very successful. When Brazilian officials from MCT and Itamaraty were not keen on the NGOs' version of REDD+, EDF, IPAM, ISA, and WHRC, listened to them and reformulated the REDD+ concept, and their efforts were also very successful.

NGOs encouraged scientists to create the LBA that explicitly showed donors that there was still a need to fund forests protection projects, and the REDD+ opposition to forests being included in the UN climate change discussions decreased. So, these NGOs' efforts undermine Gent et al.'s idea that NGOs short-term initiatives are often "at odds with long-term normative aspirations typically attributed to NGOs."[271] These NGOs involved in advocating for REDD+ were able to overcome bureaucratic constraints without compromising their own agendas or disregarding their beneficiaries' needs because they were committed to a long-term strategy.

[270] Adil Najam, 307.
[271] Stephen E. Gent et. al., 426.

NGO involved in advocacy further illustrates Sikkink's point that NGOs can be effective when they capitalize on domestic and international opportunity structures and engage in partnerships with those entities. For instance, NGOs strategically partnered with, at the time, Senator Marina Silva to persaude Brazilian government officials to accept REDD+. This partnership greatly contributed to this goal and even had more of an impact on other members of the opposition, those being European NGOs. After Silva created the alliance with other developing countries to support REDD+, European NGOs really had no other choice, but to accept REDD+ or risk reputational costs. Thus, I do agree with the pluralists who argue that NGOs are effective when they take on the role of "prophetic voices of the voiceless lobbying governments and the UN,"[272] and believe that NGOs in transnational advocacy networks especially help give a voice to the powerless.[273]

The case of NGOs implementing the PCFS (which was thought to be a REDD+ project) clearly shows that they did not have much success. These NGOs became so concerned with demonstrating effectiveness of the project to donors in the short-term that they lost sight of the true nature of NGOs: helping their beneficiaries to accomplish their beneficiaries' objectives. They became, as Gent et al. articulates, "…hobbled by their continuous need to produce tangible results in order to maintain reputations."[274] They did not address the underlying problems causing the deforestation on the Paiter Surui's lands, mining and logging. ACT's overwhelming desire to meet donors' expectations caused the organization to be kicked out by FUNAI for allegedly engaging in bioprospecting activities. Instead of engaging in partnerships that would benefit their beneficiaries like EDF and IPAM did, ACT antagonized the Brazilian agency FUNAI.

[272] William E. DeMars, 36.
[273] Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*, x.
[274] Stephen E. Gent et. al., 428.

While the examination of NGO involvement in the PCFS shows that NGOs are ineffective policy implementers, the door still remains open as to whether NGOs are effective when taking on the role of policy implementers, or, as globalists argue, "UN's extension agents or Texas Rangers bringing authority and order to the hinterland…passively implementing and enforcing the global norms that emanate from UN organs and multilateral agreements."[275] This information was not learned from this study because the PCFS was not a REDD+ project. Thus, the question still remains whether NGOs can be effective in implementing REDD+. It is interesting to think that if NGOs implementing REDD+ mimicked the conditions of NGOs advocating for REDD+, would ACT, Forest Trends/KI, Kaninde, and IDESAM have been more effective. What if they waited for the Brazilian government to enact national legislation for implementing a REDD+ project? What if they engaged more with Paiter Surui people during the FPIC phase of the project? What if they diminished the opposition, such as the CIMI and logging faction, and built a consensus around the idea of REDD+, as the NGOs involved in advocacy did with the European NGOs, MCT, and Itamaraty? What if they engaged in more salient partnerships such as with FUNAI, EDF, or IPAM who all have a strong foothold in Brazil and have expertise in dealing with forest-related initiatives? All of these questions, as of right now, remain unanswered.

More research has to be done to conclusively state that NGOs are ineffective when acting as policy implementers, especially in REDD+ projects. This work leads to other questions regarding NGOs who choose to take on the role as either advocates or policy implementers: How do NGOs' presence in the international sphere affect their ability to push their own agendas forward? How important is it for NGOs to have the backing of national governments? Is it

[275] William E. DeMars, 37-38.

necessary for NGOs to have active beneficiary involvement? How do international mechanisms such as REDD+ affect NGOs' ability to be advocates for their beneficiaries?

Until more research is done to assess the most effective role(s) for NGOs, what is the formula for NGO effectiveness? Based on my research, if NGOs have limited legitimacy, are unable to overcome bureaucratic constraints, and do not establish powerful partnerships, then NGOs will achieve limited success, as seen with the NGOs involved with the PCFS. But, if NGOs show legitimacy, overcome bureaucratic constraints, and establish powerful partnerships, then these NGOs will achieve success, as seen with NGOs who brought REDD+ to the UNFCCC.

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