SIX. THESSALY AND THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER

By 323, the good feelings produced in Thessaly by the return of the veterans from Alexander’s army with their money and their exciting stories about their daring commander had dissipated, to judge from the Thessalian reaction after Alexander’s death. At this point, it had been over a decade since the Thessalians at home in their own country had seen the elected leader of their confederacy. Following an Athenian lead (just what they had not done after the death of Philip), the Thessalians almost unanimously joined the Greek movement to destroy Macedonian control in Greece. The Athenians were in the lead because they had reason to fear imminent Macedonian action as a result of Alexander’s decision to restore Greek exiles.¹ The Athenians were very seriously affected by the decision because they stood to lose their possession of the island of Samos, which they had taken over after capturing it and banishing its inhabitants. The Athenians simply could not take the chance that Alexander’s successor might enforce the dead king’s order, and their choice to rebel is easy to understand. The choice of the Thessalians is not so obvious. Tricca, Pharadon, and Heraclea may have had an important group of men in exile for anti-Macedonian actions, and their return might have boded ill for those in the cities who

had stepped in to benefit from their absence. But we do not hear of any potential losses of property by the Thessalians to match the loss the Athenians faced, and perhaps the reasons for the Thessalian decision to rebel were not directly connected with the provisions of the edict on exiles but, rather, had to do with the history of political relations between Macedonia and Thessaly in the preceding thirty years.

First, the argument raised against Philip II long ago, that the Macedonian king in his capacity as leader of the Thessalian confederacy was receiving Thessalian revenues without using them on Thessalian affairs, had applied to Alexander with even greater force. As his father's successor at the head of the confederacy, Alexander had been receiving Thessalian funds from the time of his election in Philip's place. Although no source mentions the disposition of these funds once Alexander had left for Asia in 334 B.C., a good guess would be that Antipater continued to insist on their payment in Alexander's name throughout the king's reign despite the peaceful condition of Thessaly. If so, the dissatisfaction of the Thessalians at the time of Alexander's death would be easier to understand. They knew Antipater for the tough and unyielding character he was, and they probably suspected that he would still want their taxes even with Alexander dead. But Antipater himself had no legitimate claim at all to the leadership of the Thessalian confederacy because he was not related to Alexander. This fact is connected to the second reason for Thessalian feelings after the death of Alexander.

Since Alexander had left no legitimate heir behind in Macedonia and Philip III was absent in Asia (as would be Alexander IV), there was no one locally available whom Antipater could try to have installed as leader of the confederacy as a successor in the traditional Thessalian fashion which Alexander had exploited in succeeding Philip in this post. Both Philip and Alexander had come to Thessaly to be elected to the leadership of the

2 Diodorus 18.56.5. We do not know when these men were exiled. It could even have been after 323. Griffith, *HM*, p. 286, assumes Pharcadon and Tricca had been destroyed by Philip II, but Pharcadon is mentioned at Livy 31.41.8. This could mean either that the town was not obliterated by Philip or that it had been rebuilt by the late third century B.C.
confederacy. Since these great men had been careful to respect
the proper ritual for the election of a Thessalian leader, the Thes-
salians would have expected the same observance of Thessalian
custom from the less prestigious leaders left after the death of
Alexander. Form matters for those, like the Thessalians, to
whom only form remains after their inferiority in power has been
de facto institutionalized and the real ability to settle their own
fate has been taken from them. Any action Antipater might take
in Thessaly before a new Macedonian king was formally and
properly installed as the leader of the Thessalian confederacy
could only be construed as an attack on Thessalian nomos, and
that was all the Thessalians had left to be proud of and to fight
for. Antipater showed his intentions in this direction when he
demanded the service of the Thessalian cavalry in his army
marshalled to put down the rebellion of the Greeks to the south
which had been set in motion by the news of Alexander's death. 3
The Thessalians can have had no doubt that this dragooning
meant that Antipater intended to exploit them without even a
nod to the requirements of Thessalian nomos despite the prece-
dents established by Philip II and Alexander. This recognition
can only have outraged the Thessalians after thirty years of at
least ostensible Macedonian respect for local traditions in
government. A generation had grown up in Thessaly under the
arrangement which Antipater unilaterally canceled, and the price
for this abrupt change was going to be paid by both sides.

The Thessalians deserted Antipater's army to join the Greek
cause at the urging of the Athenians, and the result of the
conflict was especially disastrous for the deserters. The war was
largely fought in Thessalian territory. After his victory over the
Greek army at Crannon in Thessaly in 322 B.C. in the battle
which effectively finished the Greek revolt ignited by
Alexander's death, Antipater refused at first to make a common
settlement with all the various Greek states. Instead, he de-
manded separate negotiations for peace with each city. When

3 Hypereides, Epitaphios 13; Diodorus 18.12.3; Plutarch, Moralia 846E (Vitae
decem oratorum).
the Greeks refused, he began to sack cities in Thessaly in a campaign of terror. The tactics worked. Envoys arrived from the separate cities, whereupon Antipater granted all of them peace "on mild terms." This clemency completely undid the rebel alliance, and all the Greeks except the Athenians and the Aetolians soon came to terms with Antipater. This means that the Thessalians should be numbered among those who benefited from Antipater's new policy. Some of their cities had suffered grievous physical damage, and their territory had been exposed to the ravages of invading and occupying armies for two campaigning seasons. They had survived politically, however, thanks to a timely surrender.

It seems reasonable to think that the Thessalian confederacy was not abolished at this point to make way for some new arrangement formally subordinating the land to Macedonia as a kind of province. When the spoils of Alexander's empire had been divided at Babylon in 323 B.C., Antipater had been given Europe. Parts of Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus, and "all the Greeks" were listed as separate entities under his charge. The Thessalians were neither singled out for any special treatment nor differentiated from the other Greeks. It was unnecessary then to do away with the confederacy, and it was unnecessary a year later. Now, after the lessons just taught by Macedonian terror tactics, an attempt could be made to exploit the traditional links of the confederacy to Macedonian control of Thessaly in a new way by the general who could claim to act for the Macedonian kings in Greece, and that was Antipater. If his reorganizations of the democratic constitutions of other Greek states in favor of oligarchies are any indication, Antipater could have gotten what he needed in Thessaly simply by checking and then purging the roll of delegates who represented the various Thes-

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salian cities in the confederacy in order to ensure a pro-Macedonian selection was in office.\(^6\)

Whatever it was Antipater did in Thessaly, the Thessalians did not approve. After Antipater had conveniently left Europe for Asia, the Aetolians invaded Thessaly in 321 B.C. and convinced most of the Thessalians to rebel once again. But the commander whom Antipater had left behind in Macedonia, Polypetuchon, quashed the revolt in a very bloody battle in Thessaly and, according to Diodorus, “recovered Thessaly.”\(^7\) What this second revolt and “recovery” meant for the form and substance of Thessalian government we are not told. It is usually said that the outcome of the events of 322 and 321 B.C. meant the end of Thessalian independence.\(^8\) This generalization is perhaps true at the level of historical interpretation in the abstract, but it is hard to see how the situation in practical terms differed radically from that of Thessaly during the leadership of the confederacy by Philip and then Alexander. Macedonians were controlling Thessaly in, presumably, the manner most advantageous to themselves. It is perhaps conceivable that, for Antipater, advantage demanded that he abolish the confederacy. But he would have been in an excellent position to profit from the now longstanding connection between the leadership of the confederacy and the Macedonian throne once he had returned to Europe from Asia with the new kings in tow.\(^9\) At this point, Antipater could have seen to the formal acknowledgment of Philip III as leader of the confederacy in conformity with Thessalian nomos. (Alexander IV was only a baby, so the ticklish question of what to do with the second king could easily be sidestepped for now.) Since Antipater could control Philip, using him as a tool to exercise control over the Thessalians would have made sense. The

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\(^6\) For Antipater’s oligarchies, see Diodorus 18.18.4–8.


\(^9\) Diodorus 18.39.7. Antipater returned after the settlement at Triparadeisus, on whose date (321 or 320) see J. Seibert, Das Zeitalter der Diadochen (Darmstadt, 1983), p. 78.
exploitation of tradition was the best way to manage recalcitrant and sentimental Greeks.

By 319 B.C., Antipater was dead and Polyperchon had been elevated to the post of guardian of the joint kings Philip III and Alexander IV. In that year, Polyperchon in Macedonia publicized a royal edict which guaranteed to the Greeks, including the Thessalians, the forms of government they had enjoyed under the reigns of Philip II and Alexander.\(^\text{10}\) In fact, the edict claimed that this very guarantee had been extended shortly after Alexander’s death but had been sabotaged by the Greek revolt which “the generals” had quelled with, it had to be said, considerable harshness toward the cities. Now there was to be a return to the *status quo ante*. If Antipater had ever taken the trouble to decree the formal dissolution of the Thessalian confederacy, Polyperchon as royal guardian in 319 sanctioned its resurrection. Thessaly was not a part of the Macedonian kingdom. If the confederacy had been abolished at some point after the Lamian War (an action for which there is no direct evidence) and if civic coinage had also been suppressed at the same time, now they could both make comebacks. The mints of Thessaly could operate as they had under Philip II and Alexander.

For what it is worth, the evidence from outside Thessaly suggests that Antipater was not the man to make the sort of radical change in the Thessalian monetary system which suppression of the coinage of Larissa (and of any other operating Thessalian mint) would have meant. When the Athenians finally surrendered in 322, Antipater imposed an oligarchy, but he allowed everyone to keep his property.\(^\text{11}\) That permission is not consistent with the abolition of civic coinage, and the mint of Athens was not closed. In Corinth, Antipater maintained the garrison


\(^\text{11}\) Diodorus 18.18.4.
originally associated with the League of Corinth, but the civic mint of Corinth continued to produce local coinage as always. In Macedonia, Antipater apparently reinstituted the production of posthumous issues of Philip II to complement the production of posthumous issues of Alexander (and perhaps the lifetime issues of Philip III, the chronology of which is not precisely established). Whatever this extraordinary proliferation of types of royal coinage meant, it certainly recalled the situation in force under the two previous regimes. Coinage in Macedonia under Antipater overtly recalled the past in the time of Philip as well as that of Alexander. When Antipater became the official guardian of Alexander's successors, i.e., when he was in a position to gain from traditional arrangements which bolstered the power of the Macedonian throne, he had reason to see the past as the best guide to a successful future.

Even if these arguments cannot claim to prove that Antipater did not suppress Thessalian coinage, it cannot be denied that Polyperchon's edict of 319 would have sanctioned its revival, at least temporarily, had the Thessalians so wished. For the situation after 319, there is little to go on, but the scattered evidence from the early Hellenistic period nevertheless hints that the confederacy of the Thessalians did not disappear. If it survived, political tradition was alive in Thessaly. A live political tradition representative of the nomos of the Thessalians is not the context in which to look for the imposition of a uniform royal monetary system made possible by the suppression of local coinages in a region which was not a province of Macedonia. The evidence requires review.

Within a year or two of the publication of the edict, Polyperchon had apparently lost whatever influence he had in Thessaly because Cassander operated safely there against him on several occasions during the struggles which eventually ended with Polyperchon's acceptance in 309/8 B.C. of a subordinate position as

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Cassander’s ally. To seal the bargain, Cassander gave Polyperchon (among other things) five hundred Thessalian cavalry to use, a sure sign that Cassander controlled Thessaly. Whether any formal changes in Thessalian government followed on Cassander’s establishing himself as the dominant force in Thessaly we cannot know because no source tells us. By 312 B.C., Cassander had created a “general for Greece” whose job above all entailed overseeing the security of central Greece where Cassander’s interests were strong. The best guess is that this general was not concerned with the forms of local government and that confederacies such as the one in Thessaly were allowed to continue as convenient intermediaries between the Greek population and the Macedonian overlords and garrisons.

In 307 B.C., Demetrius Poliorcetes came to Greece from Asia “to free the Greeks” from Cassander’s domination. Thessaly was not one of the areas Demetrius liberated. Several years later, Demetrius, acting for his father, established a Hellenic League based in Corinth. When in 302/1 B.C. Demetrius led the allied forces of the new organization to the north to take on Cassander, the latter anticipated the attack by taking up a position in Thessaly. Cassander obviously felt he could count on support there and a secure line of communication to Macedonia, which means that Thessaly was still in his orbit. Demetrius made his move by capturing the city of Larissa Cremaste and some nearby settlements in Phthiotic Achaea. He then struck further north into the southern region of Thessaly proper. The city of Pherae had a Macedonian garrison, but Demetrius was able to take the city and to restore “freedom” to its population when the

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13 Diodorus 19.35.2, 19.36.1, 19.53.1, 20.28.3.
14 Diodorus 19.77.6.
17 See SVA III, no. 446.
19 For a recent discussion of the coinage which Larissa Cremaste is assumed to have begun to strike after receiving its “freedom” from Demetrius, see C. Heyman, “Achille-Alexandre sur les monnaies de Larissa Cremaste en Thessalie,” in Antidorum W. Peremans sexagenario ab alumnis oblatum (Louvain, 1968, Studia Hellenistica 16) pp. 115–125.
Pheraeans "called him in."\textsuperscript{20} It may not be an accident that the city which voluntarily gave itself up to Demetrius was the same city which had rebelled against the Thessalian confederacy led by Philip II and which had been garrisoned for that reason. Perhaps the Pheraeans (or at least those who found themselves outside the power structure of the government tolerated by Cassander, most likely an oligarchy like those favored by his father, Antipater) were hoping by their defection to Demetrius to escape from a confederacy dominated by Cassander in which they had little sway and large obligations. If so, they failed. When events in Asia made it necessary for Demetrius to leave Greece and his war of liberation not long after the restoration of freedom to Pherae, Cassander recovered the cities which Demetrius had "freed."\textsuperscript{21} Cassander had reached an agreement with Demetrius before the latter's departure for the East that all Greek cities would be left free, but Cassander evidently interpreted this commitment in the spirit of Alexander's orders to Craterus twenty years earlier: the freedom of the Greeks needed a Macedonian to look after it.

It would be difficult to argue that any of the successors of Alexander had a genuine commitment to the cause of Greek freedom, or at least any commitment that got in the way of their own aggrandizement. But some of them were very vocal about their loyalty to the cause, if only for purposes of public relations. Cassander, however, was not one of those who proclaimed his love for Greek freedom loud and often. In fact, the sham compact with Demetrius is the only evidence of any public stance on the issue by Cassander. Does this mean that he is a likely candidate for identification as a suppressor of local Thessalian coinage? Since he took over Thessaly from Polypерchon probably not long after 319 B.C., the \textit{terminus} of \textit{ca}. 320 B.C. for the coinage of Larissa could be compatible with suppression by Cassander. It is perhaps significant, nevertheless, that Cassander did not suppress local coinage in Athens, even though he clearly had the power to do so. In 317 B.C., Cassander reached an agreement with the

\textsuperscript{20} Diodorus 20.110.

\textsuperscript{21} Diodorus 20.111.1–2, 20.112.1.
Athenians which legitimized his control of the city. The terms show just how strict Cassander’s domination over these “friends and allies” was to be: a Macedonian garrison was to stay in the port until the end of the war with “the kings”; the city government was to be an oligarchy; Cassander would choose an Athenian suitable to himself as “ overseer” of the city.22 To call this freedom would be stretching a point. It is, therefore, instructive to notice the remaining stipulations of the pact: the Athenians could keep their city, their land, their revenues, their ships, and everything else. This certainly implies that the Athenians could continue to mint their own coins, and there is every indication that they did so.23

By 316 B.C., Cassander had taken charge of Alexander IV, the sole surviving legitimate successor of Alexander after the murder in 317 of Philip III by Olympias. He let the boy live, as a prisoner, until after the Peace of 311 B.C.24 Cassander himself seems to have assumed the title of king only after the assumption of the title by Antigonus and Demetrius in 306.25 Unfortunately, we are particularly ill informed on Cassander’s relations with the Thessalians. If he took any action to change traditional Thessalian government or coinage, we do not know about it. One late source, in fact, shows Cassander allowing traditional institutions to function as of old in this part of Greece. According to Quintilian, when the Thebans after the refoundation of their city by Cassander demanded repayment of a large loan from the Thessalians which Alexander had canceled after his capture of Thebes, the Amphictyonic council heard the case. In other words, Cassander did not, in this instance anyway, exercise direct jurisdiction even in a matter concerning the financial

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22 Diodorus 18.74.
23 There are no indications of an interruption in production (such as a change in types) in Athenian coinage of the late fourth century, and Athenian coins continue to appear in contemporary hoards.
well-being of a city in which he had a clear interest.\textsuperscript{26} It is also noteworthy that Cassander was conservative in his arrangements for Macedonian coinage during his rule. Precious metal issues continued just as before to carry the names and types of Philip and of Alexander. The name of Cassander was stamped only on bronze small change.\textsuperscript{27} There is nothing which speaks against the assumption that Cassander, like his predecessors, followed a \textit{laissez-faire} policy on Greek coinage, which is perhaps another way of saying that he had no discernible interest in the subject at all.

The history of the confederacy of the Thessalians in the last decades of the fourth century B.C. has been traced here as a guide to the actions of the Macedonian kings and commanders who controlled the region, in order to see if politics is likely to have had any direct and intentional effect on the right of the Thessalian cities to issue coins. In my opinion, no such effect is discernible. But perhaps the evidence is hidden from us. One final way to investigate the situation is to look for traces of a fourth-century policy of direct Macedonian interference with Thessalian coinage in the history of Thessaly in the third century. We must search for such traces by asking what, if any, reflection of fourth-century practice is to be found in the relationship between the Macedonian king and Thessalian government in the third century. There are a few scattered but important clues.

When in (probably) 294 B.C. Demetrius Poliorcetes left southern Macedonia after a visit with Alexander, the son of Cassander who had just recently come to the throne, the new king escorted

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Institutio oratoria} 5.10.111. This is not to say, of course, that Cassander could not have controlled or influenced the decision of the council.

\textsuperscript{27} Head, \textit{HN}, p. 228; C. Ehrhardt, "The Coins of Cassander," \textit{Journal of Numismatic Fine Arts} 2 (1973), pp. 25–32. When his brother Alexarchus founded a new city called Uranopolis in Macedonia, it issued a complete series of silver coins in typically Greek style with punning types of the universe and Aphrodite Urania. See Head, \textit{HN}, p. 206.; Martin Price, \textit{Coins of the Macedonians} (London, 1974), p. 18; M. Thompson, "The Cavalla Hoard \textit{(IGCH} 450)," \textit{ANSMN} 26 (1981), pp. 40–42. Since this was certainly a special case, given Alexarchus' apparently unbalanced condition and his status as the ruler's brother, it would not be legitimate to draw further conclusions from it about Cassander's attitude toward Greek coinages.
Demetrius as far as Larissa in Thessaly. Since Alexander suspected that Demetrius, a rival for his position as king, was actively plotting against him, his trip to Thessaly implies that Alexander felt relatively secure there. Otherwise he could have stayed in Macedonia. This detail is a hint that some special relationship still existed between the Macedonian king and at least the part of Thessaly dominated by Larissa.  

28 Subsequent events indicate that this relationship was probably in some sense a continuation of the traditional arrangement. Demetrius proved Alexander’s suspicion correct by murdering him in Larissa, whereupon Demetrius was recognized as their king first by the Macedonians of Alexander’s army, and then by the Macedonians at home after Demetrius’ triumphant return at the head of a unified army.  

29 After Macedonia (and, it must be emphasized, therefore not simultaneously), Demetrius “took possession of” Thessaly.  

30 Plutarch, our source, offers no details, but he implies that Demetrius “took possession of” Thessaly in much the same way as he became king in Macedonia, without a fight and with the “agreement” of the population. Whether the Thessalians were enthusiastic about the situation does not matter for the point at hand. If Demetrius did not “take possession of” Thessaly immediately upon assuming the kingship in Macedonia, the implication is that the leadership of Thessaly was not at this time automatically a part of Macedonian kingship.

There is every reason to think that Demetrius could have gotten all he needed from the Thessalians by perpetuating the relationship which Philip and Alexander had established (on the assumption that Cassander had not changed it). After all, he had imitated them with the establishment of his panhellenic league at Corinth. He could get Thessalian revenues, Thessalian cavalry, and an easy entry into Thessalian political affairs as leader of the confederacy.  

31 Nothing more was required. By now, it had been

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28 Plutarch, Demetrius 36.8—9.
29 Plutarch, Demetrius 36.10—37.
30 Plutarch, Demetrius 39.1: Δημήτριος δὲ μετὰ Μακεδόνιαν καὶ Θεσσαλίαν ἐν παρελθὼν.
31 The Antigonids later claimed to be related to the Argead line. See Müller, Antigonus, p. 115, and Bosworth, Commentary, p. 174 (on Arrian 1.29.3), on the idea of C. F. Edson, “The Antigonids, Heracles and Beroea,” HSCP 45 (1934),
sixty years since anyone other than the Macedonian king had served as leader of the Thessalian confederacy, except perhaps during the Lamian War, and most likely whatever limits of law or of custom there had originally been to the power of the leader had by now been eroded or forgotten. When Demetrius created a new city named after himself in Magnesia not long after he had “taken possession of” Thessaly, he could have argued that as leader of the confederacy he had a special responsibility and a special right to see to such matters in the interest of the confederacy. That Demetrius was able to include a city as important as Pagasae in his synoecism to form Demetrias, however, is a clue that he did not have to make arguments to get his way. All he had to do was to decide what he wanted. He had the power to enforce his wishes. E. T. Newell thought that one of the things Demetrius wanted was to mint some of his own royal issues in his new city, but this is far from certain. In any case, it has nothing to do with the fate of coinage in Larissa or the survival of the confederacy.

One of the things Demetrius had apparently not wanted to do was to put large military forces into Thessaly. This we know because Plutarch’s account of the struggles between Demetrius and Pyrrhus, his erstwhile supporter and now ambitious rival, shows that Pyrrhus overran Thessaly without any difficulty because Demetrius had not occupied the area with a large force. Strong garrisons came only after the invasion had been

\[\text{p. 226, that Antigonus Monophthalmus was actually related to the royal house. On the claim to be descended from Heracles, see Edson, “Perseus and Demetrius,” } \text{HSCP 46 (1935), pp. 191–202. This latter claim, if made already in the time of Monophthalmus, could have served to legitimize leadership of the confederacy, as it had done for Philip II and Alexander.} \]

\[\text{32 On Demetrias, see E. Meyer, } \text{Pagasai und Demetrias (Berlin, 1934), pp. 178–195; V. Milojčić and D. Theocharis, } \text{Demetrias I (Bonn, 1976, Beiträge zur ur- und frühgeschichtlichen Archäologie des Mittelmeer-Kulturraumes 12). Meyer argues (p. 187) that Demetrias lacked the right of coinage “zufolge ihrer Zugehörigkeit zu Makedonien” except for the “few years” of the rule of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Unfortunately, hoard evidence is lacking for the coins of Demetrius dated ca. 290 B.C. by Head, } \text{HN, p. 294, to which Meyer is referring.} \]

\[\text{33 The Coinages of Demetrius Poliorcetes (London, 1927), pp. 131–136.} \]
repelled.\textsuperscript{34} Evidently Demetrius had felt confident enough in his relationship with the Thessalians to do without such strongholds before. Thessaly was apparently a relatively peaceful place unless attacked by outsiders, another hint that the traditional arrangement between the Thessalians and the Macedonian king was still in effect. More trouble might have been expected and more garrisons might have been required if a new arrangement had been made by which the Thessalians were no longer even nominally independent under their own \textit{nomos} but were instead subjects of the king in the same way as the Macedonians.

Sometime in the early 280s B.C., Demetrius was displaced as Macedonian king by Pyrrhus.\textsuperscript{35} Again the meager details supplied by Plutarch are all we have. It appears that even though Demetrius had lost Macedonia, he still retained his influence in Thessaly. Only after Demetrius left Europe for Asia did Pyrrhus as king of Macedonia and on the advice of Lysimachus initiate his attempt “to bring about a revolt in Thessaly,” presumably by force of arms.\textsuperscript{36} This account implies that Demetrius had retained some tie to Thessaly (in addition to the garrison in Demetrias) which Pyrrhus had not automatically taken over when he became king in Macedonia. One could suggest that the tie was the leadership of the confederacy voted by the member cities of Thessaly, the by now customary fief of the Macedonian king but still something which was supposed to be acknowledged and conferred by the Thessalians. In other words, the confederacy still existed as a functional body, even if its function was only to rubber-stamp.

Plutarch does not explicitly say so, but Pyrrhus did take over control of Thessaly from Demetrius’ supporters. There was no one in Thessaly powerful enough to stop him.\textsuperscript{37} But what was Pyrrhus’ status in Thessaly? Modern scholars usually assume that he became “king of the Thessalians,” on the evidence of the list of “Kings of the Thessalians” preserved in the Armenian

\textsuperscript{34} Plutarch, \textit{Demetrius} 40.1–2.
\textsuperscript{35} Plutarch, \textit{Demetrius} 44; \textit{Pyrrhus} 11.
\textsuperscript{36} Plutarch, \textit{Pyrrhus} 12.8.
\textsuperscript{37} Only Demetrias was saved. See W. W. Tarn, \textit{Antigonos Gonatas} (Oxford, 1913), p. 102.
version of the first part of Eusebius’ *Chronicle*, the *Chronogr"aphia*. This chronologically arranged list consists of the Macedonian kings from Philip III to Philip V. The list is preceded by a prose summary entitled “Kings of the Thessalians” which begins with the statement that “for a long time the same ones who ruled over the Macedonians ruled over the Thessalians and the Epirotes.” A completely separate list entitled “Kings of the Macedonians” comes before the list entitled “Kings of the Thessalians.” The names are the same in both lists, but the numbers of regnal years assigned to each name do not agree in every instance. The implication is that these lists in some sense refer to different offices held by the same people.

Taken together, the list of “Kings of the Thessalians” and the accompanying prose summary are not evidence that the political relationship between the Macedonian kings and the Thessalians had changed after the death of Alexander the Great. The *Chronogr"aphia* has no independent value as historical evidence for constitutional change in Thessaly (or in Epirus, for that matter). In the first place, as we have seen, it was common for other Greeks to refer to the leader of the Thessalian confederacy as a “king.” A list of the “Kings of the Thessalians” could easily be a list of the leaders of the confederacy. If the relationship between the Macedonian king and the Thessalians had truly changed in a fundamental way so that the Thessalians were the subjects of the king in exactly the same way as were the Macedonians, one would expect, at the very least, to find evidence of a unitary kingship, not two separate kingships. If there were only one office, only one list would have been called for: the “Kings of the Macedonians and the Thessalians.”

Second, the format of the list preserved in the *Chronogr"aphia* prevents us from knowing what Eusebius’ source for the “Kings of the Thessalians” thought the relationship had been between the Macedonian kings and the Thessalians during the reigns of Philip II and Alexander the Great. For reasons which are not

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explained in the *Chronographia*, Eusebius changed his source for the chronology of Macedonian history after the death of Alexander. For the kings of Macedonia from Caranus, the founder of the royal line, to Alexander the Great, Eusebius seems to have relied on Diodorus, but he switched to the work of his contemporary Porphyry for the chronology of the Macedonian kings after Alexander (from Philip III to the end of the monarchy in the second century B.C.).\(^{40}\) The change of sources is at first glance odd because Porphyry probably relied on Diodorus for his information, and one can only assume that Eusebius, for some reason, found it more convenient to use Porphyry for all of Hellenistic Greek history.\(^{41}\) Perhaps Porphyry's work was more convenient because it was written specifically to deal with the history of the successors of Alexander, a well-known scheme for historical and chronological treatises from the Roman imperial period.\(^{42}\)

In any case, regardless of whether Porphyry was in fact Eusebius' source for the "kings of the Thessalians," there is a clear hint in the *Chronographia* that this source realized that the relationship between the Macedonian kings and the Thessalians which it was describing did not begin with Philip III. After an introduction, the prose summary entitled "Kings of the Thessalians" begins its record of the names of the various kings with the statement that "there ruled also over these after Alexander, Arhidaeus" (with the other names following).\(^{43}\) The "also" in this sentence suggests that Eusebius' source recognized that the political relationship between the Macedonian kings and the Thessalians did not begin with Philip III and that this source did not imply that any constitutional change had taken place in Thessaly at this point.\(^{44}\) The source simply happened to begin its

\(^{40}\) See the headings in Karst's edition, pp. 106, 109.


\(^{42}\) Arrian (\textit{FGrH} 156) and Dexippus (\textit{FGrH} 100) wrote monographs on "Affairs after Alexander."

\(^{43}\) Schöne, p. 241 (\textit{iterum}); Karst, p. 114 (\textit{wiederum auch}).

\(^{44}\) There is no indication in the *spatium historicum* of the Canons of the *Chronicle* that any constitutional change took place in Thessaly after the death of Alexander the Great.
chronology with the death of Alexander and therefore referred to the political status quo of that time. On the assumption that Porphyry was Eusebius’ source for the “Kings of the Thessalians” and that Porphyry in turn relied on Diodorus, it is easy to see how the notion that the Macedonians should be referred to as the “kings of the Thessalians” could find its way into the chronological tradition which Eusebius used. Diodorus had made this development possible by stating that Philip II “extended his rule” as a consequence of his victory in Thessaly.45 But, as we have seen, Philip II did not rule in Thessaly in his capacity as Macedonian king. He exercised authority in Thessaly in the traditional Thessalian way as leader of the confederacy, a position which the Greeks equated with kingship. Diodorus’ account of Philip’s actions in Thessaly did not reveal this crucial fact, which would account for the ignorance of it on the part of those who relied on Diodorus’ account for their own interpretations of the history of Thessaly in the fourth century and even later. The lists in the Chronographia support the idea that Thessaly did not become part of Macedonia, a “Macedonian province,” in the fourth or the third century B.C.

The other evidence for the relationship between the Thessalians and the Macedonian kings after Demetrius Poliorcetes supports the idea that the form of Thessalian government which came into being under Philip II and Alexander continued to exist at least formally long after 323 B.C. There is no direct evidence for the nature of the relations between Thessaly and the Macedonian kings Pyrrhus, Lysimachus, or Antigonus Gonatas, but Tarn thought that Pyrrhus’ dedication in the temple of Athena Itonia in Phthiotic Acakea (a deity whose favor the Thessalians traditionally cultivated) after a victory over Gonatas in Macedonia probably meant that Pyrrhus was claiming to be the head of the Thessalian confederacy.46 Since the Meno of Pharsalus who led the Thessalian cavalry in the Lamic War was

45 16.38.2: ηὐξηκὼς ἑαυτῷ τὴν βασιλείαν. The use of βασιλεία here, for example, could have helped to implant the idea that Philip became the king of the Thessalians, even though Diodorus was probably only using the word in the general sense of “rule” or “domination.”

46 Antigones Gonatas, p. 265.
Pyrrhus' maternal grandfather, the Epirote Pyrrhus could claim a kinship with the Thessalians which was considerably closer than the kinship with them which Philip and Alexander had traced through a shared divine ancestor. If Pyrrhus controlled Thessaly in the capacity of the leader of the confederacy instead of merely as the Macedonian king, his rivals and successors had reason to emulate his example in their dealings with the Thessalians by paying at least lip service to the tradition of the nomos of the Thessalians.\footnote{Later evidence reveals a tradition that Lysimachus' father was a Thessalian, the kind of connection which could have been exploited. This tradition is, however, generally rejected. See Helmut Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, 2 vols. (Munich, 1926), no. 480; I. L. Merker, "Lysimachos—Thessalian or Macedonian?" *Chiron* 9 (1979), pp. 31–36.}

Justin, echoing the language of his source Pompeius Trogus, says that Antigonus Doson "suppressed" the Thessalians when they rejoiced at the news of the death of Demetrius II in 229 B.C.\footnote{Justin 28.3.14 (confessuerit); prologue to book 28 (subiecit). \footnote{4.9.4. Cf. 2.54.4–5. Polybius' reference to the Thessalians as allies is consistent with the assumption that the Macedonian king served as the leader of their confederacy. Cf. Demosthenes' reference to Philip II as the "ally" of the Thessalians (9.12). Polybius' terminology may, however, only indicate the status bestowed by inclusion in the Hellenic League which Doson formed.}} That Doson had to act in Thessaly as the result of the death of a Macedonian king implies that some special relationship still existed between the Thessalians and the king. Justin naturally assumes that Doson then went on to rule the Thessalians as their king, in the same way Demetrius II had. But the evidence of Polybius shows that the Thessalians were the allies of Doson (and so perhaps had been the allies of Demetrius II as well), not his subjects.\footnote{Polybius 11.5.4.} The same relationship continued between the Thessalians and Doson's successor in 221 B.C., Philip V.\footnote{Justin 28.3.14 (confessuerit); prologue to book 28 (subiecit).} It is an important point that the Thessalians were, properly speaking, allies of Philip V, and not his subjects, because we can glimpse from the literary and epigraphical sources just how intrusive the king's influence was in Thessalian affairs. The Thessalians meant more to Philip than did any of his other allies, thanks to their strategic location on his southern flank and to the
long tradition of Macedonian hegemony over their confederacy. As in Macedonia, certain local officials in Thessaly reported to him (or were supposed to do so, in any case).

A well-known inscription from Larissa demonstrates Philip’s concern for and power over important local matters. After hearing the report of the city’s ambassadors, Philip instructed the Larissaeans to pass a decree extending citizenship to qualified individuals. When the locals later tried to revoke the grants, he again intervened politely but firmly to have the disenfranchised citizens reinstated. In his letters to Larissa, Philip calls himself simply “king.” This was his most important title, the one by which he was of course known in Macedonia, from where he sent the letters. By this time late in the third century B.C., “king” was the title which Philip and his royal colleagues elsewhere in the Hellenistic world used routinely in their letters, regardless of the status of those with whom they were corresponding. In the case of Thessaly, the tenure of the Macedonian kings as the leaders of the national government for well over a century perhaps meant that after such a long time no one much cared anymore whether the leader was called “king” or “tagos.” There is, in any case, no evidence that the confederacy had disappeared in favor of some

51 Livy 32.10.7–8. Cf. 32.10.4.
54 As one can see, for example, from the collection of royal letters in C. B. Welles, Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period: A Study in Greek Epigraphy (London, 1934). The Macedonian material is collected by R. M. Errington, “Macedonian ‘Royal Style’ and Its Historical Significance,” JHS 94 (1974), pp. 20–37.
arrangement which made Thessaly just another part of Macedonia and therefore part of the kingdom.\textsuperscript{55}

The continuing existence of the confederacy in the third century would be certain if we could be sure that Mario Segre’s date in that period is correct for the Hellenistic inscriptions which show the confederacy of Thessalian cities making decisions as a federal body.\textsuperscript{56} But even without the testimony of these epigraphical texts, we can infer the persistence of the traditional form of Thessalian national government in this era from the words of Polybius (4.76.2). He describes the status of Thessaly early in the reign of Philip V as follows: “The Thessalians seemed to be governed according to their own laws and to differ greatly from the Macedonians, but there was no difference; in every way they experienced the same things as the Macedonians, and they did everything which the king’s men ordered.” The reality of life in such a situation for the Thessalians and those who came into the same circumstances could be very harsh, as Polybius goes on to suggest, and there was no doubt that the king controlled Thessaly. But the appearance of normal government continuing as usual, which Polybius presents as the façade masking royal power, is the point on which we must focus our attention. The “\textit{nomos} of the Thessalians” was formally preserved.\textsuperscript{57} Tarn put it well: “The Thessalians can hardly have exercised any free choice in the appointment of Macedonian


\textsuperscript{56} “Grano di Tessaglia a Coo,” \textit{Rivista di filologia} 12 (1934), pp. 169–193. Larsen, \textit{GFS}, p. 281, assumes the confederacy continues in the third century. Cf. the federal decree for judges from Teos (\textit{Bulletin épigraphique} 1973, 240), which should date to the third century because the year is not given by reference to a \textit{strategos}, as it would be after 196 B.C.

kings as presidents of their League; but no doubt all forms were observed."\(^{58}\)

The evidence for the status of Thessaly in the third century B.C. has been reviewed in order to make clear that, just as in the fourth century, there is no identifiable point in the history of the region during the early Hellenistic period at which it makes sense to assume that Thessalian local coinage came to an end for political reasons. If all indications are that the form of traditional Thessalian government endured on the national level under Macedonian domination, then it makes no sense to assume that the Macedonian kings infringed on Thessalian \textit{nomos} in the area of coinage by closing local mints. There simply is no evidence that the answer to the question of what caused the end of Thessalian coinage lies in the realm of political history. Another solution to the puzzle has to be found.

\(^{58}\) \textit{Antigonos Gonatas}, p. 207.