ONE. SCHOLARLY OPINION ON
MACEDONIAN KINGS AND THESSALIAN
COINAGE

The fate of the coinage of Thessaly in the classical period presented a puzzle to those scholars who first studied these coins in a comprehensive fashion. The cities of Thessaly minted a large number of different coinages in the fifth and fourth centuries, but at some point all these civic coinages came to an end and were eventually replaced in the second century B.C. by a federal coinage. Since the ancient sources did not directly reveal the solution to the puzzle of the precise date and the reason for the cessation of civic coinage in Thessaly, scholars had to produce a solution based only on indirect evidence, the uncertainty of which was often unacknowledged. As it happened, a scholarly consensus on the question of the fate of Thessalian coinage was established on the basis of an unexamined assumption about the relationship between political sovereignty and the right of coinage. An explanation of the origin of that assumption must be our first concern.

1
The Assumption behind the Scholarly Consensus

The history of the idea that fourth-century Macedonian kings abolished at least some Greek coinages in favor of their own coins is linked to the history of ancient numismatics as a scholarly discipline. This idea was developed not from study of the ancient Greek situation but, rather, from theories based on the history of other periods. In fact, the strength and persistence in modern scholarship of the idea that fourth-century Macedonian kings suppressed autonomous Greek coinage in favor of their
own royal coinage as a matter of policy, which was determined by the nature of their rule, is only comprehensible when one considers the general background of this idea in the history of European political theory on sovereignty, especially the sovereignty of monarchs.

This subject received a comprehensive treatment in the sixteenth century in the famous work on sovereignty of the French political philosopher Jean Bodin (1530–1596). His *Six livres de la république*, first published in 1576, was an attempt to elaborate an absolutist theory of sovereignty based on Bodin's decided preference for monarchy.\(^1\) To make his case, Bodin produced an extremely detailed list of the characteristics and attributes of sovereignty which this absolute sovereign must possess. The comprehensiveness of his definition of sovereignty set Bodin apart from his predecessors in political philosophy, whose traditional views on sovereignty he inevitably inherited, and the wide scope of his thought and of his research for evidence to support his views allowed him to discuss the issue of the sovereign and his coinage in unprecedented detail.

The power to coin money was seventh in Bodin's extensive list of the necessary attributes of a sovereign.\(^2\) In summary, his position was that the right of coinage is the exclusive prerogative of the sovereign, who must suppress all other coinages in his realm and should never grant permission to anyone else to issue coins. A uniform monetary system naturally results, and Bodin recommended that the sovereign emulate the ancient Roman

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Emperors and Charlemagne by allowing only one central mint, to ensure close control of a single coinage for the protection of all.3

Bodin's formulation of a theory of sovereignty was especially influential because it represented a culmination of centuries of European thought on the topic. Already in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, for example, the elaboration of the notion of the inalienability of regalia, "royal rights," made it easy to reach the conclusion that a king might need to suppress nonroyal coinages. These regalia were the rights and functions which a kingdom had to exercise if it was to exist and to flourish. Since from a certain perspective in political philosophy an individual king was in effect only a trustee of the powers and responsibilities conferred on him by his royal office, he lacked the right to alienate these essential components of his office's sovereignty to the detriment of his successors and of the state itself. Such was the kernel of the theory of the inalienability of sovereignty as it emerged in this period.4 The right of coinage was one of the "royal rights." This meant that the sovereign, from the very fact of his possessing sovereignty, was forbidden to invest anyone else with the authority to mint coins. It was a necessary conclusion, therefore, that all nonroyal coinages would have to be eliminated to achieve and maintain a uniform monetary system.5

Significantly, this same conclusion also emerged in the great monograph on the theory of money written by Nicole Oresme in the fourteenth century, a treatise which advanced arguments

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4 On the subject of inalienability, see Peter N. Riesenberg, Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought (New York, 1956).

5 Riesenberg, Inalienability, pp. 5–9, points out that no firm list of the regalia that could not be alienated was ever drawn up, but the control of coinage was definitely one of the rights at issue (cf. p. 30). See, for example, the law in the thirteenth-century Spanish code Fuero Viejo that makes "Moneda" one of the four things a king cannot alienate "por razón del señorío natural," quoted by Salvador Mingujón, Historia del derecho español (Barcelona, 1953), p. 97. Not every contemporary thinker, however, believed that a uniform monetary system was absolutely necessary. See Romualdo Trifone, "La variazione del valore della moneta nel pensiero di Bartolo," in Bartolo di Sassoferrato. Studi e documenti per il VI centenario (Milan, 1962), vol. 2, p. 698.
against the notion that a ruler could manipulate the monetary system absolutely as he pleased. The main point of the work was to argue that the sovereign’s monopoly over coinage arose not from an absolute royal right or from ownership of the coinage, but from practical necessity in the interests of the public, whose property the currency really was. The sovereign is to control the coinage for the benefit of the community, and this benefit must be ensured by the suppression of other domestic coinages besides the royal, whether counterfeit or valid. Foreign coinages that threaten the domestic monetary system must be suppressed, by war if necessary.

It would be hard to imagine a stronger statement than Oresme’s in favor of the idea that the sovereign should control the monetary system so as to provide a uniform circulation of coinage, by means of the suppression of competing mints if need be. That this statement came from a theorist who also held that the sovereign did not possess this control over the monetary system as an inalienable right meant that both sides in the theoretical debate over the origin of the sovereign’s monetary prerogative could be made to agree on the practical point under discussion. They agreed that a king was required by his status and office to restrict the right of coinage only to royal mints throughout the territory over which he exercised sovereignty. On this point, the streams of opinion converged, culminating in Bodin’s great work.


8 In the French version of his treatise, Oresme expanded the recommendations in this area made in the Latin version. See Bridrey, *Oresme*, pp. 209–211.

9 Subsequent specialized discussions on the subject of the sovereign and the monetary system essentially echoed the views which had been elaborated in the political philosophy of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The German scholar Gabriel Biel (1430–1495), for example, in his major treatise on money written in the fifteenth century (first published in 1542), repeated the opinion
Bodin marshaled examples from both ancient and modern history to support his views on the subject of the sovereign and the monetary system. From the Roman Republic came proof that the sovereign power in the state had the power to determine the value of coinage. From the Roman Empire, he cited a law ascribed to Constantine which punished counterfeiting as treason. In other words, an offense against the sovereign’s coinage constituted *lèse-majesté*. Moving immediately from ancient history to more modern, Bodin remarked that the same punishment applies even to those who issue good coinage without the sovereign’s permission. And in any case, such permission ought never to be granted to a subject because to do so would compromise the sovereignty of the sovereign. Francis I of France (1515–1547), Bodin noted, suppressed the traditional coinage of numerous nonroyal mints in France, and the “estates” of Poland at about the same time issued an edict which denied that king Sigismund II Augustus (crowned 1530, sole ruler 1548–1572) had the power to bestow the right of coinage on the duke of Prussia, because that right was inseparable from the crown.

All of Bodin’s evidence up to this point pertained either to

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that in theory only the highest sovereign, in this case the Emperor, enjoyed the right of coinage. In practice, he admitted, others exercised this right from immemorial custom or failure to acknowledge the Emperor’s superior suzerainty. See his *Treatise on the Power and Utility of Moneys*, trans. Robert Belle Burke (Philadelphia, 1930), pp. 31–32.


11 McRae edition, p. 176. For the monetary policy of Francis, see A. Blanchet and A. Dieudonné, *Manuel de numismatique française* (Paris, 1912–1936), vol. 2, pp. 131–133. For the grant of the right of coinage to Albrecht of Brandenburg, duke of Prussia, in 1525 under the rule of Sigismund I (1506–1548), see Arthur Engel and Raymond Serrure, *Traité de numismatique moderne et contemporaine* (Paris, 1897–1899), vol. 1, pp. 380–381, 533–535. Sigismund’s arrangement with Albrecht itself necessitated the suppression of various mints and the centralization of royal authority over coinage, a reform which was elaborately justified in 1526 by Nicolaus Copernicus in his treatise *Monetae Cuden- dae Ratio*, written at the request of the king.
ancient Roman or to modern European history. Greek antiquity
did not appear in his catalogue of historical evidence for the
inalienability of the right of coinage. The situation changed,
however, when he continued his discussion on the further topic
of the importance of the sovereign's image on his coinage. The
citations here ranged from Theseus, the legendary king of
Athens, through Darius, the Great King of Persia, to Commodus,
Emperor of Rome. As part of this catalogue, Bodin mentioned
Philip II of Macedonia (359–336 B.C.) as the first to coin money
in Greece (sic) with his own image on it. These pieces, he added,
were called *Philippaei*, in imitation of the Persian kings, who
called their gold pieces *Dariques* after the image of king Darius
(521–486 B.C.) which they bore. For Bodin, the placing of the
king's own image on his coinage smacked of vanity more than
anything else, but it is noteworthy that Philip made an appear-
ance here as an example of a sovereign who insisted in an inno-
vative fashion on his monetary prerogative. As it happens, Bodin
had nothing explicit to say about Philip's effect on Greek
coinages, but he did remark later on in his work that Philip sub-
jected to himself almost all of Greece. Given these two assump-
tions, it would be a simple matter to draw the inevitable conclu-
sion that Philip as sovereign of most of Greece insisted on his
prerogative over coinage there as well as in Macedonia.

By the time of Bodin, then, the idea had been established as a
commonplace of educated opinion that a ruler should insist on a
uniform monetary system for his own benefit and for the benefit
of his subjects. A scholarly consensus existed that only the

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14 Political philosophers after Bodin generally reflected his view on this ques-
tion. See, for example, Bernardo Davanzati, *Lezione delle monete* (presented
orally 1588, publ. 1638), in *Ecrits notables sur la monnaie, XVIe siècle. De Copernic
*De monetis et re nummaria libri duo* (Cologne, 1591), pp. 19–20, 734–745; Gem-
iniano Montanari, *Della moneta* (1687), in *Scrittori classici italiani di economia poli-
Theory before Adam Smith* (Cambridge, Mass., 1923), pp. 91–92. The influence
of Bodin is still felt. See, for example, Dominique Carreau, *Souveraineté*, p. 39:
"Avec ces divers auteurs et surtout Bodin la monnaie apparait définitivement
comme un attribut de la souveraineté. Elle s'inscrit donc dans la construction
sovereign should coin and that extreme measures were justified to prevent exceptions. When in the century after Bodin's classic doctrine of sovereignty had been established scholarly work began to be focused on Greek coinage, the view so persuasively argued by Bodin (and validated by the lessons of modern history above all) passed as part of the common wisdom of political philosophy. This assumption about sovereignty and coinage stood ready as a convenient and respectable aid for the investigation and interpretation of such an imperfectly understood and poorly documented subject as ancient Greek coinage. Numismatists and historians interested in ancient Greece, who otherwise found themselves very inadequately furnished with interpretative tools for their task, naturally found it comfortable to rely on this aid, even though it had come into being on the basis of evidence from other times.¹⁵ If we now turn to the case of Thessaly, we can see how this old assumption about sovereignty and coinage was used to solve the puzzle of the end of Thessalian coinage, thereby setting the stage for the use of the same assumption in other puzzling cases as well.

2
The Case of Thessaly

Historians of ancient Greece writing in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries disagreed on what Philip had done when he intervened in Thessaly. Some accepted the favorable interpretation of Philip's actions to be found in Diodorus, who reported that the Macedonian king made the Thessalians his friendly allies.¹⁶ Others, however, preferred the reports of Demosthenes

¹⁵ In the first modern handbook designed for historians interested in numismatic evidence, for instance, Charles Patin argued that the use of precious metals in coinage was denied to subject lands. See his Introduction à l'histoire par la connaissance des médailles (Paris, 1665), p. 6.

¹⁶ See, for example, Samuel Pufendorf, "De rebus gestis Philippi Amyntae F.," in Dissertationes Academicæ Selectiores (Lund, 1675), pp. 175–176; Charles Rollin, Histoire ancienne (Paris, 1740), vol. 3, pp. 477, 514; Abbé Gabriel Bom-
and Justin that Philip made himself the absolute master of Thessaly at the expense of Thessalian freedom.\(^{17}\) In fact, it was even argued that Thessaly so completely lost its political autonomy during Philip’s reign that the region was politically incorporated into the Macedonian kingdom. The definitive statement of this extreme view came in the work of the Scottish historian John Gillies. Justifying his interpretation by reference to the Third Philippic of Demosthenes, Gillies argued that “Philip finally settled the affairs of that distracted country; having taken on himself the whole management of the revenue, and having divided the territory into four separate governments, in order to weaken the force of opposition, and to render the whole province more patient and submissive under the dominion of Macedon.”\(^{18}\) Gillies summarized his view by saying that Thessaly was “reduced to a Macedonian province.”\(^{19}\) Strictly speaking, the word “province” in the first quotation might be understood only as a loose expression meaning “area” or “land,” but the second quotation reveals what Gillies truly meant to say: Thessaly became, in a political sense, part of the Macedonian kingdom. This view represented the ultimate extrapolation from Demosthenes’ account, and the words “Macedonian province” were to become almost a slogan in nineteenth-century scholarship on Philip and Thessaly. Although Gillies’ policy against citing secondary sources makes it uncertain whether this idea was original with

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\(^{19}\) Vol. 2, index, s. v. Thessaly (no page number).
him, his espousal of it certainly foreshadowed the common nineteenth-century assumption that Philip II in fact turned Thessaly into a Macedonian province.²⁰

Eight years after the publication of Gillies’ work, the great numismatist Joseph Eckhel stated in his monumental survey *Doc-trina Numorum Veterum* (Vienna, 1792–1798) that Thessaly lost its autonomous coinage when it became subject to Philip II, either as a result of the “impotence” of the cities or because its *jura* had been lost through a change in the form of government. Eckhel justified this statement by no explicit citation of either ancient sources or modern ones.²¹

Why, then, did Eckhel conclude that Philip’s intervention in Thessaly brought the end of local Thessalian coinage? If by “impotence” he meant only that the cities of Thessaly might have lacked the resources to continue minting coins, this was a reasonable guess about the potentially devastating economic and financial consequences of an invasion by a much stronger military power. Eckhel’s alternate explanation for the end of Thessalian coinage, however, depended on the unstated assumption that a change of government brought about by subjection to a

²⁰ Although Gillies prided himself on his knowledge of the ancient sources in general and of Demosthenes in particular, he disdained reference to contemporary scholarship. See vol. 1, preface, pp. vi–viii, vol. 2, p. 430. For Gillies, Philip was a monarch whose devouring ambition pushed him to the brink of tyranny over the “degenerate republics” of Greece. See his fascinating work *A View of the Reign of Frederick II of Prussia; with a parallel between that Prince and Philip II of Macedon* (Dublin, 1789).

²¹ Vol. 2 (1794), p. 132: “Ab eodem Philippo Thessalia Macedonibus servire coacta, ejus urbes sive per impotentiam, sive amissis per mutam reip. formam juribus cessavere signare monetam eo tempore, quo maxime monetae aeneae usus invaluit.” Eckhel referred only to Justin 7.6.7–9, for the view that Philip occupied Thessaly in order to add the Thessalian cavalry to his Macedonian army. Elsewhere Eckhel revealed that he had also read Demosthenes and Diodorus, as well as various modern historians reaching back to the sixteenth century, only some of whom he listed by name. See vol. 2, pp. 82, 88–95. He could well have known Gillies’ work. A German version of it was begun in Leipzig in 1787, and an English edition was published in Basel in 1790. In Eckhel’s own time, monetary unity between Austria-Hungary and most of the states of Germany had been mandated by international agreement. See Engel and Serrure, *Traité de numismatique moderne et contemporaine*, vol. 1, pp. 129–132.
king led to the end of local coinage. Eckhel, of course, did not decide between his alternate explanations, apparently because he felt unsure about the details of the historical situation which might explain the numismatic facts in the case of Thessalian coinage. Scholars who came after Eckhel, however, lacked his caution. They unequivocally made what had been for Eckhel one possible explanation of the end of Thessalian coinage in the fourth century B.C. the standard view on the subject.

About a century after the appearance of the *Doctrina Numorum Veterum*, Ludwig Müller explained the end of Thessalian civic coinage in line with Eckhel's second suggestion and added what was to become a commonplace in the scholarship to follow: Philip not only suppressed Thessalian coinage, he replaced it with his own royal coins minted at various locations throughout Thessaly. In other words, the king enforced a uniform, royal monetary system. This idea obviously also depended on the same unstated assumption about the relation between sovereignty and coinage as did Eckhel's second suggestion, but in this case the conclusion to be drawn about the historical situation was even more striking. Philip's intervention in Thessaly led to the introduction of an entirely new, foreign monetary system. Given the Greek tradition of minting numerous local coinages and of the circulation of different coinages in the same area, this enforcement of a uniform system of royal coinage would have been a radical innovation. With no apparent qualms about the probability of such a move by Philip, however, Müller

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22 That Philip reduced Thessaly to a state of formal subjection was the lesson taught by histories like that of Gillies, but none of these histories had said anything about the fate of Thessalian coinage under Macedonian rule.

23 Eckhel accepted the idea that cities which were subject to kings, if they were to mint any coins, could only issue coins of royal type. When they regained their autonomy, these cities would issue their own coins. See his remarks in *Doctrina*, vol. 1 (1792), p. LXXXI. He described the right of coinage as *pars autonomiae*. For his views on the right of coinage as a prerogative of sovereignty, see his discussion entitled *de jure feriundae monetae* in vol. 1, pp. LXX–LXXVIII.

24 Since Müller does not refer to Eckhel's views on Thessalian coinage, it is impossible to say whether he had been influenced by the work of his predecessor on this point.
constructed an elaborate scheme for the numismatic reorganization of Thessaly. As part of his exhaustive treatment of Macedonian royal coinage during the reigns of Philip II, Alexander, and Philip III, Müller identified the mints in Macedonia and in Greece where he imagined the issues of the Macedonian royal system had been struck. He was very clear about his method of identification. Since the coins bore numerous monograms, symbols, and letters, they must (he argued) have been minted in many different cities. Potential mint cities could be identified by determining which cities were in a relation of dependence to the Macedonian kings such that royal coins could have been struck there. The final step in identification of mints was to establish a correspondence between the results of this historical research and an analysis of the signs and symbols on the coins, which Müller assumed to be indications of the location of the respective mints. This process applied to the reign of Philip II as well as to those of Alexander and of Philip III.

Müller proceeded on the assumption that wherever the Macedonian kings exercised sovereignty, they must have suppressed local autonomous coinage in favor of their own royal coinage. Reasonably enough, Müller recognized that the Macedonian kings had not been able to achieve the same degree of effective sovereignty everywhere in Greece. For the reign of Philip II, for example, Müller postulated three gradations of Greek sovereignty ranging from the complete abolition of civic autonomy, with direct administration by Macedonian officials or supporters, to the retention of local autonomy with only formal recognition of the hegemony of the Macedonian king. Müller believed that Philip was in a position to have his own royal coins struck in any of the cities of Greece except those that retained local autonomy. In the process of identifying these royal mint cities, Müller placed the cities of Thessaly in the least-independent category. In his view, Philip overturned the constitutions of the free cities of Thessaly by dividing the country into tetrarchies, each governed by a separate administrator. Furthermore, Philip es-

25 Numismatique d'Alexandre le Grand suivie d'un appendice contenant les monnaies de Philippe II et III (Copenhagen, 1855), pp. 54–62, 362–363.
tablished dynastic governments in the individual cities which were entirely dependent on him and comparable to the hated Spartan decarchies. In this way, Thessaly lost its political independence and became a separate province under the Macedonian king. Therefore (and here the unstated assumption about sovereignty and coinage came into play), there could be no question but that Philip would have had his coins struck in at least some Thessalian cities.  

It is significant that Müller held the view that Thessaly became a Macedonian province under Philip II. He clearly took this idea from modern sources because all his references to ancient sources on this question concern periods later than the fourth century. He seems to have relied on the work of Wilhelm Wachsmuth in particular for the idea that Thessaly became, for all practical purposes including control of the monetary system, part of the kingdom of Macedonia.

Once he had accepted the modern idea that Thessaly became politically part of Macedonia, it was a simple matter for Müller to postulate that the cities of Thessaly were sufficiently dependent on Macedon so as to be forced to cease production of their own coins and to issue Macedonian coinage instead. He set out, therefore, to correlate the signs and symbols on certain Mac-

26 P. 366.

27 See his n. 22 on p. 366, for a reference to p. 65, n. 9, where he cites the following ancient sources: Polybius 4.76.2; Livy 34.1 (presumably an error for 34.51.3—6); and the list of the kings of Thessaly from the Armenian version of Eusebius, cited as Chronica I, 39 (sic). This last citation presumably refers to J. B. Aucher, Eusebii Pamphili Chronicon Bipartitum, Pars I (Venice, 1818), p. 339. This list will be discussed in chapter 6, where the appropriate references to the list of kings in the editions of the Chronica by Schoene and Karst may be found in n. 39. In his n. 21 on p. 366, Müller does refer to Demosthenes’ reports that Philip had enslaved Thessaly.

28 Hellenische Altertumskunde aus dem Gesichtspunkte des Staats ² (Halle, 1846), vol. 1, p. 715. Wachsmuth described Thessaly under Philip II and Alexander as “so gut als makedonische Provinz.” He knew of Gillies’ history, which he listed in his section “über Quellen und Hülfsbucher.” It was, however, Wachsmuth’s practice to minimize reference to secondary works in his narrative, with the result, as he himself stressed, that it would often be difficult for the reader to tell whether his views were original or not. See the preface to his first edition (1828), pp. xiv-xvi.
donian royal issues with similar types found on Thessalian autonomous issues. Finding such correlations in five cases, he identified Macedonian mints in Magnesia, Melitea, Lamia, Pharsalus, and Tricca. 29 In some instances Müller was clearly only clutching at straws. For example, the correlating symbol for the issue supposedly struck at Lamia was an amphora. Since Lamian autonomous silver coins had an amphora as the reverse type, Müller assumed that Macedonian coins featuring an amphora as an adjunct symbol would have been minted in Lamia because the amphora was the Lamian type par excellence. It apparently made no difference that contemporary Lamian bronze coins could have a completely different reverse type (Philoctetes in various postures), 30 or that the amphora was hardly an unusual coin type, as Müller himself admitted. This identification as a Macedonian mint seemed all the more certain because he believed that the city had been occupied by a Macedonian garrison under Alexander and served as headquarters for the Macedonian commander Antipater in the Lamian War against the Greeks after the death of Alexander. 31

The other identifications of Macedonian mints in Thessaly were on an equally slippery footing. For Melitea, Pharsalus and Tricca, Müller had nothing to go on but the symbols of a bee, a horse’s head, and a coiled serpent respectively, and even these correlations were less than perfect. Coins of Melitea indeed had a bee as reverse type, but they could also have a bull or a lion’s head. 32 Pharsalian coins had horsemen on the reverse as well as simple horses’ heads, 33 and in any case, the parts of a horse were common types almost everywhere. The Macedonian coins with the adjunct symbol of a coiled serpent were given to Tricca because that city’s coins had an Asclepius reverse type, which, however, never consisted of only a coiled serpent and was by no

29 Numismatique, pp. 182-189.
31 This identification as a garrisoned city came from J. G. Droysen, Geschichte des Heilensimus I: Geschichte der Nachfolger Alexanders (Hamburg, 1836), p. 65.
32 Head, HN, p. 301.
33 Head, HN, p. 306.
means the only civic type in use. For Magnesia, Müller could point to the report in Demosthenes of Philip’s fortifications there to support his identification based on the symbol of a prow. But this identification was only a measure of desperation because Müller could find no other city in Philip’s dominions with a prow symbol. Furthermore, the coins of Magnesia with the prow symbol were all considerably later in date than the reigns of Philip and Alexander. Finally, Müller’s system meant that the most important city of Thessaly, Larissa, had no mint at all under Philip.

Müller’s entire method of identification of Macedonian mints in Greece was unreliable at best, and his Thessalian mints were certainly not among the most plausible of his numerous identifications of mint cities. The evidence was simply much too vague. Nevertheless, his method of identification based on the adjunct symbols of Macedonian royal coins retained its scholarly respectability long enough to influence Percy Gardner in his standard work, the British Museum Catalogue of Greek Coins. Thessaly to Aetolia (London, 1883). Gardner concluded that “it is almost certain that the abrupt cessation of the issue of Thessalian money took place at the time of the termination of Thessalian autonomy in B.C. 344–2 . . . the probability is that any money issued in Thessaly during the latter half of the fourth century would be of the regular Macedonian types.” Gardner was plainly rephrasing in his own words the conclusions which Müller had used to establish a chronological peg for the end of fourth-century Thessalian coinage. The assumption of a close connection between sovereignty and coinage represented the basis of all these scholars’ views, whether they acknowledged it or not.

Barclay V. Head, Gardner’s close colleague at the British Museum for sixteen years, incorporated his friend’s work on

34 Head, HN, pp. 310–311.
35 Head, HN, p. 300. Cf. IGCH nos. 239, 306, 313, as corroboration of Head’s date (no earlier than the second century B.C.).
Thessalian coinage into his own great work, *Historia Numorum*. Head reported that the loss of autonomy was the reason for the end of local autonomous coinage and the imposition of Macedonian royal coinage, but he evidently considered this point to be so devoid of controversy that further explanation or reference was unnecessary. Müller’s identifications of so many mint cities made Head uneasy, but he went no further than to urge great caution. For present purposes, it is both ironic and telling that Gardner himself eventually went much further. By 1918 he had completely abandoned Müller’s results: “The subject of his [Alexander’s] mints from which coins were issued has not yet been systematically attacked since L. Müller wrote, half a century ago. Müller’s classification is quite out of date, and would not now be accepted by anyone.” In effect, Gardner had discredited Müller’s system, although he could not quite bring himself to abandon it completely, even in the face of his own arguments which demanded such a course. With admirable good sense he reasoned that “Philip’s coins are Macedonian only.” Suppression of local coinage he could accept, but there was no evidence he could see for Macedonian mints in Greece in Philip’s time.

Nevertheless, Gardner left open the possibility that Alexander’s coins might have been struck in civic mints by his permission. But he did not say whether complete suppression of local coinage had to precede the granting of permission to mint royal coins. The situation had become extremely muddled, but at least Müller’s work seemed to be dismissed. So, what of Thessaly? History came to the rescue. Since Thessaly had become part of Macedonia and ceased to be a Greek state, Gardner

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39 2nd ed., p. 244.
41 P. 427. Gardner believed that Philip’s policy in Thessaly reflected an awareness of the policy on the right of coinage of the Athenians in the fifth century B.C., as revealed by the famous Athenian Coinage Decree. The implications of this document will be discussed later in chapter 9.
42 P. 429.
found it still reasonable to continue to argue that Philip had suppressed Thessalian coinage.\textsuperscript{43} Even though Müller’s results had been spurned, his influence persisted. The perceived connection between sovereignty and coinage was so strong that it could survive even the demolition of a large part of the evidence Gardner himself had claimed in its support in 1883. The idea that Thessaly had become a Macedonian province overshadowed all other considerations, even at the risk of an inconsistent historical interpretation.

Heirs to Gardner’s position continued to appear among the scholars of the twentieth century. Fritz Herrmann used Thessaly’s alleged status as a Macedonian province in the usual way as a chronological peg to answer the very difficult question of when the fourth-century silver coinage of the important mint of Larissa ended.\textsuperscript{44} No reference was necessary. In the same casual way, the distinguished numismatist Ernest Babelon repeated Müller’s view on Thessalian coinage without acknowledgment.\textsuperscript{45} The same view appears much later in the second edition of Charles Seltman’s well-known book on Greek coinage.\textsuperscript{46} Not surprisingly, ancient historians in the twentieth century often adopted the same position as had their numismatic colleagues. The clearest application of Müller’s original bequest to Thessalian history came in H. D. Westlake’s \textit{Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.} (London, 1935). Although Westlake did not regard Thessaly as formally part of Macedonia under Philip II and was careful to say that Thessaly became “virtually a Macedonian province” which “retained the semblance of freedom without its substance,” he nevertheless added the following statement to his description of Philip’s actions: “Another indication of more stringent Macedonian control lies in the cessation of city-coinage, which was not revived until the end of the century. Nor did Philip introduce a tetrarchy-coinage, but in pursuance of

\textsuperscript{43} Pp. 354, 427.


\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Traité des monnaies grecques et romaines}, vol. 4 (Paris, 1926–1932), p. 213. This volume was edited posthumously in five fascicles by his son, Jean Babelon, but the views were those of his father. See the preface.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Greek Coins}\textsuperscript{2} (London, 1955), p. 161.
a general change in his monetary policy, he forced the Thessalians to use Macedonian coins. This humiliating measure may have caused some resentment, coinage being regarded as a symbol of autonomy, but it was endured with resignation.”47 That Westlake gave no reference for this view reveals his debt to the consensus of earlier scholarship. The argument had come full circle. The chronological terminus of Thessalian autonomous coinage, which had been established by reference to history, could now be used to establish the historical “fact” of the humiliation of the Thessalians by Philip.

Westlake’s picture of the fate of Thessaly and its coinage held the field until, in 1961, A. R. Bellinger called the attention of the International Numismatic Congress to the implications to be drawn from the composition of the hoard which is now IGCH 168.48 He suggested that the contents of this hoard of coins indicated that the autonomous coinage of at least one Thessalian city, Larissa, continued to be minted until approximately 325 B.C., although Philip had forbidden the other cities in Thessaly to mint their own coins. In other words, Bellinger recognized that the numismatic evidence could not support the assumption that Philip put an end to the coinage of Larissa, but he still found it reasonable to assume that the king would have wanted to suppress the coinages of other cities which were not, in Bellinger’s opinion, as closely allied with Philip as was Larissa. The old assumption about sovereignty and coinage was still implicitly at work, and it remained potent in the authoritative standard work on Greek coinage of this period by Colin Kraay. He essentially accepted Bellinger’s position by saying that Larissa was probably the only Thessalian mint still issuing silver coins in the period after 344 B.C. when Philip imposed “direct Macedonian rule.”49 Kraay’s reliance on the assumption that the

47 P. 204.

48 “The Thessaly Hoard of 1938,” in Congresso internazionale di numismatica Roma 1961: II Atti (Rome, 1965), pp. 57–60. In his Essays, p. 42, Bellinger suggested that it was no longer safe to assume that Philip’s coins had been minted anywhere except in Macedonia.

Macedonian king naturally suppressed Greek coinage where he could was further shown by his flat assertions that the installation of Philip's garrisons brought an end to the autonomous coinages of Ambracia and of Thebes.\textsuperscript{50}

The pervasive nature of the consensus which had been established regarding the close connection between sovereignty and coinage is illustrated even more clearly by the recent work of the ancient historians who reflect the views both of older and of contemporary numismatists. For example, N.G.L. Hammond, in the second edition of his \textit{A History of Greece to 322 B.C.} (Oxford, 1967), maintained the older view by stating that the cities of Thessaly ceased to issue their own coinages under Philip and used the coinage of Macedonia.\textsuperscript{51} In another historical survey from 1975, Claude Mossé repeated this view that Philip imposed the use of Macedonian coins on the Thessalians.\textsuperscript{52} Other historians have taken over the more recent numismatic opinion expressed by Bellinger and ceased to ascribe the responsibility for the end of all Thessalian coinage to Philip. J. R. Ellis, whose position represents the most comprehensive treatment of the subject by a recent historian, has argued that Larissa continued to mint silver during Philip's reign and that the Thessalian confederacy began to mint bronze at the same time. These coinages were suppressed, he has suggested, by Alexander \textit{ca.} 328/7 B.C.\textsuperscript{53} Marta Sordi and G. T. Griffith, however, have made Antipater responsible for the suppression of Thessalian coinage after the Lamian War of 323–322 B.C.\textsuperscript{54} Finally, Edith Schönert-Geiss has now reiterated the view that under Philip and Alexander the occupied Greek states were required to cease minting their own

\textsuperscript{50} Pp. 126 and 112–114, respectively.
\textsuperscript{51} P. 567.
\textsuperscript{53} Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism (London, 1976), p. 238.
coins and, in some cases, to produce Macedonian coinage instead.\textsuperscript{55}

By now it should be clear that all modern scholarship on this topic has been written under the unacknowledged influence of a very old, very strong, and quite unexamined preconception about sovereignty and coinage. Since the numismatic evidence now shows that Philip II was not the sovereign responsible for the end of civic coinage at Larissa, most scholars confine his role to the suppression of other Thessalian coinages. The responsibility for the end of the coinage of the major mint of Larissa is then to be shifted to a different Macedonian sovereign. In this process of historical interpretation, the idea that the Macedonian sovereign insisted on an exclusive monetary prerogative has remained strong in the scholarly consensus on the fate of Thessalian coinage. For this reason, the possibility has been overlooked that the situation in classical Greece might have been very different from that postulated as an ideal by Bodin. It is time to investigate that possibility, beginning with an examination of Thessalian coinage.

\textsuperscript{55} "Das Geld im Hellenismus," \textit{Klio} 60 (1978), p. 132.