FIVE. THESSALY AND ALEXANDER

THE GREAT

When Philip II was murdered in 336 B.C. before he could embark on his campaign against Persia, his son Alexander III moved quickly to assume his father's power and the offices through which it was exercised. Most important, of course, Alexander was acknowledged as king in Macedonia, but he also took care to establish relations with the Greeks which exactly perpetuated those of Philip. This was not a simple matter because many of the Greeks decided to try to deny to the son the leadership they had conceded to the father. But the Thessalians were not among this group. They elected Alexander as the leader of their confederacy in the tradition of passing on the office in the same family when circumstances demanded it, and they voted Alexander the same revenues Philip had received.\(^1\) The new leader of the confederacy had been careful to point out his kinship with the Thessalians through their common ancestor Heracles, an indication that the same concern for Thessalian nomos which Philip had affected carried over as Alexander's "Thessalian policy."\(^2\) Since Alexander had been chosen by consent, from the constitutional point of view nothing had changed in Thessaly except the name of the leader of the confederacy. Just as in Philip's time, the nomos of the Thessalians was the guiding principle which governed relations between the Thessalians and the Macedonian king.

\(^1\) Justin 11.3.1–2.

As proof of their loyalty, the Thessalians even voted to march with their leader against Athens to force that city to recognize Alexander as *hegemon* of the Hellenic League which Philip had established after the battle of Chaeronea in 338.\(^3\) As it turned out, Athens and the other recalcitrant Greek states caved in without a struggle before Alexander’s persuasive words and powerful army. Alexander was duly recognized by the *synedrion* of the Hellenic League at Corinth as Philip’s successor in the post of *hegemon*, and he was given command against Persia.\(^4\)

Since the Thessalians were members of this Hellenic League, they enjoyed its guarantee that they could keep whatever constitution they had when they joined the organization.\(^5\) For what it was worth (not much, of course, if Alexander changed his mind), this guarantee confirmed that government in Thessaly would continue along the lines worked out under Philip. In fact, there is no indication that any changes were made in the structure of government in Thessaly during Alexander’s reign (336–323 B.C.).\(^6\) Marta Sordi, who believes that Philip II expelled the Aleuads from Larissa in the Simus episode already described, suggests that Alexander restored them to power at Larissa. By doing the Aleuads this favor, Sordi would argue, Alexander gained their willing collaboration in the promotion of his own

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\(^3\) Aeschines 3.161. The Thessalians also appear to have taken part in Alexander’s attack on Thebes in 335. See Quintilian 5.10.111, with the comments of Brigitte Gullath, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Boiotiens in der Zeit Alexanders und der Diadochen* (Frankfurt, 1982), p. 63.


\(^6\) None of the interference in Greek governments by Alexander reported in [Demosthenes] 17 pertains to Thessaly, nor do the other sources record any.
interests in Thessaly. Whether or not the Aleuads, or their city for that matter, had actually lost the favor of Philip, if Sordi is right that Alexander established good relations with the Aleuads, this is a clear hint that the young king, like his father, saw the utility in a connection with his "relatives" (through their common ancestor Heracles). It made good sense to exploit his pretended relationship to those Larissaeans whose maneuvers had originally made it possible for a Macedonian king to seek his own advantage under the useful cover of Thessalian nomos.

In 334 B.C. Alexander left Europe for Asia, never to return. At first, the Thessalians seem to have taken the continued absence of their leader with loyal good cheer, especially since a large number of Thessalian cavalry were serving with distinction and earning rich rewards in Alexander's army as it swept the Persians before it year after year. Despite the urgings of Demosthenes, the Thessalians refused to join the revolt against Alexander's authority led by the Spartans in 331 B.C. When Alexander sent home his Greek troops in 330 B.C., the Thessalians brought home on top of their pay a bonus of two thousand talents as a reward for their meritorious service. (Some stayed on in Alexander's army as "mercenaries.") These honored veterans, safely home with their purses full, can have had no complaints against their leader, and their compatriots at home apparently felt the same, or at least realized that they should pretend to do so. From this point on in the reign of Alexander, the sources are silent about relations between the Thessalians and their nominal leader far away in Asia. Perhaps the Thessalians thought of him, but Alexander's thoughts were directed elsewhere. Nevertheless, there is no indication that, formally speaking, things had changed. Alexander was still the formal leader of the confederacy, but the need for his presence in Thessaly was essentially nil because Thessaly was at peace. Traditionally, the

7 L.T., pp. 303–304.
8 For the Thessalians at the Granicus, see Arrian 1.14.3; Thessalian reinforcements, 1.29.4; Thessalians at Issus, 2.8.9, 2.9.1, 2.11.2–3. They obtained the largest share of the great plunder seized at Damascus (Plutarch, Alexander 24.1).
9 Aeschines 3.167.
10 Arrian 3.19.5–7, 3.25.4, 3.29.5; Curtius 6.6.35.
leader of the confederacy had little if anything to do in such periods, and the Thessalians could get along without Alexander.

At times Alexander probably felt that same way about all the Greeks, but he had not forgotten about them upon his return to Mesopotamia from India in 324 B.C. When he sent back to Macedonia those soldiers who were unfit for further service, according to Arrian, the king sent with them his general Craterus with instructions "to assume charge of Macedonia, Thrace, the Thessalians and the freedom of the Greeks."\(^{11}\) It is difficult to tell what these rather vague instructions meant on a constitutional level (on the assumption that Alexander himself conceived of the situation in those terms, which is far from required), but the passage does not imply that any new arrangement for Thessaly was envisioned. Alexander was simply telling Craterus to look out for the king's interests as monarch in the north, as leader of the Thessian confederacy and, finally, as \textit{hegemon} of the Hellenic League.\(^{12}\) If nothing had changed for the Greeks, as the expression "the freedom of the Greeks" showed it had not, then nothing had changed for the confederacy. Thessaly was not being transformed into a Macedonian province.

J. R. Ellis nevertheless argues that about 328/7 B.C. Alexander "instructed Antipatros to terminate all coinages under Macedonian control that were not the king's own."\(^{13}\) These coinages were, on Ellis' view, the gold and silver issues of Philippi in Thrace, the posthumous Philip issues from Macedonian mints, and the silver of Larissa. The last was "to be replaced shortly in Thessaly by regal silver." Especially important here are Ellis'

\(^{11}\) Arrian 7.12.4.

\(^{12}\) In his speech at Arrian 7.9.4, Alexander is made to say that Philip made the Macedonians "archons" of the Thessalians. This only means that the Macedonians were "rulers" of the Thessalians because their king served as the leader of the Thessian confederacy. Hermann Bengtson, \textit{Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit}, vol. 1 (Munich, 1937, Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrushorschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte 26), pp. 27, 38–45, is overly legalistic. The presence of Medius of Larissa in Alexander's entourage afforded the king at least nominal contact with his Thessian constituency. On Medius, see H. Berve, \textit{Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage} (Munich, 1926), no. 521.

speculations about Alexander's reasons for ordering such a
dramatic change in the traditional monetary system of Thessaly. He believes that by this date Alexander had established a secure
enough power-base of his own that he could "quite openly cut
most of the ties inherited from Philip." Moreover, his victories
in the East allowed Alexander to establish himself "in his own
right as King of Persia." The first of these points is debatable;
the second is certainly true. But their relevance to the cessation
of autonomous coinage in Thessaly is illusory.

First, whatever one thinks of the idea that by 328 B.C. Alex-
ander "could cut his ties inherited from Philip," there is abso-
lutely no evidence that Alexander cut the tie inherited from Phil-
ip of the leadership of the Thessalian confederacy. Why should
he have cut it? The arrangement had worked well and presum-
ably helped to finance Antipater's guardianship of Alexander's
interests in Greece by the payment of the revenues which the
Thessalians had been turning over to their Macedonian leader
ever since the late 350s. Antipater could use the money, as
Alexander's shipments of cash to him prove. 14 With the greater
part of the very effective Thessalian cavalry now home after their
release from service in Asia in 330 B.C., there was nothing to be
gained and, perhaps, serious trouble to be expected from any
change in the long-standing arrangement between the Thessalian
confederacy and the Macedonian crown. Does it really make
sense to think that Alexander, while busily engaged at the end of
the earth in organizing Sogdiana in the winter of 328/7 B.C., gave
any thought to the coinage of Larissa or of Philippi or of any
other state in Greece so far away?

Alexander's position as King of Persia certainly had nothing
to do with the coinage of Thessaly. He did not rule the Thessali-
ans in his capacity as the successor of Darius. But perhaps, on
Ellis' view, the acquisition of the Persian throne should be
regarded as a stimulus to the kind of absolutist thinking that
would require the elimination of all coinages except royal in all
areas under Macedonian control. Again, the facts of the matter
point to a different conclusion. The Great King of Persia had

14 For example, Arrian 1.24.2, 2.20.5, 3.16.10; Curtius 3.1.1.
never sought to institute a uniform system of currency in the parts of his empire which customarily used coins in financial transactions (i.e., primarily the Hellenized areas of Asia Minor). His western satraps coined in silver, as did numerous Greek cities under his control.\textsuperscript{15} The Persian King did reserve for himself the privilege of coining in gold, but that restriction reflected the royal view that the best of everything (in this case, the best of the precious metals) belonged to the King. In fact, the Greek city of Lampsacus in western Asia Minor even issued gold staters with its own types at least intermittently over a period of about sixty years in the fourth century while under Persian control.\textsuperscript{16} Evidently it suited the King’s purposes to have a non-Persian type of gold coinage available for diplomatic bribery in Greece, and for that reason he was content to have a nonroyal mint coin in gold.\textsuperscript{17} The King did not insist on an exclusive right of coinage as an expression of sovereignty.

This situation helps us to understand a famous incident from the reign of Darius (521–486 B.C.) which Herodotus relates.\textsuperscript{18} The story is that a certain Aryandes while satrap of Egypt heard that Darius had issued a coinage of the purest gold because, the story goes, Darius wanted to perpetuate his memory by doing something which no other King had done. Wishing to imitate his superior, Aryandes minted a coinage of equally pure silver. When Darius heard this news, he had Aryandes executed on “another charge” that he was a rebel. This accusation of treason had nothing to do with silver coinage because satraps demonstrably were allowed to issue such coins. The King had no cause to dismiss a satrap for minting silver coins. If Darius actually wanted to get rid of a satrap because he resented the satrap’s


\textsuperscript{16} Kraay, \textit{ACGC}, pp. 248, 251, 259–260. For gold mines near Lampsacus which were active in the period of Alexander, see Pliny 37.193.

\textsuperscript{17} See Kraay, \textit{ACGC}, p. 251, with reference to \textit{GHI} 160.

\textsuperscript{18} 4.166.
presumption in trying to emulate the prestige of the Great King by, for example, issuing a coinage of legendary purity, the issue was rivalry with the King, not the right of coinage. Herodotus' own comments make the moral clear. \(^{19}\) The story of Aryandes in no way establishes a connection between Persian royal sovereignty and the right of coinage.

Any assumption that the King of Persia felt such a connection to exist would have to be based on a misconception of what money represented in Persia. From the Persepolis Treasury Tablets of the first half of the fifth century B.C. we gain a clear impression of the role of money in the King's world. These records refer to payments made to workmen in silver in lieu of foodstuffs. The value of the money is clearly indicated. For example, one finds on the tablets phrases such as "sheep and wine serve as the equivalent (of the money): 1 sheep for 3 shekels, 1 jar (of wine) for 1 shekel."\(^{20}\) On the tablets, this phrase is followed by a compound word that has been taken to mean "fixed by edict," which the editor explains as "(at the rate) fixed

\(^{19}\) He introduces the story (4.166.1) with the comment that Aryandes was killed because he tried to equal Darius. He concludes (4.166.2) that Aryandes "got what he deserved for his imitation of the King."

\(^{20}\) George G. Cameron, *Persepolis Treasury Tablets* (Chicago, 1948), pp. 2, 83. (The translation "serve as" appears on the latter page; "serve for" appears on p. 2.) R. T. Hallock, "A New Look at the Persepolis Treasury Tablets," *JNES* 19 (1960), p. 91, suggests "counterpart" as a translation instead of "equivalent." It is not clear from the tablets whether the silver being paid out was in coin or in shekel weights of uncoined silver. One reason to favor the latter alternative is that Persian *sigloi* are normally found in the Aegean area, not in the Persian heartland, and may have been intended primarily for use in that area. It is striking, however, that no reference to silver as payment occurs in the Persepolis Fortification Tablets, which record payments from the period of the late fifth and early fourth centuries B.C. immediately before the period covered by the Treasury Tablets. These payments are exclusively in kind. Payment in silver was apparently an unfamiliar innovation at the time of the Treasury Tablets. Since payment by weights of uncoined silver was not at all a new phenomenon in the East by the time of the Treasury Tablets, the innovative nature of the use of silver recorded in these tablets would be easier to understand if the silver being used was coined. That form of silver was something new and unfamiliar in Persia, whose use would have needed the kind of careful reference found in the Treasury Tablets. For a discussion of both kinds of tablets, see J. M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (New York, 1983), pp. 85–90.
by edict."\(^{21}\) In the grain tablets, the amount of the silver being paid varies, most likely as a reflection of the fluctuating price of grain in a period of scarcity.\(^{22}\) From this evidence, it would be fair to conclude that, at least in the period when the tablets were inscribed, the value of Persian money was officially established in relation to commodities. The mention of an edict to fix the rate of exchange between money and commodities shows that the authority behind this decision was that of the King, especially since the tablets concern royal projects in Persis, the Achaemenid homeland.\(^{23}\)

In other words, the Persian King (no doubt through a functional) established the value of his money in terms of commodities so that he could use it to pay people who were accustomed to receiving their wages in kind. Money, whether in the form of coins or of weighed pieces of metal, was a royal convenience to be produced when necessary. The King only had as many coins minted as he needed to pay expenses, preferring to keep his vast wealth in the form of bullion.\(^{24}\) One might argue that this situation was restricted to the earlier fifth century, when coinage was still being introduced as something new in the Persian Empire, and that by the later fourth century currency was so familiar that there was no need to tariff money in this way. But Daniel Schlumberger’s analysis of monetary circulation in the Persian Empire shows that even at this date silver coinage was not the normal means of exchange in the vast majority of the territory of the King.\(^{25}\) Under such circumstances, it makes sense to think that even as late as the 330s the Achaemenid King still had to decide the value of his money vis-à-vis commodities. They remained the most common standard of payment in the Persian

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\(^{22}\) Hallock, *JNES* 19 (1960), p. 94.

\(^{23}\) Cameron, *Persepolis Treasury Tablets*, pp. 11–17.

\(^{24}\) Polycritus in Strabo 15.3.21 (C735), emended to Polycleitus (*FGrH* 128 F 3a). Cf. Herodotus 3.96.

Empire. 26 I have not found any evidence to prove that Alexander set the tariff for his coinage in the East in terms of commodities, but there is no inherent reason why he should not have done so as the successor of the Persian King. He administered his Eastern kingdom on the Achaemenid model, and his subjects there still needed to know official prices so they could render their tribute in kind and compute their wages.27

With these points in mind, we will find it easy to accept that the Great King made no attempt to impose any kind of uniform monetary circulation on the part of his empire which was accustomed to use coinage on a regular basis. Royal Persian coinage, if that is the right term for satrapal silver, circulated together with the civic coinages of the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The impression one forms from the evidence for the minting and circulation of coins in the Persian Empire is that the Persian King cared not a whit about the nature of the monetary system in use among his Greek subjects. He wanted his tribute to be paid, and he did not want any rivals to his preeminent status, but he was not concerned with the details of how his subjects conducted their financial transactions. If they preferred a diverse circulation of different coinages supplied by the products of their own and of Persian mints, that was fine with him. Just let them pay on time and in full. This was the tradition Alexander took over when he ascended the Persian throne. There was nothing in his role as Darius' successor to induce Alexander to terminate any coinages in Greece.

The idea that Alexander's new status as the King of Persia led him by 328/7 B.C. to order the suppression of autonomous coinages even in the Greek homeland has roots that are hard to uncover. In Ellis' case, the idea is simply asserted without discussion. One can suspect that the implicit justification for this idea is analogy with the idea that Alexander, insisting on his rights as a king, demanded the partial or total abandonment of

26 On payment in kind (usually foodstuffs), see Cook, Persian Empire, pp. 70, 86, 140. See appendix 3 on the possible relevance of this evidence for the interpretation of the remarks on coinage in the Aristotelian Oeconomica.

local coin types by the Greek cities in Asia.\textsuperscript{28} To my knowledge, this idea and its implications for the history of Alexander's reign have been discussed in detail recently only by A. R. Bellinger in his comprehensive treatment of Alexander's general monetary policy.\textsuperscript{29} Since subsequent opinions depend implicitly or explicitly on Bellinger's discussion, it is worth summarizing his views on this important issue. First, when in 334 and 333 B.C. Alexander's conquests in Asia Minor gave him the opportunity to force a uniform currency on the cities of the region, he did not do so. Just as in Greece, imperial coinage did not replace local coinage in Asia Minor. To quote Bellinger:

Alexander came into no vacuum of currency when he brought his money to Asia. Schlumberger's statement of his purpose is very good. "What Alexander intended to do is clear. He intended to give to an empire that did not have it a silver coinage universally acceptable as money, and in so doing, to extend the use of silver money as such (and not as bullion) to the entire territory of that empire." The intention was never entirely carried out, partly, of course, because of the shortness of his life, but, aside from that, it is not likely that the plan itself was ever so complete as to contemplate the retirement of the great variety of silver that was already in use. Whatever the theory, the fact was that there was a supplementary coinage from the cities.\textsuperscript{30}

Since Bellinger introduces Schlumberger's view as authoritative, we must consider it fully here. Schlumberger goes on to argue that in the territory of the old Persian Empire Alexander


planned to retire the coinage in circulation in favor of his new, imperial coinage on the Attic standard, but he acknowledged that the hoards show almost no signs of any such policy ("les effets du retrait ne se discernent guère"). In the light of this evidence, it seems wholly unnecessary to assume that Alexander had any policy to impose a uniform monetary circulation even in the East outside Asia Minor (which Schlumberger excludes from the "empire" at this point to make his argument). It would be hard enough to assume that Alexander's purpose was only to introduce money as a regular form of payment and exchange into the vast regions of the Persian Empire which did not use coinage but, rather, relied on barter. It might be possible to regard this as a "civilizing" measure intended to bring a more enlightened form of commercial exchange and financial transactions to backward regions, but even this sort of scheme seems wildly impractical. Would Alexander really expect peasants in remote reaches of his empire to start using his silver coins? 31 It is much more likely that Alexander had his own convenience and that of his men in mind when he made arrangements for the production and distribution of his coinage. He had to pay his troops in coin, and their supplies could be much more easily acquired (from the Macedonian point of view) when they could be purchased with currency rather than bartered for (when supplies were to be paid for and not just appropriated). 32 Furthermore, the settlers in Alexander's new colonies in the East were accustomed to using coins, and in their new "Hellenic" foundations they could be expected to stick to their old, familiar habits. 33 The limited


32 D. W. Engels, Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army (Berkeley, 1978), p. 41, n. 82, categorizes the ways in which Alexander obtained supplies: through purchases, requisitions, and gifts.

spread of Alexander’s coinage throughout the territory of the Persian Empire was an inevitable, but indirect, consequence of his military and political actions.

Nevertheless, Bellinger (presumably under Schlumberger’s influence) states that Alexander’s establishment of royal mints in the East in the years 333 to 330 B.C. “had as its purpose the wholesale replacement of the Persian royal coinage by the Macedonian imperial.” 34 Since Alexander claimed to be “King of Asia” (i.e., Darius’ replacement as Persian King) after the battle of Issus in November 333, 35 it is certainly reasonable to believe that he might have planned to take over the traditional coinage of the Persian King for his own use, especially in areas where it was the only familiar coinage. But there is no evidence that Alexander planned to institute a new policy of monetary uniformity in departure from Persian royal practice. 36

Bellinger himself points to another explanation. He realizes that Alexander required a large amount of money for his grandiose campaign to the far reaches of the world in the East, and according to Bellinger, the royal mints of Cilicia and Syria were intended to produce that money. 37 Alexander had conquered these foreign, non-Greek cities, and if their local issues of coinage had to be put aside to produce for Alexander, that was an


34 Essays, p. 50.


37 Essays, pp. 54–55. One severe difficulty with Bellinger’s formulation of this idea, however, is that he envisions Alexander as having to convey to India enough coin to pay all his troops all the time. That was impossible.
obligation owed the king from his subjects. Bellinger finishes his analysis of Alexander’s policy by observing that after the battle of Gaugamela in 331 Alexander produced new issues in the East which augmented the preexisting monetary confusion by adding yet more issues to those already in circulation. Bellinger’s suggestion is that after the elimination of the Achaemenid royal house in 330 Alexander had less need to assert his identity as king in Asia and therefore decided to experiment with another approach to the monetary situation in the territory under his control. He also suggests, however, that Alexander opened mints in Asia Minor for gold and for silver in small denominations after 331 as “a belated provision of uniformity in place of the pre-existing confusion.” Bellinger summarizes his own views as follows:

Before Gaugamela the empire had two monetary zones: Greece and Asia Minor where the imperial types joined or dominated but did not extinguish the local currencies; Cilicia and Syria where the local currencies were replaced by the imperial. To this period belongs the fiscal purpose of Alexander, as defined by Schlumberger, of eventually achieving monetary uniformity for the empire as a whole. But after Gaugamela a third zone is added, of Mesopotamia and the East in which the pre-existing confusion is not merely tolerated but augmented by the emissions of the conqueror. There is concession to the Persian tradition, as proved by the double darics; concession to the satrapal tradition as proved by the imitation owls. Whether temporarily or permanently the ideal of uniformity is laid aside.

On Bellinger’s own evidence, the situation under Alexander is confused and confusing. It would be easier to make sense of the evidence if one laid aside the apparently a priori assumption that Alexander ever aimed at establishing monetary uniformity, least of all in Asia Minor, where local Greek coinages were a strong tradition. His decisions on where and when to coin are better understood as ad hoc responses to his changing needs as

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38 Essays, pp. 78–79.
39 Essays, p. 58.
40 Essays, pp. 77–78. See Badian, Greece and Rome 12 (1965), pp. 173–175, against Bellinger’s assertion that the satraps in Mesopotamia continued to coin under Alexander’s rule.
commander and administrator. For example, even as Alexander went farther and farther away from Macedonia and its royal mints, he still needed coins to pay his troops and his expenses. Since these coins were meant above all for Macedonian eyes and Macedonian purses, it was natural and indeed necessary that they carry Alexander’s name and types. It was a logistical requirement to have at least some royal mints in the East. If Alexander’s coins carried any message to the local inhabitants, who could not read the Greek legends on his coins, that was incidental to the purpose of the king in minting them.\textsuperscript{41} Alexander had nothing to gain by trying to accomplish the impossible goal of providing a standard imperial coinage and requiring its usage to the exclusion of all other coinages. The numismatic evidence continues to accumulate to show that this was not his policy.\textsuperscript{42}

Nevertheless, even Colin Kraay in his standard work on Greek coinage assumes that the numismatic evidence conforms to the idea that Alexander suppressed Greek coinages in Asia Minor: “The conquest by Alexander the Great of the western satrapies of the Persian Empire was followed by the introduction of uniform regal issues in silver on the Attic standard at a


number of mints in both Ionia and the Hellespontine area; between 330 and 325 most local issues in Asia Minor and the adjoining islands come to an end, except, it seems, at Rhodes, which was not occupied by Alexander or his lieutenants. The unreliability of the implied historical interpretation (Alexander suppressed the Greek coinages of Asia Minor, except for that of Rhodes, in favor of his own royal issues) is patent. Rhodes surrendered to Alexander in 332 B.C. after having served as an important Persian collaborator and was occupied by a Macedonian garrison which was expelled only in 323. In addition, the government was changed from the traditional oligarchy to a democracy. If Rhodes with its history of collaboration, its army of occupation, and its imposed constitution could go on coining under Alexander’s reign, it makes no sense at all to think of a conscious policy of suppressing of Greek coinage in Asia Minor which had been introduced and enforced by Alexander.

It seems far more likely that the large-scale production of Alexander’s coins in the mints of “free” cities of Asia Minor had the indirect effect of making the production of local types largely superfluous. So much money was being produced by Alexander’s agents that the cities could close their mints if they wished, saving themselves the trouble of running a municipal operation. For many local mints, this was probably a decision imposed by the nature of the marketplace. People came to prefer the coinage of Alexander. They could conveniently use

43 ACGC, pp. 249–250. He does not cite the evidence for his view.
45 This was the case with the production of electrum coinage in Asia Minor. See Friedrich Bodenstedt, Phokäisches Elektron-Geld von 600–326 v. Chr. Studien zur Bedeutung und zu den Wandlungen einer antiken Goldwährung (Mainz, 1976), p. 19. It is impossible to document the operation of a municipal mint in classical Greece. One suspects that a perhaps substantial capital outlay was required initially for the construction of a mint building, the purchase of slaves to mint bullion into coins, and so on. After these start-up expenses, the city probably expected to make a profit from a well-run mint, or at least not to run a deficit. Cf. Dittenberger, OGIS, no. 339 (Sestus, 2nd B.C. on bronze coinage). The closing of the local mint would not have been a financial boon to the city, but at
the Alexander types which were being put into circulation by the garrison troops Alexander had left behind in the cities and by others in the king's employ.\footnote{That is, garrisons such as the one in Aspendus and men such as Philoxenus. According to Kraay, \textit{ACGC}, p. 277, the silver coinage of Aspendus continued "through the fourth century." On Alexander's financial and political arrangements in Asia Minor, see E. Badian, \textit{Greece and Rome} 12 (1965), pp. 166-170, and "Alexander the Great and the Greeks of Asia," in \textit{Ancient Societies and Institutions: Studies Presented to Victor Ehrenberg on His 75th Birthday} (Blackwell, Oxford, 1966), pp. 37-69.} Alexander needed a steady production of coinage in the strategically crucial area of Asia Minor to pay those important men who looked after his interests, and this need can account for the installation of royal mints in the region. There is no reason to think that they testify to any concern on Alexander's part for a more efficient monetary circulation, or to a megalomaniacal desire to impose a uniform currency on the entire world. Speculation about possible plans to create a universally accepted coinage as the sole currency of a uniform world monetary system is not reason to believe that Alexander ever told any Greek city it could no longer mint its own coins if it wanted to and could afford the expense.\footnote{The notion that Alexander must have planned on a uniform world currency has perhaps flourished because it would fit with the popular picture of Alexander as an advocate of the "unity of mankind" or even of "Weltherrschaft." See Seibert, \textit{Alexander der Grosse}, pp. 207-211, on these ideas.} Alexander's coinage may have supplanted local coinages in various places because his royal issues were more desirable for the consumer, but supplantation is a far different historical phenomenon from forced suppression.

There is another point to consider. We cannot be certain about the status of the cities of Asia Minor, although it is reasonable to think that they were originally members of the League of Corinth.\footnote{See Badian, \textit{Greece and Rome} 12 (1965), p. 168, and \textit{Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies ... Ehrenberg}, pp. 37-69; A. J. Heisserer, \textit{Alexander the Great and the Greeks}, pp. 66, 84-85, 131 (arguing that some cities were already enrolled by Philip's generals in 336 B.C.).} No other League member is thought to have been
ordered by Alexander to stop coining, and the coinage of Corinth where a Macedonian garrison was in place certainly continued under Alexander.\(^{49}\) Why, then, should Alexander's status ca. 328/7 B.C. induce him to suppress the autonomous coinage of one member of the League and not those of others? Larissa was no more under Macedonian control than was occupied Corinth. It is simply illogical to assume that the fate of Thessalian coinage was linked to the status of Alexander in Persia, or to any changes in the nature of the coinage being produced simultaneously in Macedonia. A theory such as Ellis' labors implicitly under the burden of the fallacious assumption that Thessaly became a Macedonian province. This is of course not to say that Alexander as leader of the Thessalian confederacy and of the League of Corinth would have considered it impossible to trespass on the autonomy and privileges of his allies if he saw any advantage to be gained by it. Individual outrages, such as the imposition and support of local tyrants in Greek cities, could be perpetrated without any second thoughts if these separate changes meant a better climate for stability and obedience.\(^{50}\) But the selective suppression of autonomous Greek coinages could hardly have come under that heading. It might, however, be theoretically possible to argue that suppression in Thessaly was only part of a general and complete suppression of autonomous coinages throughout Greece in favor of royal Macedonian coinage. This sort of comprehensive disregard for the autonomy of the European Greeks would be comparable (though on a grander scale) in its implications for the relationship between Alexander and the Greeks to the edict from the end of the reign which ordered the return of the exiles to those cities from which they had been expelled.\(^{51}\) But there is no evidence at all for even an attempt at a general suppression of Greek coinage in favor of Macedonian issues during the reign of Alexander.

The final difficulty with Ellis' reconstruction is that it depends

\(^{49}\) See the discussion to follow in chapter 8.

\(^{50}\) This is clear from [Demosthenes] 17.

on the chronology worked out by Georges Le Rider for the coinages of Philip II (lifetime and posthumous) in his monumental study of this extensive body of material.\textsuperscript{52} In short, Le Rider postulates that both Philip's gold and silver coinages continued to be minted after his death until \textit{ca.} 328 B.C. For Ellis, then, this date represents the point at which Alexander decided to make significant changes in the coinage of Macedonia by eliminating further production of posthumous coinage in Philip's name so that the only Macedonian coinage would be his own coins, which (on this theory) the Macedonian royal mints had been producing along with posthumous issues of Philip up to now. If Alexander decided to make such changes in Macedonian coinage at this point, the argument goes, then he probably also decided to make significant changes in the Greek coinages under his control. For Thessaly, the change was the suppression of the coinage of Larissa, the last remaining autonomous coinage in the region.

This reconstruction cannot stand, however, because the chronology postulated by Le Rider for the posthumous issues of Philip is untenable.\textsuperscript{53} On the contrary, there are strong arguments in favor of the idea that Philip's coinage continued for only a short time after his death in 336 and that the royal mints of Macedonia under Alexander produced Alexander's coins, not Philip's. The numismatic evidence cited by Ellis in support of his theory of a suppression of nonroyal coinages by Alexander in 328/7 B.C. vanishes upon close examination, just as did the historical evidence marshalled to make the same point. We are left with the impression that Alexander, like his father before him, left Thessalian coinage alone.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Le Monnayage d'argent et d'or de Philippe II frappé en Macédoine de 359 à 294} (Paris, 1977).

\textsuperscript{53} An analysis of Le Rider's chronology is presented in appendix 4.