FOUR. THESALY AND PHILIP II

The Thessalians were no strangers to the kings of their northern neighbors in Macedonia. The aristocrats of Larissa in particular had reason to know both the good and the bad points of these powerful and meddlesome monarchs. Thucydides reports that at the time of the Peloponnesian War king Perdiccas of Macedonia was on close terms with "the first men of Thessaly," and he names Nikonidas of Larissa as one of them.¹ At the end of the fifth century, king Archelaus apparently interfered in the internal affairs of Larissa to such an extent that a Thessalian partisan could refer to his aim as enslavement.² And as previously mentioned, Alexander II responded to an Aleuad call for help against the tyrannical Alexander of Pherae in the 360s B.C. by occupying Larissa with his Macedonians, whence it took Pelopidas to dislodge him. This treachery was poor recompense for the favor the Aleuads had done his father, Amyntas III, by restoring him to his throne in the late 390s B.C.³

By the time Philip II came to power, the Aleuads knew well the potential benefits and risks of calling in a Macedonian king at the head of an army. Recent experience taught that the risks to be run in return for Macedonian aid were very high indeed. Nevertheless, not long after Philip's accession, the Aleuads invited him to bring an army to Thessaly to fight with them against the tyrannical house which ruled Pherae and claimed to represent the legitimate leadership of the Thessalian confederacy. The Aleuads and their allies disputed this claim and called on Philip to help defend the true confederacy. This young

¹ 4.78.2, 4.132.2.
² Thrasymachus frag. 2 (Diels-Kranz VS 6). For the evidence of pseudo-Herodes, see Sordi, LT, pp. 146–151, and the references given in n. 18 of chapter 3.
Macedonian king lived up to their expectations. Pherae was defeated, and Philip returned home without committing any outrages of the sort his grandfather, Alexander II, had perpetrated on his mission into Thessaly. When the threat from Pherae revived in even more dangerous fashion later in the 350s, the Aleuads of Larissa again turned to Philip. This time the confederacy was under attack not only by the tyrants of Pherae but also by the forces of their allies, the Phocians led by the commander Onomarchus. Since Onomarchus was a powerful man who, according to Diodorus, was scheming to gain control of Thessalian affairs, traditional government in Thessaly was in grave danger. That the danger came from the Phocians, the detested enemies of the Thessalians from long ago and their immediate neighbors to the south, made the situation desperate.

Philip persevered. Despite a major defeat which threatened the cohesiveness of his Macedonian army, he managed to unite the other Thessalians under his leadership in the name of the god Apollo of Delphi and to subdue the tyrants and their formidable allies. With his glorious victory, Philip put an end to nearly twenty years of tyranny in Pherae and, therefore, to the claim of the successors of Jason to head the confederacy. He saved traditional government in Thessaly. And by their association with the new conqueror, the Aleuads regained the primacy in Thessalian politics that they had last enjoyed in the fifth century B.C. This was the kind of help for which the enemies of Pherae and of Phocis had hoped, the kind of resolute and unifying military leadership they could not find in their own ranks. Philip the Macedonian had actually accomplished what just a few years earlier the Athenians had sworn by treaty to do but never did: he had protected the Thessalian confederacy against the threat of tyranny.

5 Diodorus 16.35.1–2.
6 For Philip's conspicuous allegiance to Apollo's cause, see Diodorus 16.38.2; Justin 8.2.3.
The king's reward was remarkable. By an unprecedented decision, the Thessalians selected Philip as the leader of their confederacy. G. T. Griffith in his standard work on this period rightly emphasizes the special nature of the Thessalians' decision. A foreign king at the head of a Greek league was truly something new. But in the best Hellenic fashion, the justification for novelty could be found in an alleged evocation or even resurrection of the past. Philip's election, for example, could be excused on the personal level by appeal to his descent from Heracles, the common ancestor of the Aleuads of his day and of the mythological Thessalus, the eponymous hero of the country. As Pindar had remarked, Thessaly was blessed when the race of Heracles ruled.

Another positive item in Philip's background was more recent than his kinship with Heracles. As a teenager, Philip had spent three years in Thebes after Pelopidas took him as a hostage from Macedon. Although Philip had lived in the house of another Theban, his connection with Pelopidas, whom the Thessalians had so admired, could only serve to recommend Philip. Moreover, Philip had the style that the high-living aristocrats of Thessaly understood and appreciated. He was congenial, hearty to the point of rowdiness, and comfortable in the company of aristocrats who, of necessity, had to tolerate the leadership of one of

7 HM, pp. 221, 278, 285, 294. In the light of the tendency of Greek authors to refer to the leader of the confederacy as a king, Diodorus' statement (16.38.2, for 352/1) that as a result of his actions in Thessaly Philip "increased his kingdom" could refer to Philip's election to that post.

8 Pindar, Pythian 10, line 3; Isocrates 5.32–34 et passim (Philip's Heraclid ancestry); W. H. Roscher, Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie, vol. 5 (Leipzig, 1916–1924), s. v. "Thessalos," cols. 775–776. For the view that the apologist Antipater of Magnesia proclaimed Philip's legal title to places like Pallene, Torone, Amphipolis, and Ambracia by reference to Philip's Heraclid ancestry and Heracles' exploits in these places, see E. Bickermann and J. Sykutris, Speusipps Brief an König Philipp (Leipzig, 1928, Berichte über die Verhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig, Philologisch-historische Klasse 80,3), pp. 27–29. As P. A. Brunt remarks, there is no reason to think that such genealogies were not believed in the fourth century. See his Arrian, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA, 1976, Loeb Classical Library), p. 464.

9 See Griffith, HM, pp. 204–206.
their own class. As a king of Macedonia, Philip had to deal with the same general social situation as in Thessaly because the Macedonian nobles on whose cooperation his kingship depended had to be treated as social (if not political) equals. But the most important factor in Philip's elevation to the leadership of the confederacy was what he had been able to do. In response to a Thessalian appeal, he had led Thessalian troops to victory in the name of Thessalian political tradition. Since his new post was awarded through the consent of Thessalians, that decision was Thessalian, too. But the legitimacy of Philip's status as leader of the confederacy ironically depended on maintaining a perceived allegiance to tradition. The only way to legitimize a revolution in a conservative society was to link it to the past. In this situation, the pressure to interpret or to recreate the past in the image of the present was going to be strong in certain interested quarters.

We can see that the selection of Philip as leader of the confederacy was acceptable on the level of propaganda because it could be explained as serving the interests of the nomos of the Thessalians. Here was a man with aristocratic sympathies whose royal status in Macedonia and demonstrated prowess as a military commander recommended him for the type of duties the leader had to perform. Furthermore, his personal acquaintance with Pelopidas gave hope that he could be the kind of beneficial "mediating magistrate" that his Theban predecessor had been, and which Thessaly needed at the moment (as so often). Above all, Philip's election meant the elimination of tyranny at Pherae as a threat to the confederacy and a return to leadership by consent. There were some in Pherae who would have said that their consent had not been solicited in the making of this decision, but

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10 On the Thessalian manner, see Xenophon, *Hellenica* 6.1.3; Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F 49.
12 As M. I. Finley points out in *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1983), p. 133, an "appeal to the past was usually a conservative argument against fundamental change, or . . . for a backward change." But Philip was clever enough to use the past as justification for a veiled but radical change in the politics of Thessaly.
they were disqualified anyway by their heretical views on the way Thessalian government should be run. They had agreed to bring in the Phocians, of all people. For other Thessalians weary of factional strife or intent on their own advantage, or both, Philip's election offered the hope of restoring a facsimile "ancestral constitution" and the national status a more united Thessaly had commanded in the past. That Philip understood this hope and capitalized on it is shown by his sworn promise at the time of his election to restore Thessaly to its traditional position of influence in the assembly of Greek states which controlled Apollo's temple at Delphi, the Amphictyony. Since Delphi lay within the borders of Phocis, the Phocians had been able to deprive the Thessalians of their ancient prerogatives and were not about to recognize Thessalian rights without a fight. Philip swore to win the war for Thessaly. That solemn promise proved (it could then be said) the Macedonian king's devotion to the cause of Thessalian tradition. The central fact to remember about the political climate at the time of Philip's rise to the leadership of the Thessalians in the late 350s B.C. is the way in which radical innovation (a Macedonian in the highest Thessalian office) was introduced under the cover of respect for traditional practices, "in accordance with nomos."

Philip had made a good start in Thessaly. Relations with members of what was now his confederacy became strained over the course of the next several years, however, when no progress was made in keeping the promise to defeat the Phocians in a sacred war. The strains developed because the new leader was evidently insisting on the privileges of his office while (in Thessalian eyes) neglecting his duties. For one thing, Philip was receiving certain substantial revenues in his capacity as leader of the confederacy. Part of the money came from taxes levied in markets and harbors, but perhaps the largest sums came from the tribute paid by the perioikic areas. There was no question that

13 Demosthenes 19.318.
14 Griffith, *HM*, pp. 289–291. S. C. Bakhuizen, however, in a forthcoming article on Magnesia under Macedonian suzerainty which he kindly allowed me to see, argues that Philip ended the Thessalian perioikic system and incorporated the perioikic areas into Macedonia. I cannot agree, as the arguments in this chapter show. Cf. below, n. 20, on Strabo 9.5.16.
Philip was entitled to these revenues as leader of the confederacy. The issue was whether the money was being spent in the interest of the membership and not just to further Philip's private activities elsewhere.\textsuperscript{15} That sort of dispute is common in any situation in which one official controls community funds more or less independent of a regular accounting procedure which can ensure against fraud.

The sources which imply that Philip received Thessalian revenues illegitimately are either biased or ill-informed. Demosthenes, who clearly falls into the first category, will be dealt with shortly. For the moment, it is enough to mention a passage from the geographer Strabo, writing three centuries after Philip's death. In his survey of Thessaly, Strabo remarks that the people of Larissa in mythological times gained control of the original land of the Perrhaebians in Thessaly and exacted tribute from it until Philip became "lord (κύρος) of these places." This passage cannot be taken to mean that Philip robbed the Larissaeans of revenues to which he was not entitled because Strabo shows understanding neither of the political organization of Thessaly in the fourth century nor of the legitimate claim of the leader of the confederacy to receive tribute from the perioikic peoples in the name of the confederacy. Perhaps Strabo was right if he meant that Philip, like Jason of Pherae, as legitimate leader of the confederacy received the revenues which the Larissaeans were supposed to collect for the confederacy but kept for themselves whenever possible.\textsuperscript{16} But Strabo is not by himself a witness for illegitimate (i.e., nontraditional) behavior by Philip in his Thessalian office.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Demosthenes 1.22.

\textsuperscript{16} 9.5.19 (C440). Strabo's rather general comment may be based on the evidence of earlier sources such as Polybius 9.33.2 (discussion of the question whether Philip was "lord" in Thessaly) and Isocrates 5.21 (the Perrhaebians were Philip's subjects).

\textsuperscript{17} See below, n. 20, on Strabo 9.5.16 (C437). Theopompus, on the other hand, like Demosthenes, is an independent witness whose testimony cannot be trusted. In FGrH 115 F 81, he presents a rhetorically slanted reference to Philip's dispatch of a representative "to destroy the Perrhaebians and look after affairs there." It is inconceivable that the leader of the confederacy lacked the right to supervise periaktoi by means of a man on the spot to look after "federal" interests.
Of course, Strabo is not the source which matters in an evaluation of Philip’s conduct after his election to the leadership of the confederacy and, therefore, in an evaluation of his actions in Thessaly. That honor goes to Demosthenes. Since Demosthenes launches his attacks on Philip in a series of speeches which begin not long after Philip became the leader of the confederacy, now is the appropriate time to look at the charges brought by the orator against the king. We will proceed through the speeches in chronological order so far as possible. In that way we can keep a check on the consistency of Demosthenes’ evidence and on the possibility that Philip abandoned his commitment to the nomos of the Thessalians as he served longer in his post and acquired greater and greater power throughout Greece.

The earliest references in Demosthenes to trouble between Philip and the Thessalians come in the first and second orations concerning Olynthus, which are usually dated sometime in the Athenian archon year 349/8 B.C. Since these two speeches are so similar in subject, in structure, and in wording, it is difficult to believe that they were both delivered. Which, if either, was the version spoken by Demosthenes is impossible to know. In both, Demosthenes refers to Thessalian dissatisfaction over Philip’s handling of the matters of the fate of the city of Pagasae and of the perioikic area of Magnesia. Pagasae and Magnesia had been under the control of the tyrants of Pherae until Philip’s recent victory which led to his election as leader of the confederacy. Demosthenes in Olynthiac I.12–13 makes the briefest of references to Philip’s intervention in this area during a thumbnail sketch of the king’s successes up to the time of his attack on Olynthus. Philip, he says, “first having taken Amphipolis, after this Pydna, then Potidaea, next Methone, thereupon attacked Thessaly. After this, he went to Thrace, having settled matters as he wished in Pherae, Pagasae, Magnesia, and all [that area]. Having thrown out some of those there [i.e., in Thrace] and set

18 For the dates of Demosthenic speeches, see Raphael Sealey, “Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Some Demosthenic Dates,” REG 68 (1955), pp. 77–120.
19 N. D. Papahadjis, “Magnesia polis, ‘at the foot of Mount Pelium,’” Thessalika 2 (1959), pp. 22–28, argues that the reference to Magnesia is to the harbor town of the Magnetes, not to the perioikic territory as a whole.
up others, he became ill.” Demosthenes then mentions the
attack on Olynthus, followed by a paraleipsis in which he refers to
campaigns against the Illyrians, Paeonians, and King Arybbas. In Olynthiac I.22, Demosthenes says that “the Thessalians have voted to demand that Philip return Pagasae and have prevented
the fortification of Magnesia.” In Olynthiac II.11, he says that
“the Thessalians have voted to demand that Philip return Pagasae and to confer about Magnesia.” In Olynthiac I.22, Demosthenes adds the information that he has heard a rumor from some people that the Thessalians will no longer hand over
to Philip the revenues from their harbors and markets. Since
Demosthenes’ aim is to convince his audience that Philip is in a
precarious position, there is little incentive to believe in the truth
of a rumor reported by a man who had heard of Alexander the
Great’s death in 335 B.C. and produced a witness to back up the
story. But even if the rumor about revenues was true, there is
no indication elsewhere in Demosthenes or any other source that
the Thessalians ever ceased to turn over these revenues to Philip.
The granting of these same revenues to Alexander when he suc-
cceeded to his father’s position as leader of the confederacy sup-
ports the assumption that the threat to cut off funds, if it was
ever made, was never carried out.

It is easier to believe that the status of Pagasae and of

20 This passage is probably Strabo’s source at 9.5.16 (C437) for the explana-
tion of how Philip made the islands off Magnesia a focus of attention: “Fight-
ning for the leadership, he always used to attack the areas close to him first, and
just as he made most parts of the Magnetan land and of Thrace and of the
other territory around him Macedonia, so he also took [ἀφηρείτο, an imperfect
which could mean “tried to take”?] the islands off Macedonia and made [ἐποί-
εί, “began to make”?] these islands, which had previously been known to none,
objects worth fighting for and well known.” Bakhuizen in his forthcoming arti-
cle (see n. 14 above) interprets this passage, in conjunction with other evidence,
to mean that Philip incorporated the majority of Magnesia into Macedonia even
though the Magnesians retained their identity as an ethn. Strabo, however, is
here most likely only offering an interpretation of Demosthenes’ comments and
is not an independent witness.

21 It seems likely that these two passages are simply alternate versions of the
very same facts.

22 Justin 11.2.7–8.

23 Justin 11.3.2.
Magnesia caused problems for Philip and the Thessalians of the confederacy. The location of these places on the gulf of Pagasae controlled the approach to Thessaly from the sea and the route south along the coast to Thermopylae, the gateway to southern Greece. The power of the tyrants of Pherae had been buttressed considerably by their holding Pagasae and Magnesia, and the situation had been made much worse by their allowing the hated Phocians access to these vital spots. That sort of dangerous situation had to be prevented for the future. Therefore, after his victory over Pherae and the Phocians in the late 350s B.C., Philip would have been wise to put garrisons of loyal (and thus predominantly Macedonian) troops into Pagasae and Magnesia until he could be certain that there was no serious threat of losing these strategic locations to hostile forces. It seems almost certain that Philip had introduced garrisons into Pagasae and Magnesia in the late 350s.  

If Demosthenes is telling the truth about the Thessalian reaction, the confederacy protested as a group.

Even if this is so, it is possible that Demosthenes inflated to the national level complaints which in reality came from the disgruntled leaders of Pherae who had previously controlled Pagasae and Magnesia. They might well have complained because their rivals in Larissa, surely the dominant faction in the confederacy, and their rivals' hand-picked leader, Philip, had connived to get federal approval of garrisons in these sensitive locations. These garrisons meant the Pheraeans had no chance to recover their losses even when Philip was absent. It would be characteristic of Demosthenes to report such complaints from those out of power as if they reflected the national consensus in Thessaly. But this hypothesis cannot be proved, and it is certainly the standard opinion to take Demosthenes’ report at face value. In that case, Demosthenes’ references to Thessalian demands in the first and second Olynthiac orations should mean that the Thessalians of the confederacy had objected, first, to the presence of Philip’s forces in Pagasae, a city which was supposed to be an autonomous member of the confederacy without a garrison once the danger of tyranny had passed, and, second, to

the plans for a fortified position which Philip had evidently made for Magnesia, an area which he could claim to control as leader of the confederacy. The presence of the leader’s troops in Magnesia was perhaps acceptable, but a permanent fort was too much. Since Pagasae in very early times may have belonged to perioikic Magnesia, Philip could have justified his special arrangements for that port city on the grounds that he was returning to the ancestral situation in which Pagasae’s military security had been, properly speaking, a concern of the leader of the confederacy. That is just the sort of argument which Philip seems to have used later in the 340s B.C. as camouflage for the changes in tetrarchic government which he introduced, as we will see.

Whether Demosthenes’ comments actually refer to a dispute between the members of the confederacy and their leader over garrisons of the sort just described, or to something else entirely, it seems that the matter was straightened out. Nothing is said in Olynthiac III about dissatisfaction in Thessaly, although this omission may be of no significance because there is no way to establish beyond doubt that this speech is later than the other two. But there are other hints that the matter had been settled. Diodorus reports that Philip in 349/8 B.C. had to return to Thessaly to expel the tyrant Peitholaus from Pherae again. As Griffith rightly points out, it is hard to believe that Peitholaus had been able to reestablish himself in Pherae while Philip held Pagasae (not to mention Magnesia). His solution to this puzzle is to assume that Diodorus has misreported what was actually a local popular uprising in Pherae against Philip and not a comeback by a once-defeated tyrant.

It is also possible, however, to think that Peitholaus was able to return just because, among other things, Philip was no longer holding Pagasae when the return took place. This possibility becomes more compelling when one considers the implications of Demosthenes’ remarks in Philippic II.22 (344 B.C.). There he

26 Diodorus 16.52.9.
refers to the time when Philip "was expelling tyrants for them and was giving back Nicaea and Magnesia." Since it is certain that Philip did expel tyrants from Pherae and did give back Nicaea, it makes sense to believe that he "gave back" Magnesia, too. And although Demosthenes does not mention Pagasae here, his failure to raise the question of its status in any of his speeches after Olynthiaca I and II suggests that the Thessalians "got Pagasae back" as well as Magnesia, or at least that some satisfactory compromise was reached between the leader of the confederacy and its membership on this point. In other words, Demosthenes' comments on Pagasae and Magnesia can plausibly be explained as referring, at most, to disagreements between the leader of the confederacy on one side and the members of the confederacy on the other over issues of mutual concern. That sort of trouble must have been common throughout the history of the Thessalian confederacy even before Philip's time, if the reports we have about the prevalence of stasis in Thessaly are any indication. The controversy over the status of Pagasae and Magnesia was not of such a magnitude that Demosthenes could have expected to find many Thessalians in agreement with his claim in Olynthiaca II.8 that they now found themselves "the slaves of Philip."

It should be added that "giving back" Pagasae and Magnesia did not mean that Philip abdicated his rights as leader of the confederacy in these places. Pagasae presumably had the same sort of military and financial responsibilities as did the other cities which belonged to the confederacy, and probably with stricter supervision. Magnesia as a perioikic area owed tribute which was collected for the benefit of the confederacy in theory and of the leader in practice. As in the case of the Perrhaebians,

28 Demosthenes 6.22. Cf. 6.20 for a similar use of the imperfect tense to refer to handing over Potidaea.

29 Griffith, HM, p. 287, says Philip never surrendered Pagasae "so far as we know." But if Philip held on to the city and thereby caused trouble in Thessaly in 344 B.C. (p. 524), why is Demosthenes silent on this point in the Second Philipnic of the same year? Pagasae appears as an independent city in a list of 325 B.C. from Delphi. See J. Bousquet, "Le compte de l'automne 325 à Delphes," in Mélanges helléniques offerts à Georges Daux (Paris, 1974), p. 27, n 1.
Philip continued to maintain his right to this tribute from his "subjects" the Magnesians, as Isocrates calls them.\footnote{5.20.}

Potentially more serious objections to the idea of Philip as the public respecter of the nomos of the Thessalians are the allegations of Demosthenes that Philip radically altered Thessalian government in the later 340s B.C. on both the civic and the national levels. In 346 B.C., Philip had fulfilled his promise to the Thessalians by finally defeating the Phocians in the Sacred War and by restoring the ancestral privileges of the Thessalians in the Amphictyony to the members of the confederacy. Even Demosthenes has to admit that the king and his Greek allies are on good terms in this period.\footnote{5.19–20.} In speeches written in the years 344–342 B.C., however, Demosthenes tries hard to give the impression that Thessaly is now suffering grievously from the slavery imposed by its erstwhile benefactor, Philip. As always with Demosthenes, it pays to read between the lines. In Philippic II.22 (344 B.C.), in the passage which refers to Philip's throwing out tyrants and giving back Nicaea and Magnesia, Demosthenes poses the rhetorical question of whether the Thessalians ever expected to have the dekadarchia which they now have.\footnote{Dekadarchia otherwise appears only in Isocrates Panegyricus 110 and Philippus 95 as a variant for dekarchia, the usual term for a Spartan "rule of ten" (e.g., Xenophon, Hellenica 3.4.2, 3.4.7, 6.3.8).} Or, Demosthenes goes on, when Philip was restoring their Amphictyonic privileges, did the Thessalians expect that Philip would appropriate their private resources? Details of these charges are not offered. Demosthenes' answer is obviously no in both cases, but an unbiased reply can be made only after looking at some additional evidence. In the speech On the False Embassy 260 (343 B.C.), we read that their desire for Philip's friendship has destroyed the hegemony, reputation, and now the freedom of the Thessalians because Macedonian garrisons are occupying the citadels of some Thessalian cities. Demosthenes does not name these cities or say how many were garrisoned or when. Nor does he comment on any Thessalian reaction to the presence of these garrisons, just as in Philippic II he gives no indication of unrest.
or dissatisfaction in Thessaly. Without a doubt, Demosthenes meant his audience to jump to the conclusion that the Thessalians were restive and unhappy with Philip, but it is important to notice that Demosthenes makes no such explicit claim for the period to which the Embassy speech refers, as he did for the period after Philip's election to the leadership of the confederacy. The lack of details in Demosthenes' accusations is worth noticing. When he has valid (or even invalid but plausible) charges to press, Demosthenes spells them out.

In the speeches On Halonnesus 32 (343 B.C.) and On the Chersonese 59 (342/1 B.C.), one finds the details which reveal why Demosthenes was so vague when accusing Philip of malfeasance in Thessaly in the two earlier speeches Philippic II and On the False Embassy. It turns out that Philip had campaigned against the city of Pherae and put a garrison into its citadel after a victory over, or a capitulation by, the other side. Since Pherae had previously refused to cooperate with Philip on (it seems) two occasions when he called on it to fulfill its obligations to him as leader of the confederacy, it is obvious that the city had now been forced by Philip, in his capacity as the leader of the confederacy, to fall into line and that an occupying garrison had been introduced to prevent further treason. Once again, Philip had expelled tyrants. In other words, he had done just what had won him favor with the Thessalians some years before. The other members of the confederacy might not relish the prospect of having Macedonian troops in Pherae indefinitely, but recent history showed that lesser measures only ensured the recurrence of very dangerous trouble in that rebellious city. For the good of the confederacy, Pherae had to be subdued and kept under close watch. Philip could therefore excuse the action taken against Pherae by reference to the traditional concern of the confederacy with the threat of tyranny, and he was formally correct to deny

33 Olynthiacs I.22, II.8.
34 Demosthenes 19.320. See Griffith, HM, p. 525, for the second occasion in 344 B.C.
35 Diodorus 16.69.8.
that he was making war in Thessaly when dealing with Pherae.\textsuperscript{36} As the leader of the Thessalian confederacy, he moved against Pherae as the "friend and ally" of the other Thessalians.\textsuperscript{37}

This idea of insisting that certain acts of war are merely "police actions" is unfortunately not unfamiliar to historians of the twentieth century, and then, as now, the point of the vocabulary was propaganda. When the orator Hegesippus sneers that of course Philip garrisoned Pherae so that its people could be autonomous, his sarcasm reveals the official Thessalian position on the incident.\textsuperscript{38} Pherae was attacked and garrisoned to guarantee the freedom from tyrants of the people of Pherae as well as of the rest of the Thessalians. "Dekadarchy" is, one might guess, a term of abuse to describe the special arrangements made to govern Pherae after this most recent rebellion.\textsuperscript{39} The private resources which Demosthenes claims that Philip appropriated for himself can only have been the contributions the leader of the confederacy received from the member cities and periokic peoples, and Demosthenes' accusation at this point was perhaps inspired by the reimposition on Pherae of the financial obligations which the city had been shirking (to judge from Embassy 260). So far, then, the charges raised by Demosthenes seem to have been related to action against Pherae taken in the name of the Thessalian confederacy. But what of the claim in the Embassy speech that more than one citadel was garrisoned?

G. T. Griffith has suggested that Larissa suffered the same fate as did Pherae, and this would be a point of crucial importance, if true.\textsuperscript{40} Pherae had a history of treason and recalcitrance which could be invoked to justify harsh measures as the requirements of tradition. Larissa, however, had no such record and was in fact the city which had done the most to secure Philip's position in

\textsuperscript{36} Demosthenes 8.59.

\textsuperscript{37} Demosthenes 9.12.

\textsuperscript{38} [Demosthenes] 7.32.

\textsuperscript{39} Griffith, \textit{HM}, pp. 527–533. Xenophon's reference (\textit{Hellenica} 6.3.8) to \textit{dekarchia} as a form of tyranny opposed to autonomy, whose members ruled by force rather than according to \textit{nomos}, shows that "rule of ten" was the perfect term of abuse to apply to Philip's avowed policy of respect for Thessalian \textit{nomos}.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{HM}, pp. 525–526.
The case for believing that Philip garrisoned Larissa depends on a reconstruction of the career of a certain Simus of Larissa, an Aleuad who had collaborated with Philip when the latter first entered Thessaly but later fell from the king's favor, according to Demosthenes. Griffith, for example, assumes that Philip expelled Simus from Larissa because Simus had begun to abuse his position in the city. A garrison was then introduced to keep the peace. But the various pieces of evidence from the historical sources which must be put together to form this jigsaw puzzle of a reconstruction do not fit.\textsuperscript{41} Similarly, the numismatic evidence which has served to support this reconstruction of Simus' career cannot be relied upon. This evidence consists of a group of silver coins minted in Larissa which bear the name Simus in tiny script.\textsuperscript{42} Since the appearance of the name on the coins has been taken as a sign that this Simus was a tyrant in the city, and since the date of the coins has been taken to be the period 353–344/3 B.C., the coins have been used to confirm the view that Philip expelled Simus from Larissa and imposed a garrison. But this interpretation is erroneous. The coins are dated to this period on the basis of the faulty historical evidence just mentioned, rather than on numismatic evidence. An analysis of coins found in hoards shows that in fact the Simus coins belong \textit{ca.} 370–360 B.C., much earlier than previously thought.\textsuperscript{43} Therefore, the Simus coins of Larissa provide no help whatsoever in determining what happened to the Simus who, according to Demosthenes, fell from Philip's favor.

\textsuperscript{41} For a discussion of this evidence, see appendix I on Philip II and the career of Simus.


In sum, there is no reason to think that Larissa received a garrison in 344 or 343. Pherae did, and perhaps Pagasae as well, if Demosthenes' plural is to be believed. But this action took place as part of the business of the confederacy, within the context of the nomos of the Thessalians. Even when Philip took drastic measures in Thessaly, he found it convenient to ensure their "legitimacy." We might compare the punishment inflicted on Pharcadon and Tricca in (probably) 352 B.C. for treasonous collaboration with Onomarchus. The penalty was carried out by the leader, but it was decided upon by the confederacy. This commitment to "legitimacy" is a point whose significance is not diminished for historical purposes by the acknowledgment that legitimacy and moral right are often far from the same thing. Philip respected the nomos of the Thessalians because this policy worked. As Demosthenes had to say, the majority of the Thessalians were satisfied with their Macedonian leader. Philip treated them fairly and to their benefit, and that was freedom enough, for now.

Only one substantive charge remains from Demosthenes' speeches of this period as proof of the "slavery" which Philip imposed on the Thessalians. In Philippic III.26 of 342/1 B.C., Demosthenes claims that the king had wrongly imposed tetrarchies, so that they may be slaves not only by city [κατὰ πόλεις] but also by tribe [κατ' θέματα]." In short, Philip "prescribes for the Thessalians in what way they are to be governed" (Philippic III.33). Again, the problem is to disentangle the facts from the rhetoric, especially since some scholars have thought that "tetrarchies" in this passage refers to the same thing as "dekadarchy" in Philippic II.22. But Griffith's treatment of this point should kill that impossible idea forever, and we need only concentrate on Philippic III by itself. "Slavery by city" sounds like a polemical description of Philip's leadership of the Thessalian confederacy, whose constituent elements were

44 Sordi, LT; pp. 254–256; Griffith, HM, pp. 271, 279, 286.
45 8.65.
46 Isocrates, Letters 2.20 (343 B.C.).
47 HM, pp. 527–532.
cities, and of the sort of action taken against Pherae, especially if
a new "constitution" was installed in that city after the latest
rebellion was quelled. The real issue for our purposes, then, is
the significance of the tetrarchies which Philip "established" in
Thessaly. Can this feature of Thessalian government under Philip's leadership be reconciled with the policy of ostensible respect
for the nomos of the Thessalians which has emerged from an
analysis of the other evidence as Philip's chosen position?

The answer to this question is clearly yes. First, the evidence
discussed earlier shows that Thessaly had long been divided into
four units for certain administrative purposes relevant to the con-
federacy. On the broad level, tetrarchic government was cer-
tainly nothing new in Thessaly. The details of Philip's arrange-
ments are another matter, however, and the most important of
these details is the existence of tetrarchs. Contemporary literary
and epigraphical sources prove that Thessaly had officials called
tetrarchs by the time of Philip. It is usually assumed that these
tetrarchs were officials created by Philip to replace the
polemarchs known from the earlier evidence, but in fact there is
no compelling reason why the tetrarchs could not have simply
supplemented the polemarchs as magistrates in the tetrads. A
larger number of high local offices would have served Philip's
purpose by leaving room for ambitious nobles to serve in tradi-
tional posts. But the important issue here is the intended rela-
tionship of Philip's tetrarchs to Thessalian tradition. Working

48 Theopompos, FGrH 115 F 208; SIG 3 274 VIII.
49 Sordi, LT, p. 339, and Griffith, HM, pp. 533–534, based on the use of the
verb καθωστάναι in Theopompos and Demosthenes to describe Philip's actions
regarding tetrarchs or tetrarchies, believe that Philip abolished elective
polemarchs in favor of tetrarchs whom he appointed to office. The evidence
seems far too weak to support this conclusion, and it seems incorrect to say that
the "significant thing" (in Griffith's words) in Philip's reform was a change from
elected to appointed officials at the head of the tetrads. Philip would have had
no trouble having his men elected, if election was the nomos of the Thessalians.
And why replace the polemarchs if Philip was going to have his men on hand
in a position of superior authority in alleged imitation of the "ancestral constituti-
on"? Better to keep the old offices going so that the Thessalian aristocrats
could, like the consuls during the Roman Empire, continue to satisfy their
ambitions in offices of high (though hollow) status.
strictly from the evidence from sources certainly earlier than Philip, one cannot tell whether Thessaly had officials called tetrarchs before Philip's time. The only hint that they might have existed is the reference to "tetrarchy" in Euripides' *Alcestis* lines 1154–55.

The only other source to testify to the existence of an early tetrarch is an inscription set up at Delphi by a man who himself served as a tetrarch under Philip. The Thessalian Daochus erected a series of statues of prominent members of his family in Apollo's sanctuary and inscribed on the bases the honors each ancestor had earned. Daochus refers to himself as "tetrarch of the Thessalians," which is the same title inscribed below the statue of his fifth-century ancestor Acnonius. 50 It would probably be unwarranted to suspect that this convenient fifth-century precedent for Philip was invented and inserted into the family history of Daochus. Thanks to the testimony of Euripides, we can believe that Acnonius had been a tetrarch of the Thessalians. Philip picked this office to exploit for his own purposes. Precisely what he did with it, we cannot know. The tetrarchs may have continued to exist in the fourth century but without real power until Philip strengthened their position, or he may have restored the office, which could have been abolished at some earlier time or, perhaps, failed to be filled for a long period because factional strife was so intense as to prevent agreement on suitable men to serve as tetrarchs. 51 The significance of Philip's effect on the tetrarchies is not so much in exactly what he did (whatever it was, it was in his own interest), as in how he presented his action. The Daochus inscription shows that Philip linked the present to the past. Philip's tetrarchs were clearly publicized as a return to the provisions of the ancestral constitution. They were to be regarded as part of the nomos of the Thessalians. This final point emerges even more strikingly from another inscription among those on the so-called Daochus monument, but discussion of this text must be postponed briefly in order to consider two

51 For the view that Philip reestablished the tetrarchies, see, for example, George Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London, 1978), p. 115.
final pieces of evidence on tetrarchies which come from sources no earlier than Philip’s time.

From the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Thessalians* comes the information that Thessaly was divided into four parts at the time of the legendary Aleuas the Red, who also assigned the number of cavalry and infantry which each “share” in Thessaly was to provide.\(^{52}\) It is certainly interesting that in this research on the early constitution of Thessaly, which was most likely compiled during or after Aristotle’s stay in Macedonia at Philip’s court, it was reported that the fourfold division of the land was the work of Aleuas, like Philip a descendant of Heracles who had been concerned with the Thessalian army.\(^{53}\) Interest increases when one turns to Plutarch’s story of how Aleuas was chosen “king of the Thessalians.”\(^{54}\) He was very unexpectedly picked for the office by the god Apollo in a lottery which was held at Delphi at the request of the Thessalians, who had apparently been unable to make a selection themselves. In other words, the god of Delphi could, if so moved, choose a descendant of Heracles like Aleuas as a suitable though surprising leader for the Thessalians when they could not find someone on their own. The parallel with Philip’s case was naturally imperfect (after all, Aleuas was a genuine Thessalian), but suggestive. Since Philip had led the Thessalian army to victory in the Sacred War under Apollo’s banner and, it was alleged, in the interests of proper management of his shrine, it was possible to imagine that Apollo had had a hand in the happy coincidence of interests between Philip and the confederacy.\(^{55}\) In any case, these stories make it clear that Aleuas, the leader of the Thessalians who saw to the tetrads and to the army, represented a convenient model for Philip, who was concerned with the same things. If the tradition about Aleuas

\(^{52}\) Frags. 497–498 (Rose), on which see H. T. Wade-Gery, “Jason of Pherae and Aleuas the Red,” *JHS* 44 (1924), pp. 55–64.


\(^{54}\) *Moralia* 492A-B (De fraterno amore 21).

\(^{55}\) See Diodorus 16.38.2; Justin 8.2.3; and Griffith, *HM*, p. 274.
represents what the Thessalians even before Philip’s time believed about their own distant past (as it probably does), we can again glimpse how Philip operated in Thessaly. As with the tetrarchs, he could use history to justify what he had decided to do in his own interest.

It is easy to believe that Philip relied on his tetrarchs to keep watch on the cities of Thessaly and to make certain that they sent the troops he wanted when he wanted them. One final story from Plutarch hints that the tetrarchs may have also been concerned with collecting the leader’s revenues, which we might have expected anyway. According to Plutarch, when a certain Hermon tried to beg off from service as the leader of the Thessalians on the grounds of personal poverty, it was voted that each tetrad would provide him with a ration so that he could take up his office. The moral of the story could be found in the responsibility of the tetrads to supply the leader of the confederacy with the necessary revenues. Who better than a tetrarch loyal to Philip to ensure that the king received the money due him? Tetrarchs who kept a sharp eye out would have been especially valuable in monitoring the flow of revenue from the perioikic peoples to the leader of the confederacy in order to eliminate skimming by the cities. And the same officials could have made certain that the perioikic areas kept their light-armed forces in service to the confederacy up to strength. These duties, which were especially important for a leader who was often not in Thessaly to check on things himself, could easily have been transformed by the rhetoric of Demosthenes into “slavery by tribe” because the perioikic peoples were “the tribes round

56 Moralia 822E (Praecepta gerendae reipublicae 31). The incident is not dated, but the mention of tetrads could fit just as easily into the classical period as into the period of the refounded confederacy after 196 B.C., where J.A.O. Larsen, “The Thessalian Tetrades in Plutarch’s Moralia 822E,” CP 58 (1963), p. 240, thinks the incident belongs. The continuing importance of the tetrads in this later period has now been confirmed by the inscription announced by K. Gallis at the Eighth International Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy in Athens (October 1982). It must be pointed out, however, that Plutarch in 822E otherwise discusses events from the classical period (concerning Lamachus and Phocion).
about.” 57 One might suggest that Philip’s tetrarchs were especially concerned with the management of periokic territory, thus supplementing the preexistent Thessalian administration. 58

The catalogue of Philip’s crimes in Thessaly compiled by Demosthenes is now complete. In every case, it seems that Demosthenes is referring to an action which, whatever its sinister character in reality, from the point of view of a pro-Philip propagandist fell under the heading of protection of the interests of the confederacy and of the nomos of the Thessalians. With this observation in mind, we can turn in conclusion to the epigram inscribed on the base of the statue of another member of Daochus’ family, in this case his ancestor of the same name from the second half of the fifth century B.C. 59 In this autobiographical poem, the elder Daochus is made to say that he “ruled all Thessaly for twenty-seven years not by force but by nomos. Thessaly teemed with wealth and the fruits of a great peace.”

The elder Daochus’ career, as described in this honorific text set up in Philip’s time or not long after, could be seen as a precedent for Philip’s career in Thessaly (and for that of Alexander, as it turned out). 60 Daochus had “ruled” Thessaly for a long and continuous term of office which covered times of peace. Philip, too, “ruled” Thessaly for a long time, and after 346 B.C. during peacetime. Furthermore, the elder Daochus prided himself in his posthumous poem on his observance of nomos, the great concern of Philip as leader of the Thessalians. The choice of what to

57 Theopompos, FGriH 115 F 209, echoes Demosthenes’ terminology: Thrasydaeus (one of Philip’s tetrarchs) was “tyrant over those of his own tribe.”

58 Since the story about Hermon cannot be dated, we lack even a clue as to whether the tetrarchs had special financial responsibilities before the time of Philip. If the story could be shown to belong to the history of Thessaly before Philip, one could surmise that, once again, Philip had exploited Thessalian tradition in making his own arrangements for the Thessalians.

59 SIG 3 274 VI.

60 On this monument, see Tobias Dohrn, “Die Marmor-Standbilder des Daochos-Weihgeschenks in Delphi,” Antike Plastik 8 (1968), pp. 33–53. Steven Lattimore, “The Chlamys of Daochus I,” AJA 79 (1975), pp. 87–88, has suggested that the date of the monument might be as late as the end of the fourth century, but this seems unlikely. We hear nothing of the family of Daochus after the 330s.
emphasize in this inscription about the career of the fifth-century Daochus cannot be accidental. The Daochus of the fourth century who commissioned this inscribed monument was a partisan of Macedonian rule. It would be incredible if the propaganda about the confederacy which was expressed in the texts on his monument at Delphi, a meeting place for the Amphictyonic council with which Philip had been so concerned, did not coincide with Philip’s public position on the nature of his role in Thessaly as the successor of the elder Daochus as “ruler” of the Thessalians. As Polyagenus says, Philip won over the Thessalians “not by arms.” The nomos of the Thessalians was Philip’s weapon. Wielding it deftly, he was able to create a system in professed imitation of an “ancestral constitution” which permitted him to retain effective control of Thessaly through local Thessalian officials even in times of peace, when the Thessalian leader’s office had traditionally been weak. As an absentee leader after 346 B.C. (except perhaps for short visits), Philip needed this sort of system to keep watch on the unreliable Thessalians with their history of factional strife.

On the level of moral evaluation, where the form of events matters less than their content, the modern historian may well wish to agree with Demosthenes that the Thessalians were in reality the slaves of the Macedonian king, but the form of that slavery matters if one is to answer other questions. If taken too literally, eloquent appraisals such as Griffith’s that the developments of 344–342 B.C. “drew a blanket of darkness and tyranny over Thessaly, effectively and finally stifling freedom” are apt to mislead the unwary. This has certainly been the case with Thessaly, ever since the time of Demosthenes. For this reason, it

61 Strat. 4.2.19.

62 He probably used this approach in Macedonia whenever possible; the societies were similar, as we have seen. Cf. Arrian 4.11.6, where Callisthenes is made to say that Alexander’s forebears had ruled the Macedonians by nomos, not by force.


64 HM, p. 535.
was necessary to discuss the evidence in detail and separated along chronological lines. It must be clear that Philip’s policy of public respect for Thessalian nomos is the background against which the question of the fate of Thessalian coinage must be seen.

All indications are that Philip’s policy remained unchanged in the years after 342 B.C. The Thessalians retained their treasured primacy in the Delphic Amphictyony, and they were included as independent members of Philip’s Hellenic League, formed in the aftermath of the king’s victory over the Greeks at Chaeronea in 338 B.C.\(^{65}\) That this situation was not entirely a sham is shown by the Athenian embassies which came to Thessaly in the period before Chaeronea to urge resistance to Philip.\(^{66}\) If Thessaly had been a province politically incorporated into the Macedonian kingdom, there would have been neither opportunity nor reason for such missions. After Chaeronea, the “freedom and autonomy” of the members of the Hellenic League were guaranteed.\(^{67}\) For our purposes, this is an important point no matter how insincere the guarantee. In Thessaly, nomos remained king of all. With the election of Philip as their leader, the Thessalians had found a solution to their current problems which could be reconciled with tradition of long standing. In a time of severe factional strife, they had settled on a third party to serve in a sense as “mediating magistrate” at the head of an army strong enough to quell any rebellion or tyranny. They had looked to a foreign king for help, an effective if risky business, as they knew from experience. But this was a foreigner in the mold of Pelopidas, with the added advantage of some dim claim to Thessalian kinship in his mythical ancestry and in his marriages (if that is the right word) to two Thessalian women.\(^{68}\) He obtained his rule by the consent of the strongest (or at least the most successful) of

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\(^{65}\) *SVA* III, no. 403, b, line 2. (I accept the common view that this text refers to the members of the Hellenic League, the so-called League of Corinth.)

\(^{66}\) Griffith, *HM*, p. 537.

\(^{67}\) [Demosthenes] 17.8.

those who mattered, the aristocrats with ambitions. His changes in tetradic and perioikic administration were, it was said, attempts to get back to the way things were in the good old days of the "ancestral constitution." He kept his hands off civic affairs unless it was a question of danger to the confederacy from tyranny or the like.

These are the arguments, or, rather, rationalizations, the Thessalians could make to themselves in order to stifle feelings of uneasiness and dread about their prospects for the long run as followers of a dynamic, ruthless, and militarily powerful Macedonian king. Such arguments, which reflected the propaganda of Philip, could never obscure the plain truth. Philip controlled Thessaly. What must be emphasized is how he controlled it. Philip's consistent policy was to govern Thessaly "in accordance with nomos." His changes and innovations were such that they could be explained as reversions to ancient precedent. Philip did not make Thessaly into a province of his Macedonian kingdom. This fact bears directly on the hypothesis that Philip imposed the use of Macedonian coins on the Thessalians. Since he exercised power in Thessaly in the guise of a traditional leader of the confederacy, he had an incentive to leave to the cities matters of purely civic concern such as coinage. That was the Thessalian tradition. They had never had a federal coinage which won universal acceptance or lasted for more than a brief period. The traditional Thessalian leader paid no attention to autonomous coinage in Thessaly, and there is absolutely no reason to think that Philip behaved differently.\textsuperscript{69} In fact, he had a vested interest in the financial status quo. As leader of the confederacy, he received revenue from Thessaly. To have suppressed the local production of coinage could only have interfered with the flow of this money. Fees and taxes would have to be collected in foreign coinage, charges for exchanges between different coinages would have to be paid constantly, and so on. The effect could only have been to produce confusion and even

\textsuperscript{69} There were no external models, for example, which would have influenced Philip to suppress Greek coinages. See chapter 5 and appendix 2 for discussion of two such models, those of Persia and of Boeotia.
chaos. A shrewd judge of the power of money and of its utility to himself, Philip had every reason to maximize his revenues from all quarters. Closing the mints of Thessaly was not going to help him do that.

The historical evidence confirms the conclusions already drawn from the numismatic evidence. Philip II cannot have suppressed the autonomous coinage of Thessaly as a matter of policy, and there is no reason to think that his political or financial plans could have had that effect even indirectly. In fact, Philip had good reasons to keep matters just as he found them in Thessaly so far as coinage was concerned. We must keep the precedent of Philip’s policy clearly in mind as the necessary background to an investigation of the question of what effect Alexander and his successors might have had on Thessalian coinage.